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ABSTRACT 
 
Income inequality in America has increased substantially since the early 1980s. Although 
sociological theory suggests an important impact for social classes on recent changes in income 
distribution, prior research has largely ignored the link between class structure and growing 
aggregate income inequality. This study delineates a theory of class based on antagonistic social 
relations within the workplace and investigates the relationship between class structure and 
trends in aggregate income inequality from 1983 to 2010. The proposed theory defines four 
distinct class positions based on unequal ownership and authority relations within production: 
workers, who are excluded from the means of production and do not control the activities of 
others; proprietors, who own the means of production and control the activities of workers; 
managers, who do not own the means of production but have delegated control over the activities 
of workers; and independent producers, who own and operate small firms by themselves. These 
positions are called class positions because unequal ownership and authority relations are 
thought to engender intergroup conflict between those with and without property and authority in 
production. 
Growth in aggregate income inequality is affected by (1) changes in between-class 
income differences, (2) compositional changes in the relative size of different classes, and (3) 
changes in residual, or within-class, income dispersion. With data from the General Social 
Survey and the Current Population Survey, this study investigates each of these trends in turn 
and provides a formal decomposition that evaluates their relative impact on growth in aggregate 
xv 
 
income inequality. Results indicate that between-class income differences increased by at least 
50 percent since the 1980s. This increase was driven by growing incomes for managers and 
especially proprietors together with stagnating incomes for workers. Results also indicate that, 
since the mid-1980s, the proportion of workers and independent producers increased, while the 
proportion of proprietors and managers declined. Finally, a formal decomposition analysis 
suggests that changes in the relative size of different classes had a small dampening effect and 
that growth in between-class income differences had a large inflationary effect on trends in 
aggregate income inequality, particularly during the 1990s. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
The distribution of personal income in the United States has become substantially more 
unequal since the early 1980s, reversing a general trend of declining inequality that dates back to 
the 1930s. During the 1980s, incomes in the lower half of the distribution stagnated and then 
declined, while incomes at the top of the distribution increased. These trends largely persisted 
during the 1990s, as incomes in the lower tail of the distribution continued to decline and 
incomes at the top of the distribution increased rapidly. During the 2000s, incomes in the lower 
part of the distribution ceased declining but did not rebound from the losses of previous decades, 
while top incomes continued their rapid ascent (McCall and Percheski 2010; Morris and Western 
1999; Piketty and Saez 2003; Piketty and Saez 2006; Ryscavage 1999). 
These trends have been variously described as “the most important problem that we are 
facing now today” (Christoffersen 2013), “the defining challenge of our time” (Kuhnhenn 2013), 
and “one of the most spectacular social developments in the recent history of the United States” 
(Weeden, Kim, Di Carlo, and Grusky 2007). Greater income inequality is thought to have a 
number of negative economic, social, and political consequences. It is associated with lower 
levels of trust, empathy, cooperation, and civic engagement; lower levels of health and 
psychological well-being; higher levels of property crime and violence; and higher risk of 
financial crises (Braun 1991; de Vries, Gosling, and Potter 2011; Elgar 2010; Kumhof and 
Ranciere 2010; Lederman, Fajnzylber, and Loayza 2002; Pickett and Wilkinson 2011). 
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Theory suggests that an individual’s position within the social relations of production—
that is, an individual’s position within the ownership and authority structure of an economic 
organization—is a central determinant of income in modern industrial societies (Dahrendorf 
1959; Marx 1978; Proudhon 1994; Proudhon 2011; Robinson and Kelley 1979; Weber 2008; 
Wright 1979; Wright and Perrone 1977). At a simple level, there are four distinct positions 
defined by unequal ownership and authority relations in the workplace: workers, who are 
excluded from the means of production and do not control the activities of others; proprietors, 
who own the means of production and control the activities of workers; managers, who do not 
own the means of production but have delegated control over the production process and the 
actions of workers; and independent producers, who own and operate small firms by themselves 
(Robinson and Kelley 1979; Wodtke 2013; Wright and Perrone 1977). These positions are called 
class positions because unequal ownership and authority relations are thought to engender 
intergroup conflict between those with and without property and authority in production. They 
are linked to the distribution of income through supply and demand for different factors of 
production, economic rents that emerge from market distortions and incentive problems, and the 
balance of intergroup bargaining power in the political conflict over division of net output 
(Proudhon 2011b; Wright 1979; Wright 1985). 
Despite the centrality of classes and class conflict in sociological theories of income 
distribution, they have not played an important role in empirical attempts to explain recent 
growth in aggregate income inequality. Prior studies of trends in population-level income 
inequality have instead focused on the effects of disaggregate occupations (Kim and Sakamoto 
2008; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010), skill-biased technical change and increasing returns to 
education (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Juhn 1999; Lemieux 2006), institutional change and 
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its impact on low wage workers (Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2004; DiNardo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux 1996), and demographic shifts (Borjas 1994; Easternlin 1980). No definitive 
explanation for recent changes in aggregate income inequality has emerged from this extensive 
volume of research on growing inequality, and most prior models of distributional change leave 
substantial room for improvement (McCall and Percheski 2010; Morris and Western 1999). 
Although prior studies of class structure and the personal distribution of income are rare, 
several studies investigate changes in the functional distribution of income using national 
accounts data and find that the labor share of income has declined relative to the capital share 
since the early 1980s (Elsby, Hobijn, Sahin 2013; Kristal 2010, 2013; Lin and Tomaskovic-
Devey 2013).
1
 In addition, prior studies of executive compensation reveal a pattern of strong 
earnings growth for managers throughout this period (Frydman and Jenter 2010; Goldstein 
2012), and research on economic elites at the very top of the distribution indicates that earnings 
from financial investments have become an increasingly important source of income for this 
group in the past two decades (Nau 2013; Volscho and Kelly 2012). Taken together, these 
                                                          
1
 The personal distribution of income shows how income, regardless of its source, is divided between individuals, 
while the functional distribution of income shows the division of payments between the productive factors of labor 
and capital. Although it is frequently interpreted as a measure of class inequality or even aggregate income 
inequality, the functional distribution of income is a poor measure of both of these concepts for several reasons. 
First, as a measure of aggregate income inequality, the functional distribution is limited because it contains no 
information about the distribution of factor income across individuals, meaning that stability or change in the 
aggregate payments to different factors of production need not translate into stability or change in the personal 
distribution of income. Indeed, the decline in labor’s share over the past several decades has been more pronounced 
in countries with slow growth in aggregate income inequality and less pronounced in countries with rapid growth in 
aggregate income inequality (Kristal 2010). Second, as a measure of class inequality, the functional distribution is 
limited because it includes all salaries, benefits, and bonuses paid to firm executives in the labor share. This is 
problematic not only because managers are thought to occupy a class position distinct from that of non-managerial 
production workers but also because many of these executives are majority shareholders—that is, capitalists—and 
isolating the components of their income that accrue to labor versus capital is fundamentally ambiguous. This is 
especially troubling in the U.S. because owner-executives of C-corporations, one of the most common corporate 
legal structures in this country, are incentivized to withdraw money from their company in the form of salaries, 
benefits, and bonuses, rather than dividends, in order to avoid double taxation at both the corporate and individual 
level. More detailed analyses of labor’s share show that it has been “buoyed up” over time by large compensation 
payments to executives and managers, many of whom likely own part or all of the business they operate, indicating 
that these measurement limitations may result in a serious understatement of growth in class inequality as indicated 
by changes in the functional distribution of income (Elsby, Hobijn, Sahin 2013). 
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studies suggest a potentially important relationship between class structure and growing 
aggregate income inequality, but they do not link well-defined class typologies based on 
ownership and authority relations to long-term growth in the dispersion of personal incomes nor 
do they even provide a precise accounting of how the particular trends mentioned here 
contributed to growth in income inequality at the population level. For example, because 
increases in inequality among labor incomes dwarf the decline in labor’s share, it remains 
unclear whether movements in the functional distribution of income had an appreciable impact 
on changes in aggregate income inequality (Elsby, Hobijn, Sahin 2013). 
Several other studies have directly linked growth in aggregate income inequality to class 
typologies defined in terms of large occupational groups with similar employment contracts, skill 
requirements, job tasks, and career trajectories (Morgan and Cha 2007; Morgan and Tang 2007; 
Weeden, Kim, Di Carlo, and Grusky 2007). These occupational class typologies, however, have 
only a tangential link to property and authority relations in production. The few empirical studies 
of personal income distribution that explicitly model the returns to ownership and authority rely 
exclusively on cross-sectional data that predate the recent increase in inequality (Halaby and 
Weakliem 1993; Kalleberg and Griffin 1980; Robinson and Kelley 1979; Wright 1978; Wright 
1979). As a result, previous research provides little to no information about the link between 
social relational classes and growth in aggregate income inequality since the early 1980s. 
Not only has the concept of social class—defined in terms of ownership and authority in 
production—been largely ignored in empirical research on trends in aggregate income inequality, 
it has also recently come under attack as a number of social scientists increasingly question its 
relevance to modern systems of social stratification (Clark and Lipset 1991; Nisbet 1959; 
Pakulski and Waters 1996; Pakulski 2005). According to post-class theory, the link between 
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class structure and patterns of inequality has declined over time. Class divisions may have been 
important historically, but in postindustrial society, class is no longer a salient explanatory 
category, and other social distinctions, such as those based on race, gender, and citizenship, are 
now the primary determinants of group-based inequality (Pakulski 2005). Although the strong 
claims of post-class theorists have elicited spirited rebuttals reasserting the contemporary 
importance of class divisions (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993; Wright 1996), neither side of this 
debate provides a rigorous empirical assessment of long-term trends in material inequalities and 
their link to class structure. 
This study posits that a class-analytic theory based on property and authority relations 
within production can provide an improved understanding of growth in aggregate income 
inequality since the early 1980s. The theoretical framework guiding this analysis is closely 
informed by anarchist and neo-Marxist theories of the dynamics of capitalism and class conflict 
(Proudhon 2007; Wodtke 2013; Wodtke 2014; Wright 1979; Wright and Perrone 1977).
2
 Briefly, 
it posits that changes in technology, the competitive environment, and the scope of class political 
mobilization have led to a substantial increase in between-class income differences and a 
comparatively modest change in the relative size of different classes. Widespread adoption of 
labor-displacing technologies (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Bluestone and Harrison 1982), 
growing monopolization (Foster, McChesney, and Jonna 2011; Lynn 2011), heightened capital 
mobility (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Harrison and Bluestone 1988), and escalating political 
activism on the part of large businesses (Dumenil and Levy 2004a; Useem 1984) are thought to 
                                                          
2
 Few social theories have been as disputed, confused, and misunderstood as anarchism. In popular discourse, the 
term anarchism is often haphazardly equated with chaos or disorder, while in the Marxist tradition, anarchist theory 
is frequently misrepresented as solely a critique of the state (McKay 2011; Schmidt and van der Walt 2009). In fact, 
anarchism contains a coherent social theory with an elaborate and incisive analysis of the causes of economic 
inequality, the most important of which are thought to be property, authority, and the conflict generated by these 
antagonistic social relations. 
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have substantially undermined the bargaining power of workers, and consequently, the benefits 
of economic growth are thought to have become more unevenly distributed, shifting heavily 
towards a shrinking group of high-earning proprietors and managers.  
Growth in aggregate income inequality is governed by (1) changes in between-class 
income differences, (2) compositional changes in the relative size of different classes, and (3) 
changes in residual, or within-class, income dispersion. This study investigates each of these 
trends in turn and provides a formal decomposition that evaluates their relative impact on growth 
in aggregate income inequality. Results from the General Social Survey (GSS) and the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) indicate that income differences between classes grew substantially 
throughout the period from 1983 to 2010. Estimates from a novel semi-parametric regression 
method that adjusts for the potentially confounding influence of measured skills, social 
background, and demographic characteristics indicate that mean income differences between 
classes increased by at least 50 percent since the 1980s. Growth in between-class income 
differences was driven by rapidly increasing incomes for managers and especially proprietors 
together with stagnating incomes for workers. Quantile regression analyses further indicate that 
these divergent trends primarily reflect strong income growth among the highest-earning 
proprietors and managers, and estimates based on more discriminating gradational measures of 
property and authority suggest that the incomes of proprietors in control of large businesses and 
managers near the top of organizational hierarchies grew considerably faster than those of their 
counterparts who own smaller businesses and have less extensive control over production 
operations. With respect to compositional changes in the relative size of different classes, results 
indicates that, since the mid-1980s, the proportion of workers and independent producers 
increased modestly, while the proportion of proprietors and managers declined slightly. 
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A formal decomposition analysis suggests that these between-class and compositional 
changes had a large inflationary effect and a small dampening effect, respectively, on trends in 
aggregate income inequality, particularly during the 1990s. Although growth in residual, or 
within-class, income dispersion consistently had the largest inflationary effect, growth in 
between-class income differences explains 10 to 20 percent of the overall increase in aggregate 
income inequality since the early 1980s. Additional analyses of more specific time periods 
indicate that between-class effects may explain as much as 30 percent of the increase in 
aggregate income inequality during the 1990s, and analyses that take account of  gradational 
distinctions in property and authority put this figure as high as 50 percent. 
This study extends previous theory and research on income inequality in the United 
States by outlining a class-analytic theory of recent changes in personal income distribution and 
testing several key implications of this theoretical framework with time-series data from two 
nationally representative surveys. Its findings suggest that class-analytic theory remains essential 
for understanding contemporary patterns of social stratification and that models of class based on 
property and authority relations within production capture changes in the distribution of personal 
income that are obscured by models based only on human capital, demographics, or occupations. 
It extends previous research on executive compensation and changes in the functional 
distribution of income by integrating these trends within an individual-level model of earnings 
and providing a precise accounting of their impact on growth in personal income inequality at 
the population level. 
In the sections that follow, Chapter II reviews the current debate on trends in aggregate 
income inequality, and Chapter III summarizes and critiques extant sociological theories of class 
structure. Next, Chapter IV outlines the theoretical foundations of the class typology guiding this 
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analysis, and Chapter V describes competing theories of the underlying mechanisms, such as 
technological development and market competition, that are thought to generate changes in class 
structure and class inequality. Then, Chapters VI, VII, and VIII test the competing predictions of 
these theories by estimating changes in between-class income differences and changes in the 
relative size of different classes, and by decomposing growth in aggregate income inequality to 
evaluate the impact of these trends. Chapter IX concludes with a discussion of key implications 
for theory, future research, and policy. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Debate on Growing Income Inequality 
 
Prior to the 1970s, income tax data reveal a general trend of declining inequality since the 
beginning of The Great Depression (Piketty and Saez 2003; Piketty and Saez 2006). Between 
1950 and the 1970s, median real earnings nearly doubled and gains in the lower quartile of the 
distribution were equally dramatic. However, in the mid-1970s, growth in median income 
stagnated, and in the 1980s, real incomes began to decline for a substantial part of the 
population. At the same time, incomes at the top of the distribution, and especially among the top 
one percent of earners, continued to grow. This trend accelerated in the 1990s and 2000s, and the 
resulting increase in aggregate income inequality has continued right through the most recent 
period for which data are available (McCall and Percheski 2010; Morris and Western 1999; 
Piketty and Saez 2003; Piketty and Saez 2006; Ryscavage 1999). 
Although the empirical literature is saturated with descriptions of recent changes in 
income distribution, they are not without limitations. One problem is that estimates frequently 
focus only on employed individuals and exclude the self-employed (e.g., Card and DiNardo 
2002; Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010), a diverse group which 
includes freelancers, independent contractors, limited partners, small business owners, and even 
large employers. That is, many recent studies of income distribution exclude those who own the 
means of production, potentially concealing an important dimension of growing aggregate 
inequality. Although they make up a relatively small proportion of the population, if the earnings 
 10 
 
of the self-employed are markedly different from those of employed individuals, estimates of 
growth in aggregate income inequality may be understated. Despite these limitations, the 
empirical record clearly indicates that the distribution of income underwent a remarkable 
polarization over the past several decades. 
 
Supply-side Theories 
Explanations for changes in income distribution are primarily based on neoclassical 
economic theory, which contends that changes in labor supply and demand are driving the recent 
increase in inequality. The first set of explanations for growing inequality focuses on changes in 
the demographic composition of the labor force. According to this perspective, the decline in real 
incomes at the lower end of the distribution was due to an influx of low-skill workers to the 
American labor force during the 1970s and 1980s. 
One variant of the shifting labor supply argument attributes declining real incomes to 
high fertility following World War II. As large baby-boom cohorts entered the labor force, the 
supply of young, inexperienced workers increased, and this is thought to have exerted downward 
pressure on wages and increased the income returns to experience (Easternlin 1980). A number 
of studies, however, indicate that the baby boom had little impact on growing inequality. First, 
baby boom cohorts entered the labor force between 1960 and 1970, well before the major decline 
in real wages (Morris and Western 1999). Second, although there is some evidence of rising 
returns to experience (Bloom, Freeman, and Korenman 1987), studies indicate that the growth in 
earnings inequality was substantially greater within experience groups than between them 
(Dooley and Gottschalk 1982). Finally, studies of the labor market impact of declining fertility 
following the baby boom, which would be expected to raise the wages of young and 
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inexperienced workers, indicate that these later cohorts are comparatively worse off than baby 
boomers at similar points in their work careers (Schrammel 1998). 
A second supply-side demographic explanation for growing inequality contends that the 
massive increase in female labor force participation between 1950 and 1990 depressed incomes 
for workers at the lower end of the distribution. The rapid influx of female workers with low 
levels of experience is expected to drive down wages for comparable low-wage workers and thus 
increase aggregate income inequality. Research on occupational sex segregation has 
demonstrated that there are separate labor markets for men and women (Reskin 1993), so 
according to supply-side logic, increases in female labor force participation should depress 
wages among female workers relative to men. Earnings data, however, show a notable 
convergence between the wages of male and female workers since the 1970s (Bernhardt, Morris, 
and Handcock 1995; Blau and Kahn 1994). And, while women were moving closer to wage 
parity with men, income inequality also increased substantially among both male and female 
workers (Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock 1995). 
A third demographic explanation for rising income inequality posits that high volume 
immigration of Latino and Asian workers is responsible for declines in real wages among low-
skill workers (Borjas 1994; Borjas 2003). Most empirical studies of the association between 
immigration and wage rates among native-born workers have failed to support this hypothesis. 
Metropolitan-level data consistently show no association between immigration and local wages 
(Altonji and Card 1991; LaLonde and Topel 1991), and a natural experiment examining the 
impact of changes in local migrant stock on the labor market prospects of native workers also 
failed to reveal appreciable effects of immigration on wages (Card 1990). Studies based on 
spatial variation in immigrant stock, however, may yield biased estimates of the labor market 
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impact of immigration because immigrants are drawn to metropolitan areas with thriving 
economies and native workers can themselves migrate in response to immigrant job competition 
(Borjas 1994). These confounding factors potentially obscure harmful effects of immigration on 
the earnings of native workers. Several studies that attempt to overcome these problems find a 
nontrivial impact of immigration on the wages of poorly educated native workers, where 
conservative estimates indicate that about 10 percent of the decline for this group can be 
attributed to immigration (Borjas 2003; Borjas 2006). 
 
Demand-side Theories 
Another set of explanations for rising income inequality focus on shifts in labor demand. 
The most prominent demand-side explanation for growing earnings inequality claims that the 
introduction of new technologies, such as automation and especially personal computers, has 
increased demand for analytical skills while simultaneously displacing large numbers of manual 
and service workers (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Bound 
and Johnson 1992; Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993). Because workers with higher levels of 
education are thought to have their relative productivity raised by the introduction of computers, 
the well-documented increase in the income returns to education is frequently cited as evidence 
of skill-biased technical change (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Juhn 1999). In addition, 
empirical studies find that workers who use computers on the job earn higher wages than 
comparable workers who do not use computers (Krueger 1993), that educated workers are much 
more likely to use computers on the job (Card and DiNardo 2002), and that occupation-based 
measures of skill reveal increasing demand for abstract reasoning abilities and declining demand 
for routine manual skills (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003). 
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Although some empirical patterns in earnings and employment data are consistent with 
the skill-biased technical change hypothesis, other findings are difficult to reconcile with this 
perspective. First, studies that have examined the income trajectories of workers with advanced 
qualifications in destination occupations thought to require advanced analytical skills, such as 
engineers and computer scientists, have found that wages have been stagnant for these highly 
technical positions (Card and DiNardo 2002). Second, the evidence of a causal link between 
higher wages and computer use at work is highly disputed (DiNardo and Pischke 1997). Third, 
technical change linked to computerization has been ongoing since at least the 1970s, but 
evidence indicates that the rate of technical change did not truly accelerate until later in the 
1980s, well after a pronounced increase in income inequality (Card and DiNardo 2002). Finally, 
trends in income inequality are not uniform across different industrialized nations that have 
similar levels of computerization and automation. Thus, the empirical record indicates that skill-
biased technical change is likely an important determinant of growing income inequality, but 
these limitations and inconsistencies also suggest other social and economic forces may be at 
work. 
A second demand-side explanation attributes rising income inequality to 
deindustrialization, that is, to broad shifts in employment patterns whereby the proportion of 
workers employed in the goods-producing sector has declined and the proportion employed in 
the service sector has increased (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Harrison and Bluestone 1988). 
These macroeconomic changes in the industrial structure represent the substitution of low-wage 
jobs in the service sector for well-paid jobs in manufacturing, a process that is hypothesized to 
have “hollowed” the middle of the income distribution in the United States. Data from the 
Current Population Survey show a strong inverse correlation between earnings and employment 
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growth at the industry level, and they indicate that wage dispersion within the growing service 
sector is higher than in the shrinking manufacturing sector (Meisenheimer II 1998). The expected 
consequence of deindustrialization is thus increasing aggregate income inequality. Strong effects 
of industrial shifts on inequality, however, are not consistently documented in empirical 
research. Some studies report that industrial employment shifts account for about 20 percent of 
the change in earnings inequality (Harrison and Bluestone 1988), but others find virtually no 
connection between these two trends (Raffalovich 1990). Growing inequality is not simply a 
matter of bad service jobs displacing good manufacturing jobs, as earnings inequality has also 
increased substantially within these sectors of the economy (Blackburn 1990; Grubb and Wilson 
1989). 
Increases in the transnational flow of goods, services, and capital—social developments 
often absorbed under the umbrella term “globalization”—are a third factor thought to have 
reduced demand for low-wage American workers, leading to the collapse of the bottom of the 
income distribution. Globalization perspectives on growing wage inequality highlight the effects 
of foreign imports and outsourcing on the domestic labor force. In theory, imports from foreign 
countries with lower wages than the United States represents an increase in the implicit supply of 
less-skilled laborers, which is anticipated to lower demand and depress wages for less-skilled 
domestic workers. Studies of the impact of trade on wages are mixed, with some studies 
reporting very large effects (Leamer 1994; Wood 1995) and others rejecting anything more than 
a trivial role for trade in the takeoff of wage inequality (Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994; 
Krugman 1995; Krugman and Lawrence 1994). Foreign outsourcing, on the other hand, which 
involves delegating specific tasks in the production process to foreign companies, is estimated to 
have a larger effect on wages (Feenstra and Hanson 1996). 
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Institutional Theories 
A third set of explanations for growing income inequality focus on changes in labor 
market institutions, such as unions and the minimum wage, which support the lower end of the 
income distribution and promote a more equal occupational wage structure. Between 1980 and 
1990, the federal minimum wage was frozen at $3.35 per hour. As a result, the real value of the 
minimum wage declined by about 30 percent. Although only 10 percent of the workforce was 
directly affected by the minimum wage rate, this decline is estimated to explain between 25 and 
30 percent of the overall increase in income inequality during the 1980s (DiNardo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux 1996), and nearly 20 percent of the increase in the college graduate versus high school 
dropout wage differential may be due to the minimum wage freeze (Blackburn, Bloom, and 
Freeman 1990). In addition, the legislated increases in the minimum wage that occurred from 
1990 to 1991 are estimated to have erased about 30 percent of the previous decade’s growth in 
earnings inequality (Card and Krueger 1995). Thus, the weight of the evidence indicates that the 
declining real value of the minimum wage was an important determinant of the collapse of the 
lower tail of the earnings distribution during the 1980s, resulting in substantial growth in 
aggregate income inequality. 
Other studies of labor market institutions and income inequality focus on declining union 
representation. About 30 percent of all workers were represented by a labor union in 1970, but 
by 2008, union representation had declined to about 12 percent (Schmitt and Zipperer 2009). A 
large body of empirical evidence has documented how unions reduce income inequality by 
compressing wage dispersion within firms, standardizing pay across firms within industries, and 
raising the wages of low-skill workers (Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2004; Freeman 1985). 
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Although estimates vary depending on the particular methodology employed, empirical analyses 
indicate that declines in union representation since the 1970s explain somewhere between 10 and 
20 percent of the growth in income inequality (Card 2001; Freeman 1993). 
In addition to deunionization and the minimum wage freeze, changing employment 
relations is another institutional factor that may have contributed to growing earnings inequality 
(Kalleberg 2011). According to this perspective, many employers have abandoned the 
employment system characterized by internal labor markets and lifetime jobs, moving instead 
toward a system of “market-mediated” employment with greater reliance on part-time, 
contingent, and temporary workers. Because the contingent labor force typically has lower 
earnings than permanent workers, the growth in market-mediated employment may underlie the 
increase in aggregate earnings inequality. Studies consistently reveal an increase in the number 
of contingent workers during the 1980s, although estimates of the size of this workforce vary 
widely owing to different conceptual and operational definitions of contingent work used in 
empirical research (Belous 1989; Kalleberg 2011; Mishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz 2009; 
Polivka 1996a; Polivka 1996b). The link between changes in employment relations and growing 
income inequality has not been extensively studied. 
 
Summary 
Despite the enormous volume of theorizing and research on growing income inequality, 
no definitive explanation has emerged. Supply-side explanations for rising inequality have some 
intuitive appeal, but there is little empirical evidence to support claims that the entry of large 
birth cohorts, women, or immigrants to the American labor force has had anything more than a 
modest impact on income inequality. In addition, none of these perspectives account for the 
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strong growth in incomes at the top of the distribution that has driven the increase in inequality 
since the 1990s. The evidence for demand-side explanations of rising inequality is inconclusive. 
Since the 1970s, trade and capital flows were liberalized, computers revolutionized the 
production process, and manufacturing employment declined precipitously, but empirical 
research about the impact of these social transformations on income inequality is highly 
inconsistent. Institutional explanations of growing wage inequality—deunionizaiton and the 
minimum wage freeze in particular—are consistently supported by empirical research. But 
although these perspectives provide a compelling account of income declines at the bottom of the 
distribution, they do not provide an explanation for the strong growth in top incomes. 
Furthermore, institutional perspectives are devoid of a broader theoretical framework that can 
explain the social and political forces responsible for changes in these institutions. 
Most prior models of changes in aggregate income inequality leave substantial room for 
improvement in terms of explanatory power (McCall and Percheski 2010; Morris and Western 
1999). Many of the unresolved issues with extant explanations of growing income inequality 
concern the role of nonmarket forces in generating institutional change and shaping the effects of 
shifts in labor supply and demand. Both the direction and consequences of technical and 
institutional change are not determined by unmediated market forces but rather are shaped by the 
relative influence and power of different social actors. For example, depending on the 
distribution of political and economic power, the costs of an increasing supply of unskilled labor 
and falling demand for domestic production workers could be absorbed by employers and 
shareholders in the form of lower profits, by workers through wage cuts, or by consumers in the 
form of higher prices (Morris and Western 1999). Alternatively, these changes could simply 
have a neutral effect on aggregate inequality if market competition drives competing enterprises 
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to lower prices in response to their reduced labor costs. This study posits that a class-analytic 
framework based on property and authority relations within production can provide a theoretical 
apparatus capable of unifying seemingly disjoint market-based and institutional explanations, 
leading to an improved understanding of growth in aggregate income inequality since the early 
1980s. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Debate on Classes 
 
Social class is perhaps the most diverse and contested concept in sociology. The term 
“class” has been deployed with reference to so many different social collectivities that it is 
impossible to critically engage the concept without imposing some limitations of scope. This 
section therefore focuses on generative approaches to class rather than confused and often vague 
descriptive usages of the term. When class is used merely as a taxonomic or descriptive term, it 
typically refers to arbitrarily defined groups of people with similar income, status, or education 
levels (Mayer and Buckley 1970; Parsons 1970). For example, descriptive conceptions of class 
use terms like “the rich,” “the poor,” and “the middle class” to describe the income distribution. 
They enter most prominently in popular discourse on inequality, where, for example, claims 
about the declining “middle class” in the United States simply reflect growing income inequality 
(Tavernise 2011). 
In contrast to descriptive conceptions of class that merely categorize individuals 
according to their quantitative differences, generative approaches to class analysis focus on how 
relationships between different social actors at the site of production or in the market engender 
inequalities in material welfare, shape economic interests, and promote intergroup conflict. In 
this context, class refers to specific structural positions in society that give rise to detectable 
patterns of inequality, group clustering, social distance, and conflict. The extent of class-based 
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inequality, clustering, and conflict—that is, the degree to which class positions structure 
society—is the central focus of empirical class analysis. 
When the concept of class is marshaled to explain social conflict and inequality, it is 
primarily an economic concept defined in terms of different positions within the social relations 
of production, the technical division of labor, or the market. The social relations of production 
refer to patterns of exclusionary control over different factors involved in the production process. 
The technical division of labor, by contrast, consists of the specialized occupations, jobs, and 
tasks into which the production process is divided. Markets are the collection of social 
institutions and procedures whereby individuals engage in competitive exchange of 
commodities. In this chapter, I briefly review different generative approaches to class analysis, 
outline some of their more important limitations, and summarize several challenging critiques of 
class-analytic research. 
 
Marxist Approaches to Class Analysis 
Class theory is most often associated with the Marxist tradition (Marx 1971; Marx 1978; 
Wright 1979; Wright 1985; Wright 1997), although there is actually very little sustained 
theoretical reflection on the concept in Marx’s original work. For Marx, class was an objective 
economic phenomena based on differences in the ownership of productive property. Classes had 
clear boundaries whose contours defined the main social divisions in society. They were thought 
to be closely linked to individual interests and personal identities. And, most importantly, classes 
were thought be collective actors with the capacity to transform society. 
Exploitation, in Marx’s theoretical framework, was the mechanism that shaped class 
interests, conflict, and inequality. The concept, for Marx, was premised on the labor theory of 
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value. According to this perspective, all commodities, including labor power, are remunerated at 
exactly their exchange value, defined as the amount of socially necessary labor time required to 
produce them. When control of the means of production is concentrated in the hands of a select 
few individuals, those without access to the means of production must sell their labor power to 
property owners, and in return, workers receive wages equivalent to the socially necessary labor 
time required to reproduce their own labor power. Within this seemingly equal exchange, 
however, an uncompensated transfer of labor from one group to another occurs in the process of 
production: workers are paid according to the socially necessary labor time needed to reproduce 
their own labor power, but because this amount is less than the total number of hours they are 
required to work—and, by extension, less than the total number of hours embodied in the 
product of their labor—the difference, termed surplus value, accrues to their employer. This 
uncompensated transfer of labor from workers to employers constitutes exploitation. 
Marxist exploitation arises when the social relations of production are unequal, that is, 
when rights and powers over productive assets, such as land, natural resources, machines, tools, 
and so on, are distributed unequally between individuals. In this context, exploitation generates 
intergroup conflict, polarized interests, and material inequalities between those occupying 
different social positions within the production process. Thus, for Marx, classes are defined in 
terms of the structural positions occupied by individuals within the social relations of production.  
In capitalist economies, the traditional Marxist conception of class focused on three 
dimensions underlying the social relations of production: ownership of the physical means of 
production, the purchase of others’ labor power, and the sale of one’s own labor power. The 
manner in which an individual enters these social relations defines their class position. The 
bourgeoisie own the means of production and purchase the labor power of others, and are thus 
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exploiters; proletarians do not own the means of production and sell their labor power to the 
bourgeoisie, and are thus exploited; and the petty bourgeoisie control their own small means of 
production but do not purchase the labor power of others, and are thus neither exploiters nor 
exploited. 
The traditional Marxist conception of class is thought to be inadequate for a variety of 
reasons. The main limitations involve critical flaws in the labor theory of value and thus in the 
theory of exploitation as well as its inability to account for the perceived emergence of “middle 
classes” that are, within the Marxist framework, classified as workers but appear to possess some 
of the same powers as capitalists.  
In an attempt to overcome these problems with the traditional Marxist framework, Wright 
(1978; 1979; 1977) developed a more elaborate class typology that included a domination-based 
criterion for class membership—whether or not an individual controls the activities of labor at 
the point of production—in addition to ownership of the means of production and the buying and 
selling of labor power. This typology allowed certain class positions to be positively privileged 
on one or more the aforementioned criteria while being disadvantaged on others. These positions 
were termed “contradictory locations within class relations” because they lie between polarized 
positions in the class structure. 
Based on these refinements, Wright’s (1979) resulting class schema contained the 
familiar bourgeoisie, proletarians, and petty bourgeoisie, defined as above. Between these 
polarized classes were the contradictory class locations: small employers, who are situated 
between the grand and petty bourgeoisie; managers, who occupy a contradictory location 
between proletarians and the bourgeoisie because they control the labor power of others but do 
not own the means of production; and semi-autonomous employees (i.e., employed 
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professionals), who fall between the petty bourgeoisie and proletarians because they sell their 
labor power to employers but retain control over their own work activities. 
The theoretical foundations of this new class typology remained unsatisfactory because it 
still relied on the flawed labor theory of value to account for exploitative relations between 
capitalists and workers. To resolve these problems, Wright (1984; 1985; 1994; 1997) developed 
an alternative conceptualization of exploitation that was divorced from the labor theory of value 
and also able to account for the emergence of perceived “middle classes.” This conception is 
based on a game-theoretic approach that does not rely on the labor theory of value (Roemer 
1982). Specifically, exploitation is said to exist when (1) the material welfare of one group, the 
exploiters, depends upon the material deprivation of another group, the exploited; (2) the inverse 
interdependence of the material welfare of the exploiters and the exploited depends upon the 
exclusion of the exploited from access to different productive resources; and (3) exclusion from 
productive resources generates material advantages to the exploiters because it enables them to 
appropriate part of the surplus produced by the exploited (Burawoy and Wright 2002; Wright 
1994).  
The defining feature of exploitation is that the exploiters depend on the labor effort of the 
exploited. This differs from non-exploitative forms of economic domination in which one group 
may have exclusive access to the productive resources of society but does not require the 
participation of subordinate groups in the production process (Burawoy and Wright 2002). 
Exploitation thus describes a form of antagonistic interdependence between social groups in 
which actors with conflicting economic interests are bound together in the production process. It 
defines the mechanism that links inequalities in the distribution of productive assets to intergroup 
conflict. 
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Classes, for this theoretical framework, are equated with distinct positions in a given set 
of exploitative social relations. The foregoing discussion conceived of class relations at a very 
simple level: classes consist of two perfectly polarized groups, the exploiters and the exploited, 
defined in terms of their control over productive assets or lack thereof. In pure capitalist 
economies, this simple conceptualization results in a two class typology: capitalists and workers, 
representing the exploiters and the exploited, respectively. Class structures, however, appeared to 
be more complicated than this convenient binarism. Wright (1984; 1985) accounts for this 
perceived complexity by making a qualitative distinction between different types of productive 
assets, the distribution of which underlies a more complicated class typology. 
According to this perspective, the principal categories of productive assets that underlie 
both contemporary and historical class structures are the physical means of production (i.e., land, 
tools, machines, and so on), organizational assets (i.e., the power to control the technical division 
of labor), and skill assets (i.e., special laboring abilities, advanced training, and credentials). 
Individuals may be exploiters along one dimension of the class structure, for example, if they 
possess skills that others lack, while being simultaneously exploited along another dimension, 
such as ownership of the physical means of production, if they do not possess capital and thus 
must sell their labor power. For this theoretical framework, positions within the social relations 
of production that are simultaneously exploited and exploiting are said to be “contradictory class 
locations” (Wright 1984; Wright 1985). 
By subdividing the social stock of productive assets into categories based on skills, 
organizational assets, and the physical means of production, this theoretical approach yields a 
highly complex class typology. Specifically, Wright’s cross-classification of the three principle 
assets thought to underlie exploitative social relations of production produces a schema with 
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twelve distinct class positions. The primary class division is between owners and non-owners of 
the physical means of production. Owners are then internally differentiated into large employers, 
small employers, and the petty bourgeoisie, while non-owners are subdivided into nine classes 
based on their organizational assets and skill assets. These classes consist of expert managers, 
expert supervisors, expert non-managers, semi-credentialed managers, semi-credentialed 
supervisors, semi-credentialed workers, uncredentialed managers, uncredentialed supervisors, 
and finally, proletarians. 
In addition to reformulating the concept of exploitation and elaborating increasingly 
complex class typologies, contemporary theorists in the Marxist tradition have also tempered a 
number of the explanatory claims of class analysis (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993; Wright 
1984; Wright 1996). Rather than viewing class structure as necessarily engendering 
transformative social collectivities, the distribution of rights and powers over productive 
resources is thought to have only a probabilistic influence on class formation, identity, and 
interests. In other words, just because a group of unskilled workers objectively exist in an 
economy does not mean that they constitute a self-conscious, culturally homogenous, and 
politically active social group. By virtue of their common class location, however, the probability 
of unskilled workers forming such a collectivity is thought to be greater than the probability of, 
for example, an amalgam of unskilled workers and managers forming a cohesive and enduring 
social group. The central concern of class analysis, then, is investigating empirically the degree 
to which class positions influence inequality, attitudes, behaviors, and patterns of collective 
action. 
Neo-Marxist models of exploitation and class structure provide a promising framework 
for analyzing changes in aggregate income inequality, but the approach outlined above still 
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suffers from several limitations and inconsistencies. First, within this framework, classes are 
defined as positions within exploitative social relations. But it remains unclear whether 
differential possession of skills constitutes an exploitative relationship because the rewards that 
accrue to skilled workers may not depend on the material deprivation or the labor effort of 
unskilled workers in the production process. Second, while neo-Marxist class typologies are 
purportedly based on social relationships and not on quantitative or gradational differences 
between individuals, they nevertheless use quantitative distinctions to define intermediate class 
positions, such as small versus large employers or semi-credentialed versus expert managers. 
This practice is also inconsistent with the relational theory of exploitation, at least as currently 
formulated. 
. 
Weberian Approaches to Class Analysis 
In the Weberian tradition, market relations, or differential control by individuals over 
opportunities for income, form the basis of class divisions. Specifically, Weber (1978:927-28) 
writes that “we may speak of a ‘class’ when (1) a number of people have in common a specific 
causal component of their life chances, insofar as (2) this component is represented exclusively by 
economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented 
under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets…class situation is, in this sense, ultimately 
market situation.” Thus, members of a class share common “life chances” as a result of the 
resources individuals bring to exchange in the market. In contrast to Marx, then, Weberian 
approaches to class analysis focus on relations in the market rather than in production. 
According to Weber, the resources generating unequal life chances through the operation 
of the market are property, skills, and labor power. Variations in market situations, and by 
extension in class positions, are based on different combinations of these assets. Individuals that 
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own property in the means of production, investments, and capital funds constitute a “positively 
privileged property class.” Those that do not possess property, on the other hand, fall into either 
the “middle classes,” who command larger incomes by virtue of their skills, credentials, and 
other marketable abilities, or the working class, which is composed of unskilled individuals 
completely dependent on the sale of crude labor power without a regular occupation. 
Furthermore, Weber emphasizes a highly pluralistic conception of class, highlighting how both 
property owners and workers are internally differentiated based on the type of property they 
own, the skills they possess, and the industry in which they operate (Giddens 1973; Weber 
1978). 
The most prominent Weberian class typology used in contemporary stratification 
research is that of Goldthorpe and colleagues (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Goldthorpe 1980). 
This schema aims to classify individuals on the basis of their market position, that is, “to 
differentiate positions within labor markets and production units…in terms of the employment 
relations that they entail (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, p. 37).” For this approach, classes are 
intended to capture the distinction between the self-employed and those who are employed by 
others, and among those who are employed by others, the distinction between occupations 
strictly regulated by a labor contract and occupations based on a long-term “service 
relationship.” The difference between highly regulated jobs and service occupations is held to 
distinguish positions requiring more limited skills from those that demand specific abilities, 
expertise, and knowledge (Breen 2005). 
Based on these criteria, the resulting class schema in its most aggregated form consists of 
four different classes: the manual class, the intermediate class, the service class, and the petty 
bourgeoisie (Breen 2005; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). The petty bourgeoisie consists of the 
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self-employed, small employers, and farmers. This class demarcates property owners from 
employees without an ownership stake in the means of production. Employees are divided into 
the manual, intermediate, or service class based on their type of occupation. These classes are 
distinguished by the different skills and employment relationships that characterize the 
constituent occupations. The service class consists of professionals, administrators, and 
managerial workers—occupations thought to require specific skills and rely on highly 
autonomous employment relationships. The manual class, by contrast, includes workers in 
occupations that require few specific skills and have rigid labor contracts with employers. 
Members of the intermediate class are employed in occupations that require lower skill levels but 
lack the rigid employment relationships typical of occupations in the manual class. 
Goldthorpe and colleagues (1992; 1980) also present several highly disaggregated class 
typologies. In these more complex schemas, the petty bourgeoisie is subdivided on the basis of 
size and industrial sector, and the manual, intermediate, and service classes are subdivided 
according to more narrow skill distinctions. For example, the maximally disaggregated class 
schema consists of eleven class categories: the upper service class, the lower service class, 
higher-grade routine non-manual employees, lower-grade routine non-manual employees, small 
proprietors with employees, small proprietors without employees, farmers and self-employed 
workers, lower-grade technicians and supervisors, skilled manual workers, unskilled manual 
workers in primary production, and finally, unskilled manual workers in agriculture. The most 
widely-used schema consists of seven classes and is obtained from the above categories by 
combining the different types of unskilled workers, proprietors, and routine non-manual 
employees into larger classes. 
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Weberian approaches to class analysis provide highly flexible class typologies that have 
been used extensively in empirical research, but they suffer from a number of severe limitations. 
The most important problem with the Weberian framework is that it lacks a theory of the 
mechanisms generating class conflict, differences in life chances, and differences in political 
behavior. That is, aside from differences in the personal characteristics of the individuals that 
select into different occupations, the Weberian framework does not provide any systematic 
explanation for why unskilled workers in agriculture and lower-grade technicians in primary 
production, for example, might have conflicting political agendas or fundamentally different life 
chances. Many of the class divisions in this framework are simply crude proxies for differences 
in individual tastes, aptitudes, and abilities. 
There are also problems with the methods used to operationalize Weberian conceptions 
of class structure. First, although class positions are defined in terms of their control over the 
means of production, skills, and employment relationships, the Goldthorpe typology has never 
been implemented in practice by directly measuring these characteristics. Instead, individuals are 
assigned to different classes based on their occupation. This practice is problematic because 
occupational divisions in the technical division of labor are imprecise proxies for different types 
of employment relationships (Evans and Mills 2000). Second, the most disaggregated 
Goldthorpe typology with eleven classes is frequently collapsed to generate more parsimonious 
typologies with fewer class categories, but this practice is completely without a theoretical 
rationale. 
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Durkheimian Approaches to Class Analysis 
In contrast to Marxist and Weberian conceptions of class, which respectively view 
production relations and market relations as defining the contours of class structure, some 
theorists contend that class divisions are based primarily on the myriad occupational positions 
that compose the technical division of labor (Bell 1973; Grusky 2005; Grusky and Sorensen 
1998). According to this perspective, disaggregate occupations form the basis of classes because 
they are more closely associated with conditions of work, life chances, personal identities, and 
political interests. Class theories that focus on positions in the technical division of labor are 
sometimes associated with the Durkheimian theoretical tradition, in which small occupational 
associations are privileged over large industrial classes as the most important form of social 
organization (Durkheim 1984). 
For Durkheim, large industrial classes based on the social relations of production were 
purely transitory phenomena that would be supplanted by smaller occupational groups engaged 
in comparatively harmonious social interaction. Institutionalized occupations were thought to 
engender distinct subcultures through the self-selection of similar individuals into the same 
technical positions. The concomitant interactions between similar individuals working in the 
same job as well as the common pursuit of occupational advancement were thought to reinforce 
shared interests, attitudes, and values at the occupational level. Durkheim hypothesized that this 
“localization of the collective conscience” together with increasing occupational differentiation 
and growing interdependence of positions in the technical division of labor would ultimately 
undermine the long-term cohesion of large industrial classes (Durkheim 1984; Grusky 2005). 
Many class typologies are based on occupations. As discussed previously, neo-Weberian 
approaches to class analysis use occupations as proxies for different types of employment 
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contracts (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Goldthorpe 1980), and neo-Marxist approaches use 
occupational distinctions to operationalize the concept of skill assets (Wright 1985). For the 
Durkheimian approach, classes are simply equated with disaggregate positions in the technical 
division of labor (Grusky 2005; Grusky and Sorensen 1998). 
According to this perspective, “the starting point for a modern Durkheimian [class] 
analysis is…the ‘unit occupation,’ which may be defined as a grouping of technically similar 
jobs that is institutionalized in the labor market through such means as (a) an association or 
union, (b) licensing or certification requirements, or (c) widely diffused understandings… 
regarding efficient or otherwise preferred ways of organizing production and dividing labor” 
(Grusky 2005, p. 66). Because of long-term growth in the professional sector of the economy; 
the rise of new occupations built around abstract skills; the growing use of licensure, registration, 
and certification to erect clear job boundaries; and the strengthening of local labor unions, 
occupational fractionalization of the labor market is thought to have increased substantially over 
time, leading to the demise of large industrial classes and the emergence of localized class 
formations at the occupation level. 
Within this framework, disaggregate occupational groups are thought to have an 
important influence on personal identification, group closure, political attitudes and behaviors, 
and collective action. For example, while large industrial classes appear to have only a weak 
connection to personal identity in many modern societies, occupations have come to be an 
important component of an individual’s master identity (Emmison and Western 1990). 
Differentiation in the technical division of labor also may lead to occupational self-selection 
processes and patterns of intra-occupational social interaction that promote common interests, 
class awareness, and distinct subcultures among individuals working in the same job. In addition, 
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occupations are frequently at the center of social closure efforts aimed at securing monopoly 
power in the market, which may have important effects on income distribution (Weeden 2008; 
Weeden, Kim, Di Carlo, and Grusky 2007). As a result, disaggregate occupations are thought to 
be closely linked to political attitudes, behaviors, conflict, and changes in income distribution.  
Approaches to class analysis that identify class structure with disaggregate occupations 
are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, much like Weberian approaches to class 
analysis, occupational approaches lack a systematic theory of the mechanisms underlying class 
divisions and instead rely on ad hoc or individual-level selection processes to explain the 
differences in attitudes, behaviors, and interests observed between positions in the technical 
division of labor. In general, self-selection processes that lead to within-group homogeneity and 
social closure are not unique to positions in the technical division of labor but rather characterize 
many different types of group formation. The distinction between classes and other types of 
social groups is therefore arbitrary. Second, the main problem with the Durkheimian approach is 
that it simply conflates two separate concepts—occupation and class—and thereby denies the 
existence of classes as a distinct analytic category as a matter of definitional fiat. However, 
social relational and occupation-based approaches to class analysis are not mutually exclusive: 
classes defined as positions in the social relations of production and occupations defined as 
positions in the technical division of labor are distinct phenomena that likely have independent 
effects on individual interests, political behavior, material inequalities, and so on. Occupation-
based class models may complement and enhance, but not supplant, social relational class 
models.   
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Rent-based Approaches to Class Analysis 
Similar to Marxist approaches, rent-based approaches to class analysis share an emphasis 
on the concept of exploitation: without specifying or assuming an explicit mechanism that 
generates antagonistic interests, it is unclear why classes, however defined, should have any 
unique explanatory power in stratification research. In order for class structuration to occur, there 
must be a unique underlying mechanism that engenders intergroup conflict and promotes 
different patterns of group behavior and political action. The rent-based perspective, like its 
Marxist counterparts, provides a theory of the generative mechanism underlying class divisions. 
This mechanism is also termed exploitation, but it is a fundamentally different concept from 
Marxist exploitation. The rent-based approach views exploitation as grounded in the concept of 
economic rent extraction (Sorensen 2000; Sorensen 2005), and the distribution of economic rents 
defines the class structure of society. 
Economic rents are the income returns to ownership of productive assets, including 
property, skills, information, and so on, that exceed the returns to that asset that would occur 
under conditions of perfect competition in the market. In other words, the difference between the 
actual price of a commodity, such as skilled labor power, and the counterfactual competitive 
price is the rent component of income. Rents emerge for assets that are in fixed supply and are 
needed by others to maximize their own productivity (Sorensen 2005). In this situation, price 
increases do not affect asset supply, and substantial income gains may accrue to the owners of 
rent-producing assets at the expense of consumers. 
Exploitation, according to this perspective, describes the inequality generated by 
economic rents. Exploiters have rights and powers over rent-producing assets, while the 
exploited must consume these assets and are thus compelled to pay rents to exploiters. Consistent 
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with the neo-Marxist conception of exploitation (Wright 1985; Wright 1994), rent-based 
exploitation generates antagonistic interests between the exploiters and the exploited because the 
material advantages that accrue to exploiters in the form of rents depend on the material 
deprivation of the exploited. Furthermore, this inverse welfare dependence is based on the 
exclusion of the exploited from access to certain productive resources, namely, rent-producing 
assets. Unlike the neo-Marxist conception of exploitation, however, the rent-based perspective 
does not require that exploiters depend on the labor effort of the exploited. 
Classes within the rent-based framework, then, are defined as “structural locations that 
provide rights to rent-producing assets” (Sorensen 2000, p. 4). Certain types of enduring rents 
that generate significant material inequalities are thought to be especially important for class 
formation and conflict. These include monopoly rents, composite rents, and rents on individual 
endowments (Sorensen 2000; Sorensen 2005). First, monopoly rents arise from social constraints 
on production. Prohibitively high costs of entering an extant market niche; government patents 
and licensing; and industry, occupational, and labor associations can all yield a monopolistic 
market positions and thus endow certain individuals with the ability to dictate prices. In these 
situations, rents will accrue to monopolies until they are broken. This type of rent extraction may 
lead to class conflict between different occupational associations and their employers or between 
large manufacturing cartels and their customers, for example. 
Second, composite rents emerge when “two separate assets or resources are so specific to 
each other that payment to their joint use exceeds the payment to each resource in separate use” 
(Sorensen 2005, p. 141). One of the more important types of composite rent is based on worker-
firm asset specificity. Workers may be more productive in one firm compared to another because 
they develop firm-specific skills and knowledge that are not transferable to other potential 
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employers. As a result, composite rents arise and are divided between the worker and employer, 
with both parties trying to capture a maximal share for themselves. 
Finally, rents on individual endowments arise from natural or artificial scarcities of 
certain individual abilities. For example, talented athletes and entertainers may capitalize on this 
form of rent if their abilities are based on scarce genetic endowments. In addition, if “general 
ability” leads to greater productivity and has a genetic component that is unequally distributed, 
rents based on individual endowments are thought to emerge and persist indefinitely (Sorensen 
2005). Education and credentialization may also generate this type of rent by artificially 
restricting the supply of certain skills that are produced through training. 
The rent-based approach to class analysis provides a theory of the mechanism underlying 
class structuration—exploitation through rent extraction—but this framework has a number of 
counterintuitive and potentially problematic implications that seem to conflict with observed 
patterns of intergroup conflict. For example, according to the rent-based framework, capitalist 
property relations, characterized by a highly unequal distribution of the physical means of 
production, do not by themselves engender class divisions and conflict: under conditions of 
perfect competition in a capitalist economy, there is no exploitation, and classes do not exist. 
Even in the absence of rents, however, differential control over the physical means of production 
may still generate class antagonism because the material welfare of capitalists simultaneously 
depends on the exclusion, deprivation, and active cooperation of workers (Roemer 1982; Wright 
2000). 
Another counterintuitive implication of the rent-based approach is that it is possible for 
highly disadvantaged segments of the population to exploit far more advantaged and powerful 
social actors. For example, according to the rent-based framework, poor workers whose wages 
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are held above competitive prices as a result of labor market institutions, like the minimum wage 
or collective bargaining, exploit wealthy employers who incur the costs of these higher wages in 
the form of lower profits. 
Finally, the most troubling aspect of the rent-based approach to class analysis is that it is 
impossible to define and observe the classes that extract rents and the classes that pay rents. 
Because classes are defined with reference to a particular type of counterfactual economy that 
will likely never be observed or even approximated anywhere in the real world, this theoretical 
approach precludes observation and measurement of its central concept. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Property, Authority, and Social Class 
 
Building on prior approaches to class analysis, this study proposes a theory of class 
structure based on the social relations of production that attempts to overcome some of the 
inconsistencies and limitations that afflict existing theoretical frameworks. The proposed theory 
is closely informed by several interrelated approaches within the conflict theoretical framework 
(Dahrendorf 1959; Marx 1978; Proudhon 1994; Proudhon 2011; Wright 1979; Wright and 
Perrone 1977), including anarchist and neo-Marxist theories of class. Briefly, it conceives of 
social classes as conflict groups with objectively antagonistic interests grounded in exploitative 
and oppressive social relations of production. The social relations of production refer to patterns 
of exclusionary control over different factors involved in the production process. Property 
relations refer to control over the means of production, and authority relations refer to 
exclusionary control over individuals involved in the production process.  
Unequal property and authority relations are assumed to engender exploitation and 
domination between those who own and control the workplace and those who do not. 
Exploitation and domination are defined counterfactually. They refer to the effects of 
restructuring the social relations of production on the material welfare and self-determination of 
different sets of social actors involved in production. Specifically, unequal ownership and 
authority relations within a workplace are said to be exploitative and oppressive if equalizing or 
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democratizing these relations would increase the material welfare and self-determination of those 
who were formerly denied participation in ownership and management, and reduce the material 
welfare and self-determination of those who formerly had exclusionary control over the means 
and processes of production. A class, then, is a set of social actors who would experience a 
similar increase or reduction in their material welfare and self-determination as a result of this 
counterfactual transformation of workplace social relations. In other words, a class is composed 
of actors who are similarly exploited and dominated (or exploiting and dominating) by virtue of 
the shared advantages and disadvantages that accompany their position in the social relations of 
production.  
 
Property and Authority in Anarchist Theory 
Anarchist theories of class focus on the social relations of production. Production 
requires the deployment of a variety of factors: the means of production, including raw materials, 
land, tools, machines, and so on, combined with labor power of different types. It also requires 
decisions about the manner in which this deployment is executed. The production process can be 
described from both a technical and a social relational perspective (Wright 2005). A technical 
description of the production process uses a production function to describe how inputs of 
different kind and quantity combine to produce specific outputs. A social relational description 
of the production process focuses on effective control over different factors of production and 
over decisions regarding the nature of their deployment.  
Effective control over productive assets and over decisions in the production process 
involves relationships between different people, not relationships between people and things. To 
control a parcel of land, for example, means that an individual or group can exclude other 
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individuals from its use and disposition. Similarly, effective control over the production process 
that takes place on this piece of land refers to the ability of an individual or group to exclude 
others from the great variety of decisions about land utilization, the type and volume of inputs 
and outputs, and the deployment of technology and labor power. The totality of these different 
relationships of control constitutes the social relations of production. 
In traditional anarchist theory, property ownership refers to exclusionary control over the 
means of production. It is a “right of domain” over a thing (e.g., a piece of land, a building, a 
machine, or even an idea) that allows certain individuals to control whether and how it is 
accessed and used by others (Proudhon 1994:36). Property ownership establishes a social 
relation among individuals that is different from mere possession, which refers to individual use 
of a thing without an accompanying “right.” Property relations are said to be unequal when 
ownership and possession are decoupled such that individuals who possess the means of 
production (i.e., use them) do not have property rights in the means of production (i.e., own 
them).  
Unequal property relations are held to generate exploitative and oppressive relationships 
between owners and users of the means of production. Proudhon (1994) argues that “neither land 
nor labor nor capital is productive…production results from the combination of all three of these 
equally necessary elements, which, taken separately, are equally sterile…the proprietor who asks 
to be rewarded for the use of a tool or the productive power of his land makes a fundamentally 
false assumption, namely, that capital by itself produces something and that, in being paid for 
this imaginary product, he receives literally something for nothing” (126-127). According to 
anarchist theory, then, unequal property relations result in “exploitation” because they allow 
owners to “consume without producing,” and this transfer of resources from a productive group 
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of workers to an unproductive group of proprietors contributes to “the poverty of the laborer, the 
luxury of idleness, and the inequality of conditions” (92, 159). 
 In addition to exploitation, unequal property relations also lead to domination within the 
workplace, according to traditional anarchist theory. Domination is a second source of 
antagonism between those with and without property rights in the means of production because it 
is thought to violate an individual’s natural proclivity for greater self-determination. For 
example, Proudhon (1994) contends that “property necessarily engenders despotism” because 
owners can “impose [their] will as law” within the sphere of their property (210-211). That is, 
during working hours, those who would otherwise lack access to the means of production must 
submit to the direction of property owners in order to produce and consume for themselves. 
Thus, anarchist theory conceives of unequal property relations, or exclusionary control over the 
means of production, as generating exploitation and domination, which in turn lead to intergroup 
antagonism between those with and without control over the assets needed for production. 
In the anarchist framework, another type of social relation is also thought to engender 
intergroup inequality and conflict—authority. For example, Bakunin (1953a:249) asserts that 
“anyone invested with authority must…become an oppressor and exploiter of society”. Similar 
to the distinction between property and possession, anarchist theory establishes a distinction 
between authority and influence. Authority represents power or control over others that derives 
from the hierarchical organization of institutions. It requires that some individuals “submit at all 
times to…a wisdom and a justice, which in one way or another, is imposed on them from above” 
(Bakunin 2013:25). Influence, on the other hand, refers to persuasive sway over others deriving 
from competency and knowledge. Authority is ultimately an exclusionary social relation that 
limits the influence of subordinates over institutional decisions that affect their own lives. 
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Anarchist analyses of authority involve a variety of hierarchical institutions and 
relationships, but this review draws specifically on analyses of authority in production as typified 
by critiques of statist economies with centralized control of economic decision-making. For the 
anarchist framework, authority relations in production—defined in terms of exclusionary control 
over the direction, organization, and execution of the production process—engender exploitation 
and domination, even without unequal property rights in the means of production. Responding to 
the traditional Marxist argument for consolidation of production operations under the control of a 
worker-dominated state (e.g., Marx 1978b), anarchist theory contends that “the state 
organization, having been the force to which minorities resorted for establishing and organizing 
their power over the masses, cannot be the force which will serve to destroy these privileges” 
(Kropotkin 1970:170). This hierarchical approach to organizing production is held to perpetuate 
the class inequalities it purports to abolish: “when all the other classes have exhausted 
themselves, the state becomes the patrimony of the bureaucratic class” (Bakunin 1972:318). 
 According to this theoretical framework, individuals in positions of institutionalized 
authority depend, at least in part, on the production of others for their own consumption. 
Ordering, directing, coordinating, and other managerial decisions contribute to production only 
through their combination with the directly productive activities of workers (Bakunin 1953). 
When control of the production process is organized hierarchically, these tasks are exclusively 
controlled by a select subset of individuals, and they consume by virtue of appropriating part of 
the product directly produced by their subordinates. 
Hierarchical organization of production is also thought to promote domination. Within 
statist economies, this type of domination is particularly severe because those in positions of 
state authority possess a level of control over subordinates that extends beyond working hours. 
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For example, Kropotkin (1970:171) argues that “if the state became the owner of all the land, the 
mines, the factories, the railways, and so on, and the great organizer and manager of agriculture 
and all the industries…if these powers were added to those which the state already 
possesses…we should create a new tyranny even more terrible than the old.” Even in the absence 
of unequal property relations, when workers are denied “the rights and prerogatives of associates 
and managers” and lack “a deliberative voice in the council” of the workplace, anarchist theory 
anticipates the emergence of a “new aristocracy” based on “another form of monopoly” 
(Proudhon 2011b:213-216). This approach to class analysis, then, contends that authority within 
production leads to exploitation and domination between those in positions of authority and 
those subject to that authority. 
Absent property and authority relations, skill differences are not generally thought to 
engender exploitation or domination within anarchist theory. Possessing or lacking skills does 
not constitute an exploitative or oppressive social relation because skills are inalienable; because 
skill differences alone cannot enable a subset of workers to consume without producing; and 
because skills do not immediately translate into control over others at the point of production. 
For example, Proudhon (1994:96-7) argues that “the strong cannot be prevented from using all 
their advantages,” and the result for the stronger worker is “a natural inequality, but not a social 
inequality, since no one has suffered for his strength and productive energy.” Despite the many 
tensions and ambiguities in anarchist theory about differences in individual capacities, skill 
inequality by itself is not held to generate exploitation, domination, and the consequent 
antagonistic interests that define class divisions for this theoretical framework. 
In sum, anarchist theory conceives of social classes as conflict groups with objectively 
antagonistic interests grounded in exploitative and oppressive social relations of production. 
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Exploitation and domination are thought to emanate from unequal property and authority 
relations, which establish exclusionary control over the means and processes of production, but 
not from individual attributes or skills. The shared advantages and disadvantages linked to 
exploitation and domination shape the interests of different social actors and generate intergroup 
antagonism, and thereby define class divisions. 
 
A Counterfactual Theory of Exploitation, Domination, and Class 
In traditional anarchist theory, exploitation and domination are vague and poorly defined 
concepts. For example, as in classical Marxist theory, the traditional anarchist concept of 
exploitation is based on the flawed labor theory of value and problematic distinctions between 
productive and unproductive labor. Moreover, the assumptions needed to translate patterns of 
exploitation and domination into patterns of intergroup conflict are not clearly articulated. 
Building on the approaches of Roemer (1982), Wright (1984; 1985), and Screpanti (2003), this 
study defines exploitation and domination counterfactually, that is, in terms of the effects of 
restructuring workplace property and authority relations on the material well-being and self-
determination of different sets of social actors. This definition is intended to precisely identify 
situations in which one group benefits at the expense of another by virtue of their exclusionary 
control over the means and processes of production. 
Roemer (1982) constructed a theory of exploitation based on a game theoretic analysis of 
the distributional effects of alternative types of property rights in competitive market economies. 
For this approach, rational social actors are thought to generate income according to a 
competitive model under a particular set of property constraints, where rights and powers over 
different factors of production are unequally distributed. The “game” or strategic decision that 
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different coalitions of actors face is whether to withdraw from the current economy with unequal 
property rights to a counterfactual alternative economy in which effective control over 
productive assets has been redistributed. Within this framework, a coalition of actors is said to be 
exploited, and a complementary coalition is said to be exploiting, if there is a counterfactual 
alternative economy in which the exploited coalition would be better off in terms of income 
available for consumption, and the exploiting coalition would be worse off. In other words, 
exploitation describes a situation where transforming the social relations of production would 
make some actors better off and other actors worse off in terms of their material welfare. 
The game theoretic approach is unsatisfactory because virtually any inequality can be 
defined to constitute an exploitative relationship according to the “withdrawal” criteria outlined 
above. Consider the scenario of two island societies that neither interact nor trade with each 
other. One island society controls a large amount of physical assets and the other controls only 
the minimum amount of capital needed for survival. Based on the game theoretic withdrawal 
criteria, the rich island society exploits the poor island society, even though the exploited and 
exploiting groups in question have no social interaction: if the coalition from the poor island 
were to withdraw to a counterfactual alternative economy with their per-capita share of physical 
assets, they would be materially better off, while the coalition from the rich island would be 
worse off. The withdrawal criterion therefore designates as exploitative any situation in which 
some productive asset is distributed unequally, but without some type of social interaction, it is 
unlikely that inequalities in productive assets would generate the type of antagonistic interests 
that the concept of exploitation is intended to capture (Wright 1984; 1985). 
Extending the game theoretic approach, Wright (1984; 1985) attempted to avoid this 
limitation by adding an additional criterion for identifying exploitation: not only does 
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exploitation involve an inverse relationship between the material welfare of different actors 
based on exclusionary social relations of production, it also involves an appropriation of labor 
effort. According to this perspective, the exploiting coalition of actors must depend on the labor 
effort of the exploited for their material advantages. This conception of exploitation identifies the 
unique combination of material inequalities and interdependency that is thought to have a 
powerful impact on intergroup conflict. 
Based on these theoretical foundations, exploitation and domination are here defined in 
terms of counterfactual comparisons between feasible alternative economies. An economy is 
feasible when it can be implemented without changing technologies or resource endowments but 
merely by changing the way productive enterprises are socially organized. Specifically, 
exploitation is said to transpire in an economy with unequal property and authority relations if 
the following conditions are satisfied. First, democratizing or otherwise equalizing workplace 
property and authority relations (e.g., by transforming a privately owned and hierarchically 
managed firm into a worker-owned and horizontally managed cooperative) would increase the 
material welfare of individuals who had formerly lacked participation in ownership and 
management and would decrease the material welfare of those who formerly had exclusionary 
control over the means and processes of production. Second, withholding labor effort on the part 
of individuals who lack ownership and authority in production (e.g., by going on strike) would 
not only reduce their own material welfare but also would reduce the material welfare of those 
with exclusionary control over the means and processes of production. Together, these 
counterfactuals formally define the inverse welfare relationship and interdependence between 
different coalitions of actors that are thought to emerge from exclusionary social relations of 
production. 
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 Domination is similarly defined in counterfactual terms, except the outcome of interest is 
not material welfare but rather the scope for self-determination. Specifically, domination is said 
to transpire in an economy with unequal property and authority relations if democratizing or 
otherwise equalizing these relations would increase the self-determination of those who were 
formerly denied participation in ownership and management and reduce the self-determination of 
those who formerly had exclusionary control over the means and processes of production. In 
other words, domination occurs at the point of production when one set of social actors, by virtue 
of their position in the workplace property and authority structure, can make decisions that 
govern the activities of others without any input from those directly impacted by these decisions. 
For some theorists in the class-analytic tradition (e.g., Marx 1978; Proudhon 1994), it 
appeared self-evident that unequal property and authority relations are exploitive and oppressive, 
but the counterfactual approach outlined here highlights the contingent nature of these 
phenomena. Conventional economic models of utility maximizing agents imply that, other things 
being equal, the earnings of individuals in a worker-owned and managed cooperative would 
exceed their earnings in a capitalist firm where those who supply the firm’s capital and manage 
the company enjoy the residual returns (Craig and Pencavel 1992, 1995). By extension, these 
models also imply that, other things being equal, the owners and managers of capitalist firms 
would have lower earnings if their enterprises were reorganized as cooperatives. Consistent with 
these models, empirical research comparing cooperative firms to capitalist firms suggests that 
members of cooperative firms are more productive and tend to have higher levels of 
compensation, job security, and job satisfaction (Bartlett et al. 1992; Blasi, Conte, and Kruse 
1996; Burdin and Dean 2009; Craig and Pencavel 1992, 1995; Levine and Tyson 1990; Kruse 
and Blasi 1995; Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 2010; Meyers 2006). 
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Nevertheless, the counterfactual approach calls attention to situations in which 
democratizing or otherwise equalizing the social relations of production may not affect the 
material welfare and self-determination of different social actors in the anticipated direction. For 
example, worker participation in management may introduce inexperienced and unqualified 
personnel to the decision-making process, slowing it down and potentially resulting in decisions 
that substantially harm a firm’s performance. Because of inefficiencies in collective decision-
making, the material welfare of individuals who formerly lacked participation in ownership and 
management may not increase in response to workplace democratization.  
Similarly, the self-determination of individual workers may not be appreciably enhanced 
by supplanting hierarchical with horizontal management if cooperative enterprises require 
excessive peer monitoring, supervision, and control in order to sustain the same level of 
productivity. Finally, because individual incentives for technological innovation are endogenous 
to the strength of property rights, an economy based on collective ownership of firms by workers 
may innovate and grow at a slower rate than an economy based on private ownership of firms by 
individuals. As a result, it is possible that equalizing or democratizing property and authority 
relations within production would reduce long-term earnings for everyone and not just for those 
individuals in positions of ownership and control. Given the inherent contingency of the 
counterfactual contrasts that define exploitation and domination, it is only ever appropriate to 
characterize social actors who lack control over the means and processes of production as 
vulnerable to, but not necessarily subjected to, exploitation and domination. Analogously, social 
actors with exclusionary control over the means and processes of production must be 
characterized as capable of, but not necessarily perpetrators of, exploitation and domination.  
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Positions within the social relations of production that are merely vulnerable to or 
capable of exploitation and domination, however, are still thought to give rise to detectable 
patterns of intergroup conflict under the following assumptions. First, individuals are assumed to 
have an interest in improving their material well-being and enhancing their capacity to make 
choices that affect their own lives. Second, individuals are assumed to be able to conceive of 
feasible alternatives to the current economy. Third, individuals are assumed to be capable of 
recognizing that an alternative economy is likely to be better or worse than the current economy 
in terms of their material well-being and capacity to make choices that affect their lives. 
Under these assumptions, different coalitions of individuals have some level of awareness 
of the shared advantages or disadvantages they are likely to incur by virtue of the current social 
relations of production and their position in them. In this situation, these different coalitions are 
anticipated to engage in conflicting courses of action, as those who are capable of exploitation 
work to maintain the social relations from which they are likely to benefit and those who are 
vulnerable to exploitation attempt to transform the social relations from which they are likely to 
suffer. The extent of this type of intergroup conflict is thought to be a function of (1) the degree 
to which individuals desire to enhance their material welfare and self-determination, (2) the 
magnitude of the gains and losses in material welfare and self-determination associated with 
transforming workplace social relations relative to the costs of such a transformation, and (3) the 
accuracy with which different coalitions of actors recognize these gains, losses, and costs. 
The definition of exploitation and domination outlined here is non-normative. It makes 
no claim about the injustice of exploitative and oppressive social relations of production. Rather, 
it simply provides an analytic device for explaining why individuals that occupy different 
positions in the social relations of production are expected to think and behave in conflicting 
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ways. To issue ethical judgments about different modes of organizing production and their 
consequences for the distribution of material welfare and self-determination requires a 
corresponding normative theory of justice, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
In sum, unequal property and authority relations (potentially) engender exploitation and 
domination, and social classes are defined as positions within these social relations that are 
similarly advantaged or disadvantaged in terms of their prospects for material well-being and 
self-determination. At a high level of abstraction, then, class structures are composed of 
proprietors, managers, workers, and independent producers. Proprietors own the means of 
production and control the activities of workers. Managers do not own the means of production, 
but they direct the production process and control the activities of workers. Workers lack control 
over the means of production and over the production process, and they labor under the direction 
of proprietors and managers. Finally, independent producers own the means of production and 
direct the production process within a self-operated enterprise, but they do not control the 
activities of other workers.
3
 Proprietors and managers are capable of exploiting and dominating 
workers; workers are vulnerable to be exploited and dominated by proprietors and managers; and 
independent producers are neither capable of nor vulnerable to exploitation and domination. 
These class positions are fundamentally relational. This relational conception of class, 
however, does not preclude internal heterogeneity among classes. In particular, gradational 
differences in property and authority—for example, the difference between a chief executive 
officer and a line supervisor, or between a proprietor with a majority stake in a large company 
and a small business owner—are also thought to shape intergroup antagonism because they 
determine the magnitude of the effects on material welfare and self-determination of a 
                                                          
3
 Although this class typology is based on different theoretical foundations, it resembles a simple typology that was 
used in several early studies of class structure but then subsequently abandoned in favor of more complex class 
schemas (Robinson and Kelley 1979; Wright and Perrone 1977). 
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counterfactual transformation of workplace social relations. In general, for large proprietors and 
high-level managers, the consequences of restructuring the exclusionary social relations from 
which they benefit are much more pronounced, and thus their interest in maintaining these social 
relations and the degree to which their behavior reflects these interests are likely stronger. These 
gradational distinctions within class positions that are capable of exploitation and domination are 
termed class strata. 
The conception of class outlined in this study differs from other theoretical approaches to 
class analysis in several ways. It differs from neo-Durkheimian (Grusky 2005; Grusky and 
Sorensen 1998) and neo-Weberian theories (Breen 2005; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; 
Featherman and Hauser 1978) in that it views occupational groups based on the technical 
division of labor and conflict groups based on the social relations of production as distinct 
phenomena with unique and separable effects on individual lives. The fundamental difference 
between classical Marxism (Marx 1971) and the approach to class analysis outlined in this study 
lies in their conflicting views on authority, which for Marx was not viewed as an independent 
basis for class divisions. On this point, the anarchist approach has much in common with neo-
Marxist class theory (Wright 1979; Wright 1984; Wright 1985), whose emphasis on rights and 
powers over both the means of production and the technical division of labor (i.e., 
“organizational assets”) resonates with the anarchist framework’s focus on property and 
authority relations. Yet despite this similarity, the anarchist approach outlined in this study 
differs from other elements of neo-Marxist theory—in particular, its equation of skill inequalities 
with class divisions (Wright 1985).  
Absent unequal property and authority relations, skill inequality is not thought to be 
exploitative or oppressive for several reasons. First, possessing or lacking skills is not a social 
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relation because skills are inalienable. Thus, a counterfactual economy with equalized skills does 
not satisfy the feasibility criterion because it could only be implemented by changing resource 
endowments—in particular, the supply of skills—and not simply by changing social relations 
within the workplace.  
Second, even if the feasibility problem is ignored, skill inequality does not engender 
interdependence between skilled and unskilled producers because the former group does not 
depend on the labor effort of the latter for their material advantages. If unskilled producers were 
to withhold their labor effort from production, the likely consequence would be an increase, not a 
decrease, in earnings for skilled producers owing to a general shortage of labor power.  
Finally, it remains unclear whether equalizing skills would increase the self-
determination of unskilled producers and decrease that of skilled producers because enhanced 
laboring abilities need not translate into control over others at the point of production. 
Exploitation and domination, therefore, are not directly linked to skill inequalities. Skills are an 
individual productive attribute that may have pronounced effects on material welfare and 
political behavior, but differences in laboring abilities should not be characterized as class 
divisions. Despite the many tensions and ambiguities in anarchist theory about individual 
differences in capacities, this conception of skill inequality resonates with Proudhon’s (1994:96-
7) argument that “since the strong cannot be prevented from using all their advantages,” the 
result is “a natural inequality, but not a social inequality, since no one has suffered [from their] 
strength and productive energy.” 
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CHAPTER V 
Class Structure and Income Distribution 
 
The link between class structure and growing aggregate income inequality must not be 
assumed but rather subjected to rigorous empirical investigation. The mere existence of unequal 
property and authority relations alongside growth in aggregate income inequality does not by 
itself provide evidence for the continuing relevance of class. This argument confuses changes in 
income inequality at the population level with changes in inequality between subgroups that 
comprise the population. There are two mechanisms through which class structure is linked to 
changes in aggregate income inequality: compositional changes in the relative size of different 
classes and changes in between-class income differences. In addition, trends in aggregate income 
inequality are also a function of changes in residual, or within-class, income dispersion. To 
develop hypotheses about the direction and magnitude of compositional, between-class, and 
within-class effects, this section synthesizes theory and prior research about changes in class 
structure and class inequality since the early 1980s. 
In state capitalist economies, a variety of mechanisms link property and authority to 
income, including supply and demand for different factors of production, economic rents that 
emerge from market distortions and incentive problems, the balance of bargaining power 
between classes, and state institutions. Income returns to factors of production are determined, at 
least in part, by the forces of supply and demand. Individuals with property rights in land, raw 
materials, machinery, and so on garner income according to the unit price of these factors, which 
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is linked to supply and demand and is equivalent to their marginal productivity in a perfectly 
competitive market at equilibrium. When ownership of the physical means of production is 
highly unequal, very large incomes accrue to proprietors owing to the marginal contribution of 
their physical assets to production. For those without property rights in the physical means of 
production, income is largely based on the price of their labor power, which is also equal to its 
marginal productivity in a perfectly competitive market at equilibrium. 
Apart from factor productivity, property and authority are often linked to market 
distortions and incentive problems that generate rent income. Two types of economic rents are 
particularly important: monopoly rents and loyalty rents. When proprietors monopolize a 
particular physical asset, industry, or market—even if only at a local or regional level—they can 
extract additional income through price fixing. A different type of rent accrues to individuals in 
positions of authority within the production process. When ownership and authority are 
separated within a production unit, proprietors develop incentive structures to ensure that 
managers direct the production process in a way that maximizes profits. These incentives take 
the form of compensation packages that include a “loyalty rent” designed to secure responsible 
and effective performance from managers (Wright 1997:21). 
Another important determinant of income distribution is the balance of power between 
different classes in the conflict over the division of net output. Because property and authority 
relations entangle proprietors, managers, and workers in an interdependent relationship within 
production, where proprietors and managers depend directly on the labor effort of workers and 
workers depend on proprietors and managers for access to the means of production, these 
different class positions are endowed with a particular form of power based on their ability to 
withdraw from the production process (Wright 1985; Wright 1994).  
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For proprietors and managers, their power to enforce demands on workers derives from 
their ability to withhold access to the means of production. This power is reflected in plant 
closings and relocations, lockouts, and other forms divestment. The magnitude of this power 
depends on the strength of property rights and managerial hierarchies as well as the degree to 
which capital is mobile relative to labor. For workers, the power to enforce demands on 
proprietors is based on their ability to withhold labor effort. This power is reflected in actions 
like individual shirking, organized slowdowns, worksite occupations, and striking. The 
magnitude of this power is proportional to the extent of worker organization. Different forms of 
capital and labor divestment can be leveraged to exact distributional changes or to achieve 
institutional reforms more or less favorable to different classes. 
In addition to divestment, state institutions, such as tax and transfer programs, price 
controls, business subsidization, regulation, monetary and trade policies, and labor legislation, 
can have disparate distributional consequences for different classes. These policies and 
institutions are thought to be highly sensitive to different manifestations of class power. In many 
cases, state interventions in the economy may come about as resolutions to the type of overt class 
conflict discussed previously, where, for example, business subsidies are introduced by local 
government after an industry threatens to relocate. Class-based political activism may also shift 
state policy. For example, the formation and support of political organizations, information 
campaigns, policy lobbying, and electoral fundraising may influence state interventions in the 
economy with distributional effects that favor one class over another. 
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A Class-analytic Approach to Growing Aggregate Income Inequality 
The class-analytic approach guiding this analysis suggests three interrelated social 
changes have the potential to modify the distributional mechanisms discussed previously and 
transform the relative size of different classes: changes in market competition, technological 
development, and class-based political activism. 
Anarchist theory holds that market competition has a paradoxical tendency to reduce the 
number of competitors and to promote concentration of the means of production among an 
increasingly selective group of proprietors and managers. Consistent with classical economic 
theory, Proudhon (2011b) argues that competition, in principle, is essential for determining 
prices and therefore absolutely necessary for maximizing efficiency and overall well-being: 
“competition is necessary to the constitution of value…as long as a product is supplied only by a 
single manufacturer, its real value remains a mystery…either through…misrepresentation or 
through…inability to reduce the cost of production to its extreme limit” (196).  
However, Proudhon (2011b) also cautions that, in practice, competition has a tendency to 
resolve itself in monopolies rather than an efficient allocation of resources and general well-
being: “competition kills competition…the more competition develops, the more it tends to 
reduce the number of competitors,” and thus “monopoly is the inevitable end of competition” 
(200, 208). Because competitors control vastly different resources upon entering the market, the 
best-equipped proprietors and managers use all their advantages to eliminate or absorb inferior 
businesses, while inferiors consolidate and merge together in an attempt to survive. This 
perspective suggests that periods of heightened competition are followed by a paradoxical shift 
toward consolidation, centralization, and monopoly control—a process that is thought to reduce 
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the relative number of proprietors and managers, generate rent income for large proprietors and 
high-level managers, and weaken the bargaining position of workers. 
The sudden emergence and rapid escalation of foreign competition with American 
business during the 1970s is well documented (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Harrison and 
Bluestone 1988). For example, between 1969 and 1979, the value of total manufacturing imports 
as a percentage of gross national product in the manufacturing sector increased from 13.9 percent 
to 37.8 percent (Harrison and Bluestone 1988:9). Following this sudden increase in market 
competition during the 1970s, most indicators show that the pace of industrial monopolization 
accelerated (Foster, McChesney, and Jonna 2011; Kerbo 2009). This suggests that foreign 
competitive pressure in the 1970s and 1980s eliminated smaller firms and provided the impetus 
for larger firms to merge and consolidate. For example, between 1960 and 1980, the share of 
industrial assets held by the top 100 corporations increased slowly from about 46 percent to 55 
percent, but thereafter, asset concentration increased to about 75 percent by the early 1990s 
(Kerbo 2009:190). 
Technological development may also promote economic concentration and undermine 
worker bargaining power. Although in classical economic theory, technology is expected to yield 
greater output, lower costs, and a general increase in material welfare, anarchist theory posits 
that technological development may have paradoxical effects on the material welfare of different 
classes. Specifically, technological development, like competition, is thought to promote 
monopolization. For example, Proudhon (2011b:172) argues that “if a machine is invented, it 
will first extinguish the fires of its rivals; then, a monopoly established, and the worker made 
dependent on the employer, profits and wages will be inversely proportional.” In addition, 
technology is often intentionally used to subvert collective action the part of workers, and 
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technological advances may enhance the scope for capital mobility, which is thought to enhance 
competition among workers and shift the fulcrum of bargaining power in favor of proprietors and 
managers (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Harrison and Bluestone 1988; Proudhon 2011b). 
Finally, because technological development often displaces workers and because it is an 
incessant process, innovation is thought to yield a chronic oversupply of labor, which suppresses 
wages and further undermines worker bargaining power. With the introduction of labor-saving 
technology, Proudhon (2011b:191) argues that “after a lapse of time, the demand for the product 
having increased in proportion to the reduction of price, labor in turn will come finally to be in 
greater demand than ever…with time [emphasis in original], the equilibrium will be restored; 
but…the equilibrium will be no sooner restored at this point than it will be disturbed at another, 
because…invention never stops.” Anarchist theory therefore implies that periods of rapid 
technological development will be characterized by growing monopolization, an enhanced 
capacity for proprietors and managers to subvert worker bargaining power, and a persistent 
oversupply of workers. In addition, technological rationalization may also be used to control 
workers at the point of production while avoiding the necessity of human surveillance, which 
may exert downward pressure on the growth of managerial hierarchies. 
The recent period of growing aggregate inequality is marked by two types of 
technological change thought to be particularly important for changes in the relative size of 
classes and for changes in income differences between classes: (1) improvements in 
transportation and communication, such as advances in high-speed air travel and high-volume 
shipping, construction of the interstate highway system, and new telecommunication capabilities, 
and (2) the development of advanced automation and microcomputers. The development of 
transportation and communication technology provided an environment within which production 
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operations could be widely dispersed in space and rapidly relocated. Growth in the scope of 
capital mobility since the early 1970s is evidenced by increased employment losses due to plant 
relocations, shutdowns, and cutbacks; the disproportionate increase in foreign versus domestic 
investment by American-based companies; and the transfer of manufacturing employment from 
the Northeast and Midwest to the South and Southwest (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Harrison 
and Bluestone 1988). Advances in automation and computers are also linked to worker 
displacement in a wide variety of occupations, with evidence indicating that the introduction of 
these technologies during the 1970s and 1980s lowered aggregate demand for workers 
performing routine manual or routine cognitive tasks (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003). 
Thus, along with simple cost reductions and productivity gains for individual firms, the 
class-analytic perspective outlined here posits that periods of rapid technological development 
are characterized by growing monopolization, a chronic oversupply of workers, and a stronger 
bargaining position for proprietors and managers relative to workers—all leading to greater 
concentration of income among a shrinking group of high-earning proprietors and managers at 
the expense of an expanding number workers. 
In addition to shifts in the competitive environment and technological development, the 
escalation or abatement of group organization, direct action, and other political activities on the 
part of different classes may result in distributional change through their influence on state policy 
and the institutional landscape. This type of class conflict is a central determinant of 
distributional change, according to anarchist theory: “the general facts which govern the relations 
of profits to wages and determine their oscillations…are the most salient episodes and the most 
remarkable phases of the war between labor and capital” (Proudhon 2011b:179). 
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Research on class-based forms of collective action indicates that the 1970s and 1980s 
were a period of unprecedented political mobilization by proprietors and managers in America 
(Dumenil and Levy 2004a; Harvey 2005; Mizruchi 2013; Useem 1984). Business political 
activity, including use of anti-union tactics, subvention of political candidates, establishment of 
nonprofit policy organizations, and issue advertising, greatly intensified during this period. For 
example, worker firings during union election campaigns increased roughly threefold between 
1976 and 1986 (Schmitt and Zipperer 2009), and between the late 1960s and early 1980s, the 
number of corporate political action committees increased from about one hundred to more than 
one thousand (Useem 1984). 
Although it is difficult to draw direct causal connections between shifts in class-based 
political activity and institutional change, evidence indicates a strong correspondence. The 
political mobilization of proprietors and managers during the 1970s and 1980s was closely 
followed by a set of institutional changes thought to depress worker compensation and shift 
income toward those with property and authority in production. For example, unionization rates 
were halved in just two decades, declining from about 30 percent of the private sector workforce 
in 1970 to about 15 percent by the end of the 1980s (Morris and Western 1999), and between 
1970 and 1990, the federal minimum wage lost 30 percent of its real value (DiNardo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux 1996). 
 
The Declining Significance of Class Perspective 
In contrast to class-analytic theory, the declining significance of class perspective 
contends that technological, cultural, and political changes have attenuated, rather than 
amplified, between-class income differences, and they have expanded, rather than contracted, the 
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relative number of proprietors and managers (Bell 1973; Pakulski and Waters 1996; Pakulski 
2005).
4
  
First, technological development is thought to have transformed production from a 
system based on large capital-intensive enterprises into a system in which small firms flourish, 
scale economies are less important, and innovation within highly competitive industrial sectors is 
the primary driver of economic growth (Bell 1973; Pakulski and Waters 1996). These changes, 
in turn, are held to have promoted a progressive redistribution of productive wealth and a 
“reduction in the saliency of property in [structuring]…patterns of economic allocation” 
(Pakulski and Waters 1996:75). Technological development is also thought to have dramatically 
enhanced demand for complex managerial decision making. Thus, for the declining significance 
of class perspective, ownership of the means of production has become more decentralized, a 
large number of different firms have entered new and increasingly competitive markets, and 
demand for managerial tasks has increased, leading to a decline in incomes for proprietors, an 
increase in incomes for managers, and an increase in the proportion of proprietors, managers, 
and independent producers relative to workers. 
The declining significance of class perspective also contends that changes in 
organizational culture have spawned a new corporate environment in which employee well-being 
is viewed as more important than short-term profitability. According to this approach, modern 
corporations “are no longer exclusively committed to profitability and now pay much more 
attention to quality of working life and employee loyalty” (Bell 1973; Pakulski and Waters 
                                                          
4
 In addition to the effects of changes in technology, organizational culture, and political behavior on modern class 
structures, post-class and post-industrial theories highlight a number of other changes purportedly linked to the 
dissolution of social classes in modern society, including the attenuation of class effects on personal identities, 
ideology, tastes, lifestyles, and consumption. Post-class and post-industrial theories also emphasize the fracturing 
effects of changes in the technical division of labor, skill composition of work, and market segmentation on the 
social cohesion of workers. This study focuses more narrowly on post-class arguments about changes in technology, 
organizational culture, and class politics because they have the most clearly defined and pertinent implications for 
income shifts in between classes and compositional shifts in the relative size of different class positions. 
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1996:74). Because of the increasing importance of human capital to firms and the declining role 
of institutions traditionally responsible for insuring against personal economic hardship, 
proprietors and top managers have re-conceptualized the corporation as an organization 
responsible not only for the production of goods and services but also for the welfare of workers. 
Although post-class theory does not outline an explicit set of predictions about the impact of 
changes in organizational culture on between-class income differences, it can be reasonably 
inferred that income shares for proprietors and top managers would tend to decline, while 
income shares for workers would tend to increase, if modern enterprises have become less 
concerned about profitability and more concerned with the well-being of employees. 
Finally, in sharp contrast to the class-analytic approach, this perspective argues that “the 
significance of class as a basis for political identification and behavior and as a force for change 
has been declining” (Pakulski and Waters 1996:132). More specifically, the declining 
significance of class perspective holds that the effects of class-based politics on social 
institutions intensified during the early twentieth century and peaked during the 1950s, but after 
this high point, “a reversal of this trend took shape between 1960 and 1990” (133). Because of a 
decoupling of class and partisanship, a decline in class-based political organizations, and the rise 
of new and more influential political actors organized around racial, gender, and religious issues, 
“politics…is ceasing to be a distributive game monopolized by corporate actors” (142). If the 
ability of proprietors and managers to influence income distribution through political activism 
and institutional reform has waned rather than intensified since the early 1980s, it is reasonable 
to infer that their income shares would have declined as the state policy apparatus became less 
responsive to their economic interests. 
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Hypotheses 
Several hypotheses about trends in class income inequality emerge from the foregoing 
discussion of theory and research on technology, market competition, and class political activity. 
The class-analytic approach posits a substantial increase in between-class income differences due 
primarily to growing incomes for proprietors and managers together with stagnating or declining 
incomes for workers. In addition, divergent income trajectories for proprietors and managers, 
relative to that for workers, are anticipated to be even more pronounced for the highest-earning 
upper strata of these classes because monopolization, technological change, and institutional 
reforms are thought to be most consequential for larger enterprises and higher levels of the 
managerial hierarchy. These changes imply a notable inflationary between-class effect on trends 
in aggregate income inequality since the early 1980s.  
The class-analytic approach also posits a modest decline in the relative number of 
proprietors and managers, and a nontrivial increase in the relative number workers. These 
changes imply a small dampening compositional effect on trends in aggregate income inequality 
because they involve shifts in the composition of the population away from classes that typically 
earn highly variable incomes well above the population average and toward a class that typically 
earns less variable incomes much closer to the population average.  
To the extent that economic concentration, technological development, and class political 
mobilization have been more consequential for certain subgroups within the same class position, 
this perspective is also consistent with an inflationary residual, or within-class, effect. Although 
it does not preclude a notable impact for growing income dispersion within classes, this 
perspective does insist that trends in aggregate income inequality are not solely due to within-
class changes. 
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An essential component of the class-analytic perspective is that the anticipated changes in 
between-class income differences and their impact on aggregate income inequality are not 
simply due to confounding social processes like increasing income returns to education and other 
skills. Because education is associated with class attainment and its effect on income has been 
increasing over time, inequality between classes would increase even if property and authority 
relations have not become more important determinants of income. All of the hypothesized 
trends outlined here are expected to be highly robust to confounding by educational and 
demographic differences between classes. 
The declining significance of class perspective, by contrast, hypothesizes a nontrivial 
decline in between-class income differences owing to stagnant or falling incomes for proprietors 
and growing incomes for managers and workers. These changes imply a notable dampening 
between-class effect on trends in aggregate income inequality. This perspective also anticipates 
an increase in the relative number of proprietors, managers, and independent producers together 
with a decline in the relative number workers. These changes imply a small inflationary 
compositional effect on growth in aggregate income inequality because they involve shifts in the 
composition of the population away from a class that typically earns less variable incomes near 
the population average and toward classes that typically earn highly variable incomes above the 
population average. In addition, this perspective implies an overwhelming inflationary effect of 
within-class income dispersion on growth in aggregate income inequality. Indeed, a central tenet 
of post-class theory is that contemporary changes in material inequalities are almost entirely due 
to the internal fracturing of classes (Pakulski and Waters 1996; Pakulski 2005). 
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CHAPTER VI 
Trends in Between-class Income Differences 
 
This chapter analyzes between-class changes in the distribution of income from 1983 to 
2010. Specifically, it investigates whether income differences between positions in the property 
and authority structure of the workplace changed during the recent period of growing aggregate 
income inequality, and if so, which class-specific income trajectories have driven changes in 
overall class inequality.  
 
Methods 
Data and Measures 
For this analysis, I use data from the 1983 to 2010 waves of the GSS and the Annual 
Social and Economic Supplement of the CPS. The GSS contains demographic, employment, and 
income data from nationally representative samples of non-institutionalized adults in the United 
States. During the period under consideration, it was conducted annually from 1983 to 1994—
except in 1992—and biennially after 1994 (Smith et al 2011). The CPS is based on annual 
nationally representative samples of the non-institutionalized population and includes data on 
basic employment and demographic characteristics as well as detailed information on personal 
income (King et al 2010). This analysis uses two data sources to attenuate the limitations of each 
survey taken separately. The GSS contains more precise measurements of property and authority 
relations than the CPS, but it contains a less accurate interval measure of income and is based on 
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smaller samples. Parallel analyses performed with both data sources allow for a more complete 
assessment of class structure and income distribution over time.  
This analysis focuses on data from 1983 to 2010 because it is the period for which both 
surveys provide suitable measures of property, authority, and personal income. The analytic 
sample for this study includes respondents who were 18 to 65 years old at the time of the 
interview and worked full-time during the previous calendar year. This definition yields a total 
sample of 20,577 respondents in the GSS and 1,539,568 respondents in the CPS. Supplemental 
analyses of data that include both full- and part-time respondents yield similar results (see 
Appendix A). Additional sample restrictions are necessary in some analyses because the 
requisite data are only available in select survey waves. 
In the GSS, respondents are asked whether they are self-employed or whether they work 
for someone else. This question is used to distinguish between employees who do not own the 
means of production and individuals with sufficient assets to at least gainfully employ 
themselves. Respondents to the GSS are also asked whether their main job involves supervising 
other workers.
5
 These GSS items are used to classify respondents as proprietors (self-employed 
and supervise others), independent producers (self-employed and do not supervise others), 
managers (work for someone else and supervise others), or workers (work for someone else and 
do not supervise others).
6
  
Like the GSS, the CPS also records a respondent’s self-employment status, but it does not 
directly inquire about a respondent’s authority at work. Instead, it asks about a respondent’s 
                                                          
5
 The GSS uses a split-ballot survey design, and questions about supervisory responsibilities are typically asked of a 
random 50 to 75 percent subset of respondents. 
6
 Similar approaches to measuring property and authority in production with self-employment and supervisory data 
are used by Wright and Perrone (1977), Robinson and Kelley (1979), and Halaby and Weakliem (1993). In the GSS, 
nurses and teachers report an unusually high level of supervisory responsibility at work. This suggests that 
respondents in these occupations answered this survey question with their responsibilities for students and patients 
in mind as opposed to their authority over subordinate workers, as is intended. These responses are treated as 
erroneous, and all teachers and nurses are coded as either workers or independent producers. 
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occupation, which indirectly provides some information about supervisory and other managerial 
powers, and together with information on self-employment, these data can be used to assign 
respondents to different classes. CPS respondents are classified as proprietors if they are self-
employed in an occupation that typically involves supervisory or managerial responsibilities; as 
independent producers if they are self-employed in an occupation that does not typically involve 
supervisory or managerial responsibilities; as managers if they work for someone else in an 
occupation that typically involves supervisory or managerial responsibilities; and as workers if 
they are employed by someone else in an occupation that does not typically involve supervisory 
or managerial responsibilities.
7 
Appendix B provides a detailed explanation of the procedures 
used to identify occupations that typically involve supervisory and managerial responsibilities, 
and it investigates the properties of this occupational proxy measure. 
This analysis also investigates gradational differences in property and authority among 
proprietors and managers. The CPS and GSS, since 1992 and 1994 respectively, include a 
question about the number of employees at a respondent’s workplace. This provides an 
approximate measure of the amount of physical assets controlled by proprietors. Based on this 
survey item, large versus small proprietors are differentiated according to whether they own a 
business that employs more versus less than ten workers.  
To measure gradational differences in workplace authority, the GSS asks respondents 
who report supervising others whether any of their subordinates are themselves supervisors. 
High-level managers are distinguished from low-level managers based on whether their 
subordinates also have supervisory responsibilities, indicating that they occupy a position closer 
to the top of the workplace authority structure.  
                                                          
7
 In the CPS, individuals who report being state officials or public administrators are coded as managers regardless 
of their self-employment status. 
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With the CPS, the occupational classification system distinguishes between professional 
managers and executives, and lower level managers and supervisors. These occupational 
distinctions are used to differentiate high- versus low-level managers among CPS respondents. 
Analyses of class strata in the CPS are limited to the 1992 to 2002 survey waves because the 
occupational classification system was revised in 2003 and several large managerial categories 
were disaggregated to better capture authority distinctions. This increase in measurement 
precision for managerial strata over time would inflate estimates of income growth for high-level 
managers. Note that the 2003 revision of the occupational classification system only effects 
consistent measurement of gradational strata within classes; no evidence indicates that this 
change appreciably impacts measurement of relational class boundaries. 
Personal market income is the dependent variable of interest. This includes income 
earned during the previous year from an individual’s job, business, or investments. It does not 
include earnings from other family members, transfer income, capital gains, or the value of in-
kind benefits. In the GSS, personal income is measured in intervals, and dollar values are 
imputed based on interval midpoints. For the last open-ended interval capturing the highest 
incomes, nominal values are estimated using a Pareto approximation (Hout 2004).  
The CPS, by contrast, uses an extensive battery of questions to measure income in 
nominal dollars from employment, businesses, farm operations, and different types of 
investments. These amounts are then summed to arrive at a measure of personal market income. 
In the public release of these data, very high incomes are topcoded to protect respondent 
anonymity. To adjust for this type of right censoring, topcoded incomes are replaced with group 
means of the uncensored income values above the top-coding threshold, which were computed 
from internal CPS data and publically reported with special permission by Larrimore et al 
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(2008). Appendix C provides additional information about income measurement in the GSS and 
CPS as well as a detailed description of the imputation procedures for topcoded incomes.
8
 
Nominal incomes are adjusted for price inflation over time using the Consumer Price Index, with 
all values henceforth expressed in 2011 real dollars. Following convention with self-reported 
income data (e.g., Card and DiNardo 2002), a small number of full-time respondents who report 
implausibly low annual incomes are truncated (<5000 real dollars). All analyses are based on 
untransformed income values. Parallel analyses based on the natural log transformation of 
income yield results similar to those based on untransformed income data. For simplicity, 
estimates are displayed on the untransformed scale.
9
 
The covariates included in multivariate analyses of both the GSS and CPS are age, race, 
gender, education, and geographic region. Analyses based on the GSS also include measures of 
parental education and respondent cognitive ability. These covariates are all commonly included 
in conventional earnings functions and potentially confound income differences between classes 
over time. Age is expressed in years; race is coded 1 for black and 0 for nonblack; and gender is 
coded 1 for female and 0 for male. Geographic region is expressed as a series of dummy 
variables for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Both respondent and parental education are 
measured in years and recoded as a series of dummy variables for “less than high school,” “high 
                                                          
8
 In both the GSS and CPS, I also preformed parallel analyses using a constant multiple adjustment for topcoding in 
which topcoded incomes are replaced with 1.4 times the topcode threshold. A comparison of imputed values from 
this procedure with values given by group mean imputation based on uncensored incomes from internal CPS data 
indicates that constant multiple imputation understates top incomes from the mid-1990s onward, and the problem 
grows more severe over time. Nevertheless, these analyses produced similar results to those based on the Pareto and 
group mean imputation procedures reported in the main text, although they suggest slower growth in between-class 
inequality in the CPS. 
9
 Research on income measurement suggests that self-employment income may be underreported by as much as 30 
percent in some surveys (Hurst, Li, and Pugsley 2010). This type of measurement error would result in substantial 
underestimation of between-class income differences at any single point in time, but it would only impact an 
analysis of trends if its magnitude changed over time. There is some evidence that underreporting of business 
income is more prevalent at higher income levels, so it is possible that this problem became more severe since the 
early 1980s as incomes for proprietors substantially increased. If this were indeed the case, it would likely lead to 
underestimating overall growth in between-class income differences. Thus, the results presented in this chapter may 
be conservative. 
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school graduate,” “some college,” and “college graduate” to account for potential nonlinearities. 
Cognitive ability is measured with scores on an abbreviated version of the Gallup-Thorndike 
verbal intelligence test, which ranges from 1 to 10 correct answers (Thorndike 1942). Multiple 
imputation with five replications is used to fill in missing values for all variables (Rubin 1987). 
 
Analyses 
To investigate trends in income differences between classes, I first use local linear 
regression, a nonparametric curve-fitting technique that avoids strong assumptions about 
functional form and the error distribution of the outcome (DiNardo and Tobias 2001; Kvam and 
Vidakovic 2007). The nonparametric regression function is expressed as  
  ( |     )    ( )              ,                                                                          (6.1) 
where  ( |     ) is the expected income for class     at wave  , and  ( ) is a 
nonparametric function of time that permits different income trends for each class. The local 
linear estimator for  ( ) is given by 
 ̂ ( )  ∑       
  
    ∑ (
 
  
)
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   .                                   (6.2) 
In Equation 6.2,     is the real income of individual   in class  , and     is a local weight assigned 
to the income of each respondent, where    ( )  ∑ (
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    and   (    
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 (
     
 
) represents a kernel function with bandwidth  .  
This estimator proceeds by computing locally-weighted least squares estimates of a 
simple linear regression model at each wave  , where observations located farther away from the 
focal time point receive lower weight than observations close to that time point. The kernel 
function spreads or concentrates weight around the focal time point depending on its shape and 
 70 
 
bandwidth size. Pointwise estimates are obtained from this series of weighted linear regressions, 
which together characterize the entire conditional expectation function. They are plotted 
graphically to display time trends in mean income by class. This analysis uses a Gaussian kernel 
with the bandwidth selected via experimentation in each analysis to achieve a balance between 
mean squared error and trend parsimony.  
The nonparametric regression analysis described here estimates overall changes in mean 
income by class. Any divergent income trends observed in this analysis, however, may simply be 
due to changes in the demographic composition of different classes or changes in the income 
returns to education or other skills that are correlated with class attainment. To adjust income 
trends for these potentially confounding factors, this study combines inverse probability (IP) 
weighting with local linear regression. This method involves reweighting observations by the 
inverse of the conditional probability that they are members of their observed class given their 
measured characteristics. Weighting by this inverse probability creates a standardized pseudo-
population with the distribution of measured covariates balanced across classes at each time 
point. Local linear regression is then applied to the weighted pseudo-population to estimate 
trends in mean income that are unconfounded by compositional differences between classes.
10
  
This approach to covariate adjustment has several important advantages over more 
conventional methods. First, IP-weighted local linear regression adjusts for potential 
confounding of class income differences while remaining nonparametric about the functional 
form of the relationship between income, class, and covariates over time. Second, this approach 
                                                          
10
 Inverse probability weighting is a flexible method of covariate adjustment developed primarily to draw causal 
inferences about the effects of treatments in observational studies (Robins, Hernan, and Brumback 2000). This 
method has other applications, however. At a basic level, it is simply a form of direct standardization—a widely-
used technique in demography—that treats the marginal distribution of covariates as the standard to which classes 
(or treatment groups) are transformed via weighting. This form of standardization addresses the following type of 
counterfactual question: if, for example, workers and proprietors had the same educational distribution as the overall 
population at each time point, how would these groups differ in terms of mean income over time? 
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improves on both fully nonparametric multivariate regression techniques and semi-parametric 
partial linear models (e.g., DiNardo and Tobias 2001; Yatchew 1998) by avoiding the severe 
dimensionality problems these techniques suffer when the number of covariates is large. 
 The IP weight for individual   in class   is given by 
    
 (   |  )
 (   |       )
 ,                                                                                                       (6.3) 
where the denominator of the weight is the probability that an individual is a member of her 
observed class conditional on personal characteristics and time. The numerator of the weight is 
the probability of membership in that same class location conditional only on time. This ratio of 
probabilities “up-weights” individuals who are less likely to be members of their observed class 
given their demographic characteristics, and it “down-weights” individuals who are more likely 
to be a member of their observed class. The true IP weights are unknown and must be estimated 
from data. A multinomial logit model of class attainment conditional on individual covariates is 
used to estimate the denominator of the weight, and a restricted version of this model provides 
estimates of the numerator. The IP Weights are censored at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles to improve 
efficiency and avoid disproportionate influence from a small number of outlying observations. 
Appendix D provides additional details about IP weighting and local linear regression. 
 The foregoing analyses are designed to estimate trends in mean income—a somewhat 
limited single number summary of central tendency, especially with skewed data. To investigate 
temporal changes across the entire income distribution, this study also uses semi-parametric 
quantile regression (Hao and Naiman 2007; Koenker and Hallock 2001). These models express 
income deciles as a function of class, time, and covariates, permitting a more detailed 
examination of temporal shifts in income distribution between classes than is afforded by 
analyses of trends in mean income alone.  
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This decile regression model has form 
   ( |         )     
     
      
    (   
     
      
   )                         (6.4) 
where   ( |         ) is the  
   decile of the income distribution at time   for the 
subgroup of respondents in class     with covariates    . In Equation 6.4, the   parameters 
define a quadratic function of time, and the   parameters allow this function to differ by levels of 
measured covariates. Experimentation with different functions of time indicates that a quadratic 
function performs just as well as higher-order polynomials. This model is estimated with an 
exterior-point algorithm (Hao and Naiman 2007), and adjusted estimates of trends in income 
deciles for each class are plotted graphically with covariates set to their pooled sample means. 
In analyses of the GSS, confidence intervals for all trend estimates are computed using 
bootstrap methods (Efron and Tibshirani 1993). Inferential statistics are not reported for analyses 
of the CPS because its extremely large sample size renders the magnitude of sampling error 
trivial. The GSS and CPS also provide weights designed to adjust for survey nonresponse and a 
complex multistage sampling design, respectively. Because analyses conducted with the 
weighted and unweighted samples are not notably different, results from the unweighted analysis 
are reported here. 
 
Results 
Demographic Composition of Classes 
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 contain statistics describing the demographic composition of 
classes, revealing stark differences between them. In particular, these estimates reveal a strong 
and enduring correspondence between ascriptive status and class position, where lower status 
groups, such as blacks and women, are disproportionately represented among workers, and 
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higher status groups, such as whites and men, are disproportionately represented among 
managers and proprietors. For example, during the 1980s, proprietors consisted almost 
exclusively of white men. In the CPS, only 2 percent of proprietors were black and only 16 
percent were female. Among workers, by contrast, about 10 percent were black and 44 percent 
were female. The GSS reveals a similar pattern of racial and gender differences across classes. 
The lower rows of Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 describe educational differences across 
classes. Both the GSS and CPS show persistent educational disparities, where proprietors and 
managers have more advanced educations than workers and independent producers. Consistent 
with these findings, data from the GSS additionally suggest that proprietors and managers, 
compared to workers and independent producers, have higher cognitive ability and come from 
families with more highly educated parents. Separate estimates from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s 
document a substantial increase in educational attainment across all classes. 
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1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Class size
N 2,776 3,773 5,010 234 395 516 1,823 2,251 2,487 374 481 457
Age 37.77 39.17 40.16 40.68 43.17 44.87 38.09 38.89 40.98 40.94 43.80 45.22
Race
Nonblack 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.95 0.94 0.94
Black 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.06
Gender
Male 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.61 0.57 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.76 0.73 0.78
Female 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.39 0.43 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.24 0.27 0.22
Region
East 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.14
Midwest 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.19
South 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.36 0.42
West 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.24
Education
Less than high school 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.08
High school 0.36 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.24 0.29 0.22 0.23
Some college 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.23 0.23 0.26
College graduate 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.20 0.29 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.45 0.43
Verbal ability 5.92 6.11 6.05 6.15 6.37 6.34 6.30 6.24 6.26 6.37 6.77 6.56
Father's education
Less than high school 0.51 0.40 0.34 0.50 0.41 0.32 0.45 0.33 0.28 0.45 0.32 0.31
High school 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.34 0.36 0.29 0.31 0.29
Some college 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.12
College graduate 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.29 0.28
Table 6.1. GSS Sample Characteristics by Class and Decade
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the GSS. Results are combined estimates from 
5 multiple imputation datasets. Cells for the covariate by class and year cross-classification contain sample means.
Workers Ind. producers Managers Proprietors
Variable
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1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Class size
N 216.4K 309.0K 498.7K 18.5K 24.1K 35.6K 69.3K 106.2K 181.3K 18.3K 24.8K 37.3K
Age 37.76 38.58 40.27 42.37 43.10 44.23 39.65 40.39 42.14 44.25 44.97 46.16
Race
Nonblack 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.98 0.98 0.96
Black 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.04
Gender
Male 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.78 0.73 0.70 0.67 0.61 0.58 0.84 0.79 0.77
Female 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.22 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.39 0.42 0.16 0.21 0.23
Region
East 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.21
Midwest 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.22
South 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28
West 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.29
Education
Less than high school 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05
High school 0.44 0.39 0.34 0.46 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.23
Some college 0.19 0.27 0.29 0.19 0.26 0.29 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.26
College graduate 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.47
Table 6.2. CPS Sample Characteristics by Class and Decade
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the CPS. Results are combined estimates from 
5 multiple imputation datasets. Cells for the covariate by class and year cross-classification contain sample means.
Workers Ind. producers Managers Proprietors
Variable
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Income Differences between Class Positions 
Figure 6.1 displays unadjusted local linear regression estimates of mean income from 
1983 to 2010, separately for each class. The upper panel of the figure contains estimates from the 
GSS, and the lower panel contains estimates from the CPS. Consistent with hypotheses about 
growing income differences between classes, estimates from both samples show a clear 
divergence in mean income between proprietors and managers, on the one hand, and workers, on 
the other. 
Specifically, results indicate that mean income for proprietors increased substantially 
since the early 1980s. Point estimates from the GSS show that, on average, proprietors earned 
about $71,000 (expressed in 2011 real dollars) in 1983 and about $113,000 in the late 2000s, 
which represents a relative increase of about 60 percent. Mean income for managers also 
increased substantially, rising more than 25 percent between 1983 and the mid-2000s, from 
about $55,000 to nearly $70,000. By contrast, mean income for workers grew much more 
slowly, with estimates from the GSS showing an increase of only 12 percent over three decades, 
from about $41,000 in the early 1980s to about $46,000 in the late 2000s. Incomes for 
independent producers grew less rapidly than for proprietors and managers but more rapidly than 
for workers. Trend estimates from the GSS and CPS are largely consistent, although point 
estimates of mean income are slightly different between surveys and the magnitude of growth in 
class income differences is less pronounced in the CPS. In general, both data sources document 
considerable income gains for managers and proprietors, and minimal growth for workers. 
Figure 6.2 displays IP-weighted local linear regression estimates of mean income trends 
from the GSS and CPS. These adjusted estimates capture divergent trends in mean income 
between classes that are not simply due to potentially confounding social changes like increasing 
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income returns to education or the declining gender wage gap. Overall, adjusted differences in 
mean income between classes are smaller than unadjusted differences, as expected. But even 
after controlling for compositional differences across classes, Figure 6.2 indicates that between-
class differences in mean income grew much larger over time. Net of demographic 
characteristics and measured skills, incomes for managers and proprietors increased 
substantially, while incomes for workers largely stagnated. For example, between the early 
1980s and the late 2000s, adjusted estimates from the CPS indicate that mean income increased 
by 30 percent, from about $65,000 to $85,000, for proprietors; by about 25 percent, from roughly 
$56,000 to $71,000, for managers; and by about 13 percent, from approximately $46,000 to 
$52,000, for workers. Adjusted estimates from the GSS, which additionally control for verbal 
ability and parental education, suggest an even greater divergence in income between proprietors 
and workers over time. 
Figure 6.3 plots the sum of pairwise Euclidean distances between class means at each 
time point to provide a single number summary of total growth in between-class income 
differences. This metric is scaled to equal one in 1983, and all values thereafter represent 
proportionate changes. Estimates from the CPS suggest that unadjusted differences in mean 
income between classes increased by about 53 percent from 1983 to the mid-2000s, when class 
inequality reached peak levels, and then declined slightly during the economic recession of 2007 
to 2009. After controlling for the potentially confounding influence of education and other 
demographic characteristics, estimates from the CPS suggest a comparable increase in total class 
inequality: adjusted differences in mean income increased by about 48 percent from 1983 to the 
mid-2000s and then declined during the recent recession. In the GSS, estimates suggest an even 
larger overall divergence in income distribution between classes. Unadjusted and adjusted 
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differences in mean income are estimated to have approximately doubled and tripled, 
respectively, since the early 1980s. These estimates, however, are imprecise, as indicated by the 
wide confidence intervals plotted in gray. Given this high level of variability, caution dictates an 
emphasis on the more conservative results from the CPS. 
 Figure 6.4 contains estimates from decile regression models, which describe temporal 
changes in both the location and shape of the class-specific income distributions. These estimates 
are computed only from CPS data because the interval measure of income in the GSS lacks the 
precision needed to accurately estimate quantiles. Consistent with hypotheses that divergent 
income trends between classes have been driven predominantly by income growth at the top of 
the property and authority structure, decile regression estimates indicate that incomes for 
managers and proprietors in the upper half of the distribution increased substantially since the 
early 1980s, while incomes in the lower half of the distribution stagnated or increased more 
slowly. For example, net of education and demographic characteristics, the 90th percentile of the 
income distribution for proprietors increased by 30 percent, from about $119,000 to $155,000, 
between 1983 and the mid-2000s. Median income, by contrast, increased by just 7 percent, from 
about $55,000 to $59,000. For workers, almost the entire income distribution stagnated or 
declined after controlling for education and demographics. Only the top decile of the income 
distribution for workers increased by a nontrivial amount, but even this increase—about $7,000, 
or approximately 9 percent, over three decades—is comparatively modest. 
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Figure 6.1. Unadjusted Trends in Mean Income by Class Position
Workers
Ind. Producers
Managers
Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 GSS and 
CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets. Confidence intervals (CIs) are 
based on 200 bootstrap samples.
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CPS 1983-2010
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Figure 6.2. Covariate-adjusted Trends in Mean Income by Class Position
Workers
Ind. Producers
Managers
Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 GSS and 
CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets. Confidence intervals (CIs) are 
based on 200 bootstrap samples.
95% CIs
Point est.
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CPS 1983-2010
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Figure 6.3. Total Change in Mean Income Differences between Class Positions
Unadjusted means
Adjusted means
Notes: Samples include respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 GSS and 
CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets. Confidence intervals are based on 
quantiles of 500 bootstrap samples.
Point est.
95 % CI
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CPS 1983-2010
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Figure 6.4. Covariate-adjusted Trends in Income Deciles by Class Position, CPS 1983-2010 
A. Workers           B. Independent Producers 
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Figure 6.4 continued 
C. Managers           D. Proprietors 
       
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 CPS waves. Results are 
combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets and are based on quantile regression models with quadratic functions of time. 
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Income Differences between Class Strata 
Figure 6.5 displays unadjusted local linear regression estimates of mean income separately by 
class strata. In the GSS, results indicate that income growth was considerably greater for high-
level managers than for low-level managers. From the early 1990s to the late 2000s, mean 
income for high-level managers increased by more than 50 percent, from about $59,000 to 
$90,000. For low-level managers, mean income increased by about 17 percent, from 
approximately $48,000 to $56,000. The CPS suggests a similar pattern of income growth for 
high- and low-level managers, but because distinctions between managerial strata are 
imprecisely measured by occupational categories, these results are much less reliable. 
The weight of the evidence also indicates that incomes for large proprietors increased by 
a greater amount, on average, than incomes for small proprietors. In the GSS, between 1994 and 
the mid-2000s, mean income increased by about $50,000 for large proprietors and by about 
$30,000 for small proprietors. These estimates, however, are subject to considerable sampling 
error. The CPS provides more definitive evidence of income divergence between strata within 
the proprietor class, indicating that mean income for large proprietors, compared to small 
proprietors, increased by a substantially greater amount during the 1990s. 
Figure 6.6 presents IP-weighted local linear regression estimates of trends in mean 
income, separately by class strata. These estimates suggest that greater income growth among 
upper versus lower class strata is not simply due to confounding by demographic characteristics 
or education. For large proprietors, adjusted estimates from the CPS indicate that mean income 
increased by 30 percent during the 1990s, from about $99,000 to $130,000, while for small 
proprietors, mean income increased by approximately 16 percent, from about $60,000 to 
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$70,000. Adjusted estimates from the GSS are consistent with those from the CPS, although they 
are highly imprecise owing to the small number of respondents in several class strata. 
Figure 6.7 displays decile regression estimates describing changes in both location and 
shape of the strata-specific income distributions. These estimates assess whether changes in class 
income differences are disproportionately driven by income growth among the highest-earning 
upper strata of the property and authority structure. Figure 6.7 suggests that incomes for both 
high- and low-level managers in the upper half of the distribution increased during the 1990s, 
while incomes in lower half of the distribution generally stagnated. Similarly, decile regression 
estimates also indicate that income growth was especially pronounced in the top half of the 
distribution for large proprietors. For example, among large proprietors, the 90th percentile of 
the income distribution increased from about $200,000 to $250,000 in just ten years, while 
median income increased from about $70,000 to $80,000. These data indicate that the highest-
earning upper strata of proprietors and managers have become substantially better off in terms of 
personal material welfare in contrast to the vast majority of workers. 
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Figure 6.5. Unadjusted Trends in Mean Income by Class Strata
Low-level Managers
High-level Managers
Small Proprietors
Large Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1994 to 2010 GSS waves 
and in the 1992-2002 CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets. Confidence 
intervals (CIs) are based on 200 bootstrap samples.
95% CIs
Point est.
GSS 1994-2010
CPS 1992-2002
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Figure 6.6. Covariate-adjusted Trends in Mean Income by Class Strata
Low-level Managers
High-level Managers
Small Proprietors
Large Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1994 to 2010 GSS waves 
and in the 1992-2002 CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets. Confidence 
intervals (CIs) are based on 200 bootstrap samples.
95% CIs
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Figure 6.7. Covariate-adjusted Trends in Income Deciles by Class Strata, CPS 1992-2002 
A. Low-level Managers         B. High-level Managers 
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Figure 6.7 continued 
C. Small Proprietors          D. Large Proprietors 
       
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1992 to 2002 CPS waves. Results are 
combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets and are based on quantile regression models with quadratic functions of time.  
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Social versus Technical Divisions 
Several researchers argue that occupations defining the technical division of labor have 
become considerably more important determinants of inequality than classes based on the social 
relations of production (Grusky and Sorensen 1998; Weeden and Grusky 2005). Although this 
study controls for a variety of individual-level confounders, it remains possible that observed 
income trends between classes simply reflect occupational differences in skill, prestige, or the 
extent of social closure. Property and authority relations are in part expressed through the 
technical division of labor, but for the approach to class analysis outlined in this study, these 
social relations are posited to have effects on income independent of occupational distinctions. 
Have income differences linked to property and authority relations also increased within 
occupations? 
 To address this question, I use GSS data to estimate income regressions for the effects of 
class that include both individual controls and fixed-effects for unit occupations. For this 
analysis, detailed codes from the Census Occupational Classification System are collapsed into 
126 occupational groups following the methods used by Weeden and Grusky (2005). These 
disaggregated occupational groups are constructed to reflect “institutionalized boundaries as 
revealed by the distribution of occupational associations, unions, and licensing arrangements, as 
well as the technical features of the work itself” (Weeden and Grusky 2005:156). With these 
data, I estimate a series of income regressions that include class, individual covariates, and 
occupational dummy variables as regressors. These models are estimated separately by decade, 
which allows for a crude tracking of class income differences over time while ensuring a 
sufficient number of observations per occupational group and improving the precision of 
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estimates. These models reflect class income differences within occupations for each decade 
under consideration. 
Results from this analysis are presented graphically in Figure 6.8. This figure displays 
trends in mean income by class position (upper panel) and class strata (lower panel), net of 
individual covariates and occupation fixed effects. After controlling for both individual 
covariates and occupation, results continue to show significant income differences between 
positions in property and authority relations. Furthermore, results indicate that these differences 
have increased significantly over time. For example, net of individual covariates and occupation 
fixed effects, estimates show that proprietors’ average income increased from about $62,000 
during the 1980s to about $94,000 during the 2000s, while workers’ average income increased 
from about $48,000 to only $49,000 over the same time period. Overall, class income inequality 
within occupations is estimated to have nearly tripled from the 1980s to the 2000s. These results 
indicate that growing inequality between positions in the property and authority structure cannot 
be reduced to occupational differences in skills, prestige, or social closure. Even within highly 
disaggregated occupations, incomes for those with property and authority in production have 
grown substantially, while incomes for workers without property and authority have stagnated. 
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Figure 6.8. Trends in Mean Income by Class Net of Occupation Fixed-effects, GSS 1983-2010
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old, work full-time, and have nonmissing occupation 
data in the 1983 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets. 
Confidence intervals (CIs) are based on heteoscedasticity-robust standard errors.
95% CIs
Point est.
1983-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
 93 
 
Summary 
Consistent with class-analytic hypotheses, data from the GSS and CPS indicate that 
income differences between classes have increased substantially over time. Between 1983 and 
the late 2000s, conservative estimates from the CPS suggest that unadjusted income differences 
increased by about 50 percent. More extreme estimates from the GSS suggest an increase in class 
income differences of more than 100 percent. Prior to the economic recession of 2007 to 2009, 
the average proprietor earned about $70,000 more and the average manager about $25,000 more 
than the average worker. By comparison, mean income differences between those with a college 
education and those with only a high school education or less increased by about 70 percent 
since the early 1980s, and by the late 2000s, college educated respondents earned about $45,000 
more on average than their less-educated counterparts. Thus, recent growth in income differences 
between classes has been as severe as the well-documented growth in income differences by 
levels of education, and the gaps in material welfare that separate those with and without 
property and authority in production remain some of the deepest in American society.  
Growth in between-class income differences was driven by strong income gains for 
managers and especially proprietors combined with stagnating incomes for workers. In addition, 
the distributional gains among proprietors and managers have been most pronounced for the 
highest-earning upper strata of these classes—those with ownership stakes in large production 
operations and with extensive control over the production process. Adjustment for compositional 
differences between classes further indicates that none of these trends simply reflect confounding 
by educational or demographic changes. Rather, the weight of the evidence suggests that these 
trends reflect a broad shift in the balance of power between those with and without property and 
authority in production.  
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CHAPTER VII 
Trends in Class Structure and Class Attainment 
 
This chapter investigates changes in the American class structure and trends in racial and 
gender disparities in class attainment from 1972 to 2010. Despite a variety of competing 
hypotheses about changes in class structure and class attainment, few prior studies employ a 
time-series research design capable of rigorously adjudicating between them. The vast majority 
of research on class structure and class attainment is based on cross-sections of the population at 
a single point in time (e.g., Carr 1996; Fairlie and Meyer 1996; Jaffee 1989; McGuire and Reskin 
1993; Wolf and Fligstein 1979a; Wolf and Fligstein 1979b; Wright 1985), and prior studies that 
do examine temporal changes rely on imprecise measures of ownership and authority in 
production (Aronson 1991; Blau 1987; Fairlie 2004; Fairlie and Meyer 2000; Wright 1997; 
Wright and Martin 1987) and data series that only extend through the 1990s (Aronson 1991; 
Fairlie 2004; Fairlie and Meyer 2000; Smith 1999; Wright 1997; Wright and Martin 1987). The 
analyses in this chapter extend previous research by using time-series data that permit direct 
repeated measurements of class position and that cover more recent decades. In the sections that 
follow, I first discuss different theories of class attainment, focusing on racial and gender 
disparities in ownership and authority within production. Then, I estimate recent trends in class 
structure and class attainment with time-series data from the 1972 to 2010 waves of the GSS. 
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Race, Gender, and Class Attainment 
Previous research based on cross-sectional analyses indicate that women and racial 
minorities, compared with men and whites, are less likely to occupy positions of ownership and 
authority within production (Fairlie 2007; Smith 2002; Wright 1997). Theories of the social 
processes that generate racial and gender disparities in class attainment can be roughly 
categorized into micro-level explanations that emphasize individual differences in human capital 
and personal preferences for certain types of work, macro-level explanations that focus on how 
minorities and women are disproportionately located in marginalized sectors of the economy, 
and meso-level explanations that highlight the role of discrimination and homosocial 
reproduction (Smith 2002). In fact, these various explanations are not neatly separable and 
intersect in many ways—for example, career preferences and sector marginalization are likely 
shaped by discrimination—but this heuristic categorization nevertheless provides a useful guide 
for analyses of racial and gender disparities in class attainment. 
Micro-level theories point to differences in the preferences and human capital 
characteristics of individuals as explanations for differential class attainment by race and gender. 
According to this perspective, women and racial minorities, compared with men and whites, are 
underrepresented in positions of ownership and authority largely because they have less training, 
education, and experience (Becker 1964; Blau and Duncan 1967; Sewell, Haller, and Portes 
1969). Individual investment in human capital increases the likelihood of attaining authority at 
work (Kluegel 1978; Ross and Reskin 1992) and is positively associated with self-employment 
and small business ownership (Fairlie and Meyer 1996; Hout and Rosen 2000; Loscocco, 
Robinson, Hall, and Allen 1991). Racial and gender disparities in education and training, then, 
are thought to explain, at least in part, disparities in ownership and authority within production. 
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Indeed, previous cross-sectional research indicates that human capital differences explain part, 
but not all, of the racial and gender gaps in workplace authority and self-employment (Carr 1996; 
Hout and Rosen 2000; Smith 2002). 
With regard to gender disparities in particular, micro-level theories also contend that 
aspirations, preferences, and strategic decisions based on early socialization processes and 
rational evaluations of economic opportunities explain female underrepresentation in ownership 
and managerial roles (Boden 1999; Carr 1996). According to this argument, women place less 
value on workplace authority and business ownership, are less competitive and more risk-averse, 
and are also more likely than men to assume family responsibilities that conflict with the time 
demands associated with owning or managing a firm. For these reasons, women are thought to 
choose career paths that do not lead to business ownership and select themselves out of 
contention for managerial responsibilities at work. Although family responsibilities and personal 
preferences are important predictors of class attainment, the weight of the evidence indicates that 
these factors can explain only a small part of the gender gap in ownership and authority within 
production (Fairlie 2007; Hull and Nelson 2000; Smith 2002). 
Macro-level explanations for racial and gender disparities in class attainment posit that 
women and racial minorities are underrepresented in positions of ownership and authority 
because they are disproportionately located in marginalized sectors of the economy that offer 
limited opportunities for business development and promotion into managerial hierarchies 
(Jaffee 1989; Loscocco and Robinson 1991; Loscocco, Robinson, Hall, and Allen 1991; Smith 
2002). Macro-level indicators commonly used to explain racial and gender differences in class 
attainment include geographic region, population density, and industrial sector (Loscocco and 
Robinson 1991; Loscocco, Robinson, Hall, and Allen 1991; Smith 1999; Wilson 1997a). Prior 
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research indicates that women and racial minorities are more likely than their demographic 
counterparts to work in certain sectoral economies, such as the personal services industry, which 
provide fewer promotional opportunities and are less conducive to successful business 
development, but pronounced racial and gender disparities in class attainment persist even after 
accounting for a variety of structural economic factors (Loscocco, Robinson, Hall, and Allen 
1991; Reskin and Padavic 1994; Smith 1999; Smith 2002; Wilson 1997b).  
Meso-level theories are based on the premise that dominant status groups, like whites and 
men, have an objective interest in maintaining their disproportionate control over privileged class 
positions (Smith 2002; Wright 1997). To this end, dominant group members with substantial 
influence over business development and managerial hierarchies, such as financiers and 
promotion managers, may exclude women and minorities from access to capital and workplace 
authority structures in an effort to preserve economic power for themselves and similar others.  
In addition to overt acts of discrimination, members of dominant status groups in key class 
positions may also engage in statistical discrimination by using race and gender identities as a 
proxy for productivity when making promotion and investment decisions, or they might engage 
in more subtle forms of “homosocial reproduction” (Kanter 1977). Homosocial reproduction 
refers to the situation where dominant group members who occupy privileged class positions 
develop and maintain “management enclaves” and business networks composed of individuals 
who share a set of social, demographic, and ideational characteristics. This is thought to occur 
because of uncertainty associated with promotion and investment decisions together with the 
need for proprietors and managers to maintain a sense of shared value commitments and 
solidarity in the face of potential challenges to their economic power (Elliott and Smith 2001; 
Elliott and Smith 2004; Smith 2002). Previous empirical research using a variety of different 
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study designs to identify the extent of discrimination suggest that it is widespread and 
significantly harms the class attainment prospects of women and racial minorities (Blanchflower, 
Levine, and Zimmerman 2003; Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken 2002; Elliott and Smith 
2001; Elliott and Smith 2004; Reskin and Padavic 1994). 
Based on the foregoing theories of status group differences in class attainment, two 
competing perspectives on recent trends in racial and gender disparities can be derived. The 
declining disparities perspective posits that women and racial minorities have made substantial 
inroads to business ownership and management since the early 1970s, leading to a steady 
reduction of the race and gender gaps in class attainment. The enduring disparities perspective, 
by contrast, anticipates persistent racial and gender differences in class attainment as a result of 
continuing discrimination and homosocial reproduction. 
The declining disparities perspective emphasizes several broad social changes since the 
early 1970s that may have attenuated the historically severe underrepresentation of women and 
minorities in positions of economic power. First, the U.S. federal government enacted and 
expanded a variety of nondiscrimination and affirmative action policies designed to facilitate 
access to managerial hierarchies and promote business ownership among women and minorities. 
Second, human capital differences between men and women and between whites and racial 
minorities have declined—in some cases substantially—since the early 1970s (Kao and 
Thompson 2003; Kerbo 2009). To the extent that racial and gender disparities in class attainment 
are driven by human capital differences, this trend suggests a pattern of growing parity in access 
to positions of ownership and authority in production. Finally, over the past several decades, 
research on intergroup attitudes documents a substantial decline in overt racism and sexism, a 
smaller but nontrivial decline in negative stereotypical views about women and racial minorities, 
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growing endorsement of less restrictive gender roles, and an increase in support for principles of 
intergroup equality (Brewster and Padavic 2000; Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Schuman, Steeh, 
Bobo, and Krysan 1997). These attitudinal changes may signal real declines in the extent of 
discrimination and in-group preference not only among the population at large but also on the 
part of dominant group gatekeepers within extant networks of business owners, creditors, and 
promotion managers. 
 The enduring disparities perspective recognizes these egalitarian social changes but 
insists that members of dominant status groups continue to have an objective interest in 
maintaining their privileged access to positions of economic power. To maintain these privileges 
during a period when they are being actively challenged by subordinate status groups, dominant 
group members may continue to discriminate and engage in homosocial reproduction while 
superficially retreating from negative intergroup attitudes and tolerating relatively weak 
opportunity-enhancing policies in an effort to placate subordinate group members and subvert 
more radical challenges to the status quo (Jackman 1994; Jackman and Muha 1984; Wodtke 
2013a). According to this perspective, the well-documented liberalization of intergroup attitudes 
since the early 1970s simply indicates that dominant status groups have developed a more 
sophisticated ideational defense of their privileges. Similarly, nondiscrimination and affirmative 
action policies are thought to be largely symbolic concessions, and the limited scope and lax 
enforcement of these policies ensure that they do not fundamentally transform the distribution of 
economic power. 
In sum, for the enduring disparities perspective, attitudinal and policy changes over the 
past several decades are not held to reflect a sincere commitment to racial and gender equality. 
Rather, they are thought to reflect dominant group efforts to pacify subordinate groups striving to 
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overcome their disadvantages, among which exclusion from positions of ownership and authority 
in production is paramount. This perspective implies that women and racial minorities, despite 
their considerable human capital gains, have remained significantly disadvantaged in terms of 
their class attainment prospects owing to persistent, albeit more subtle, forms of discrimination 
and homosocial reproduction on the part of predominantly white male proprietors and managers. 
 
Methods 
Data and Measures 
To investigate trends in class structure and class attainment, this analysis uses data from 
the 1972 to 2010 waves of the GSS. The analytic sample for this analysis includes respondents 
who were 18 to 65 years old and worked full-time. Supplemental analyses of data that include 
both full- and part-time respondents yield similar results (see Appendix A).
11
  
For this analysis, class position is measured using the same procedures as in Chapter VI. 
This analysis also examines gradational differences in property and authority among proprietors 
and managers. As mentioned previously, the GSS asks respondents who report supervising 
others whether any of their subordinates are themselves supervisors. This question indicates 
whether employed managers occupy a position closer to the top of the workplace authority 
structure, and it provides an approximate measure of the size of the business owned by self-
employed proprietors (larger companies are more likely to have a multilevel managerial structure 
than smaller companies). Based on this survey item, large versus small proprietors, and high- 
versus low-level managers, are differentiated according to whether their subordinates also have 
supervisory responsibilities at work. 
                                                          
11
 Analyses that include unemployed respondents as a residual category in the class typology also yield results 
nearly identical to those presented in the main text, and there is no evidence that changes in class structure are 
simply responses to cyclical changes in unemployment. 
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To evaluate whether the hypothesized persistence of racial and gender disparities in class 
attainment are due to discrimination and homosocial reproduction, this study adopts the 
“residual” approach to isolating these mechanisms. This approach involves estimating the 
residual racial and gender gaps in class attainment that remain after controlling for an extensive 
set of other covariates thought to explain these disparities, including human capital, family, and 
structural economic factors. Nonzero estimates of residual racial and gender differences are then 
interpreted as evidence of discrimination and homosocial reproduction. Although this approach 
suffers from several well-known limitations, it is widely used in studies of racial and gender 
inequality and can provide highly suggestive, if not definitive, evidence of discrimination 
(Rodgers III 2006; Smith 2002; Wolf and Fligstein 1979a). 
The demographic and human capital factors included in this analysis are respondent race, 
gender, nativity, education, cognitive ability, age, and parental education. The measurement and 
coding of these variables was previously described in Chapter VI. In addition, I measure and 
control for several other dimensions of a respondent’s family background, including father’s 
occupational prestige and self-employment status. Father’s occupational prestige scores come 
from the Hodge-Siegel-Rossi rating system, which assigns scores based on respondent estimates 
of the relative social standing of different occupations (Hauser and Featherman 1977; Siegel 
1971). Father’s self-employment status is coded 1 for self-employed and 0 otherwise.  
In addition to human capital and family background, this analysis also controls for 
marital status and the presence of young children in the household. Marital status is coded 1 for 
married and 0 for unmarried, and the presence of young children is expressed as a dummy 
variable coded 1 if there are children younger than 12 years old present in the household and 0 
otherwise. Multivariate analyses include interactions between these measures and gender to 
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account for the differential impact of family responsibilities on men’s and women’s career 
choices. Controlling for measures of marital status and household composition is intended to 
adjust for the possibility that women are more likely than men to assume family responsibilities 
that may interfere with class attainment. 
The structural economic controls included in this analysis are geographic region, rural 
residence, and industrial sector. Geographic region is expressed as a series of dummy variables 
for residence in the “East,” “South,” “Midwest,” and “West.” Rural residence is coded 1 if a 
respondent lives in a county without any towns of 10,000 residents or more, and 0 otherwise. 
Industrial sector is measured with a series of dummy variables for “agriculture,” 
“manufacturing,” “wholesale or retail trade,” “business or personal services,” and “professional 
or other services.” For all variables, missing values are simulated using multiple imputation with 
20 replications, and all results are combined estimates across these multiply imputed datasets 
(Rubin 1987). 
 
Analyses 
To investigate trends in class structure, semiparametric multinomial logit models are used 
to compute smoothed estimates of the proportion of the population in different class positions at 
each survey wave, denoted by  (   | ). In this notation,   is a polytomous variable with 
        categories representing each the class positions defined previously, and   
            denotes the survey wave. The multinomial logit model has the general form 
 (   | )     ( (      )) ∑    ( (      ))
 
   ⁄                ,                    (7.1) 
where  (      ) is constrained to equal zero and  (      ) for         are functions of time 
and the unconstrained parameters,   . Exploratory analyses that evaluated a variety of 
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specifications for the unconstrained  (      ), including several different polynomial and spline 
functions of time, indicated that a quadratic B-spline with knots at the years 1972, 1992, and 
2010 provided the best fit to the data.  
B-splines are a semiparametric smoothing technique that models temporal changes in 
class structure using a flexible nonlinear function of time. In a quadratic B-spline, k knots are 
introduced on the time axis located at           , and the model consists of piecewise quadratic 
polynomials between adjacent knots that are constrained to be continuous and smooth at each 
knot (Kvam and Vidakovic 2007). Because parameter estimates from B-splines are difficult to 
interpret, results are presented graphically as interval estimates of  (   | ) plotted across 
time. These figures, which give smoothed estimates of trends in the relative size of different 
class positions, have a straightforward interpretation. A similar multinomial logit smoothing 
approach is used to estimate trends in the relative size of different class strata. 
To investigate racial and gender disparities in class attainment over time, the multinomial 
logit model in Equation 1 is elaborated to permit separate B-spline functions for blacks and 
nonblacks and for men and women. Based on this model, unadjusted smooth trends in class 
attainment are estimated, plotted graphically, and compared for each status group. Then, to 
evaluate whether unadjusted racial and gender differences in class attainment are due to 
persistent discrimination, another model is estimated that includes controls for human capital 
characteristics, socioeconomic background, family responsibilities, and structural economic 
factors. Results from these more complex models are also presented graphically to simplify 
interpretation—specifically, interval estimates for the probabilities of class attainment are plotted 
across time, separately for blacks and nonblacks and for men and women, with control variables 
set to their pooled sample means. 
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Because of problems associated with data sparseness, analyses of racial and gender 
differences in gradational measures of ownership and authority are based on more parsimonious 
models of temporal change. Instead of a complex spline function with many parameters, these 
models use a simple stepwise function of time that permits separate estimates for the period from 
1970 to 1990 and for the period from 1991 to 2010. Comparing racial and gender differences in 
the attainment of higher versus lower class strata across these two periods allows for a crude 
tracking of temporal changes while improving the precision of estimates. Probabilities of 
attaining higher versus lower class strata are estimated from these models and plotted graphically 
in bar charts. Confidence intervals for all estimates are computed using the delta method (Long 
and Freese 2006). 
 
Results 
Trends in Class Structure 
Figure 7.1 presents interval estimates of the proportion of the working population in 
different class positions from 1972 to 2010. These estimates are computed from a multinomial 
logit model of class structure with a quadratic B-spline function of time. The upper panel of the 
figure displays the relative size of all four classes on the same scale. The lower panel plots trends 
for the two smallest classes—proprietors and independent producers—using a magnified scale 
on the right vertical axis. The stacked plot makes it easier to visibly discern changes in the 
relative size of both large and small classes. 
Figure 7.1 reveals that the American class structure followed two different trajectories 
from early 1970s to the mid-1980s, on the one hand, and from the mid-1980s to the present, on 
the other. From 1972 to 1985, the proportion of workers decreased, while the proportion of 
managers, proprietors, and independent producers increased. Specifically, the proportion of 
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workers declined from about 60 percent to 53 percent between 1972 and 1985. Over the same 
time period, the proportion of managers increased from about 31 percent to 34 percent, as did the 
proportions of proprietors and independent producers, which grew from about 5 percent to 7 
percent and from about 3 percent to 5 percent, respectively. 
 From the mid-1980s onward, however, these trends reversed. Between 1985 and 2010, 
the proportion of workers increased, while the proportions of managers and proprietors 
decreased. Only the proportion of independent producers continued to grow modestly throughout 
this period. Specifically, the proportion of workers increased from about 53 percent to 58 percent 
between 1985 and 2010. By contrast, the proportion of managers declined from about 34 percent 
to 31 percent, and the proportion of proprietors declined from about 7 percent to 5 percent during 
this period. The proportion of independent producers grew slowly from about 5 to 6 percent 
between the mid-1980s and 2010. As a result of the different trends from 1972 to 1985 and from 
1985 to 2010, the class structure of the late 2000s closely resembles that of the early 1970s. 
 Figure 7.2 presents interval estimates of the relative size of different class strata from 
1972 to 2010. The upper panel of the figure displays estimates for all class strata, and the lower 
panel plots trends for the smallest strata on a magnified scale. Although these estimates are less 
precise than those for class position, they reveal a similar trend. From 1972 to 1985, the 
proportions of low-level managers and small proprietors increased, and from the mid-1980s 
onward, these lower strata generally decreased, despite some evidence of a recent uptick in the 
proportion of low-level managers. Similarly, between 1972 and the late 1980s, the estimated 
proportions of high-level managers and large proprietors increased, albeit slightly and not to a 
statistically significant degree, and then decreased thereafter. Overall, the relative sizes of the 
upper strata of proprietors and managers exhibit more stability than do the lower strata. 
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In sum, trends in the class structure of the American economy follow two distinct 
trajectories during the period under consideration. From the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, results 
are consistent with the declining significance of class perspective, which predicts a decline in the 
proportion of workers and an increase in the proportion of managers, proprietors, and 
independent producers. From the mid-1980s onward, the observed trends are less consistent with 
this perspective; rather, they are consistent, at least in part, with the class-analytic perspective. 
 The modest but persistent growth in the proportion of independent producers is somewhat 
difficult to reconcile with this perspective, however. Because of measurement limitations in the 
GSS, it is difficult to distinguish nominally self-employed contingent workers, who sell only 
their own labor power, lack capital, and have no control over the production process, from self-
employed independent business owners that do possess some capital and control their own small 
production operation. If observed growth in the proportion of independent producers simply 
reflects growth in the number of nominally self-employed contingent workers, such as 
freelancers, homeworkers, and temporary contractors (Dale 1986; Kalleberg, Reskin, and 
Hudson 2000; Kalleberg 2011), then this trend would be more consistent with class-analytic 
theory. Descriptive results from Chapter VI indicate that workers and independent producers are 
not substantially different in terms of earned income and human capital. Furthermore, despite 
considerable gains in human capital over time, there is some evidence that mean income for 
independent producers declined slightly since the early 1980s—a trend that contrasts sharply 
with the tremendous income growth observed among proprietors. These patterns suggest that 
increases in the proportion of independent producers may simply reflect growth in the nominally 
self-employed contingent labor force. 
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Figure 7.1. Trends in Class Structure, 1972-2010
Workers
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Ind. Producers
Proprietors
Notes: Plot displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and 
work full-time in the 1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation 
datasets. 
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Figure 7.2. Trends in Class Strata, 1972-2010
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Notes: Plot displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and 
work full-time in the 1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation 
datasets. 
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Racial Differences in Class Attainment 
Figure 7.3 summarizes unadjusted racial differences in class attainment from 1972 to 
2010. Specifically, it presents interval estimates of the proportions of blacks and whites in 
different class positions over time. Although these estimates are somewhat imprecise for 
blacks—a consequence of their comparatively small sample size in the GSS—results indicate 
that they are less likely than nonblacks to be proprietors, managers, and independent producers, 
and more likely to be workers. Throughout the entire period from 1972 to 2010, between 65 to 
75 percent of blacks are workers, between 25 to 30 percent are managers, between 2 to 3 percent 
are independent producers, and between 2 to 3 percent are proprietors. Among nonblacks, by 
contrast, between 52 to 58 percent are workers, between 30 to 35 percent are managers, between 
4 to 6 percent are independent producers, and between 6 to 8 percent are proprietors during the 
same time period. 
Estimates also indicate that from 1972 to 2010, despite some transitory fluctuation, racial 
disparities in class attainment have been fairly stable, consistent with the enduring disadvantage 
hypothesis. Between 1972 and the mid-1980s, when the proprietor and manager classes were 
expanding at the population level, nonblacks were about 6 to 8 percentage points, or about 1.3 
times, more likely than blacks to be managers and about 4 to 6 percentage points, or about 4 
times, more likely to be proprietors. Then, in the 1990s, the proportions of nonblacks in 
management and ownership declined rapidly, while the proportions of blacks in these class 
positions remained comparatively stable. These trends lead to a modest and temporary decline in 
class attainment disparities by race. For example, in the late 1990s, nonblacks were not 
significantly more likely than blacks to be managers, and nonblacks were only about 3 
percentage points, or about 2 times, more likely to be proprietors. During the 2000s, however, 
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the proportions of blacks in management and ownership sharply declined, and racial disparities 
in class attainment abruptly widened. At the end of this decade, racial disparities reached their 
highest point since the early 1970s: in 2010, nonblacks were about 10 percentage points, or about 
1.5 times more likely, than blacks to be managers and about 5 percentage points, or nearly 4.5 
times, more likely to be proprietors. 
Figure 7.4 summarizes covariate-adjusted racial disparities in class attainment. It plots 
interval estimates of the proportion of blacks and nonblacks in different class positions computed 
from a multinomial logit model that controls for human capital characteristics, family 
background, and structural economic factors. Estimates are computed with control variables set 
to their pooled sample means. These estimates indicate that racial differences in human capital, 
family background, and sectoral concentration account for a large part of overall racial 
disparities in class attainment. In general, covariate-adjusted racial differences in the probability 
of class attainment are considerably smaller than unadjusted differences. At several points 
between 1972 and 2010, these differences are not statistically significant at conventional 
thresholds. Similar to trends in unadjusted racial differences, covariate-adjusted racial 
differences in class attainment widen during the 1980s, decline during the 1990s, and then widen 
again during the 2000s. 
Although covariate-adjusted racial differences in class attainment are smaller overall, 
these results provide little evidence of a consistent decline in these disparities over time. After 
accounting for differences in human capital, family background, and sectoral concentration, 
blacks were underrepresented in positions of economic power during the 1980s and approached 
parity with nonblacks during the late 1990s. The period of declining racial disparities from the 
mid-1980s to the late 1990s, however, was due to sharp declines in the proportion of nonblacks 
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in management and ownership rather than growth in the proportion of blacks in these class 
positions. Moreover, the trend toward declining racial disparities during the 1990s eroded over 
the subsequent decade as the proportion of blacks in management and ownership declined in 
turn, and toward the end of the 2000s, significant racial disparities in class attainment remerged. 
In sum, these results are difficult to reconcile with the declining disparities perspective, and 
despite some fluctuations over time, they are generally consistent with the enduring disparities 
perspective. 
  
  
 
1
12 
 
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
E
stim
ated
 p
ro
p
o
rtio
n
E
st
im
at
ed
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
Year
Figure 7.3. Unadjusted Racial Disparities in Class Attainment, 1972-2010
Workers
Managers
Ind. Producers
Proprietors
Notes: Plot displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and 
work full-time in the 1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation 
datasets. 
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Notes: Plot displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and 
work full-time in the 1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation 
datasets. Proportions are estimated with control variables set to their pooled sample means.
Nonblack
Blacks
Figure 7.4. Covariate-adjusted Racial Disparities in Class Attainment, 1972-2010
 114 
 
Gender Differences in Class Attainment 
Figure 7.5 summarizes unadjusted gender disparities in class attainment from 1972 to 
2010. It displays interval estimates of the proportion of men and women in different class 
positions over time. These estimates reveal large and persistent gender disparities in class 
attainment, with men substantially more likely than women to take part in ownership and 
management within production. Throughout the four decades under consideration, between 45 to 
55 percent of men are workers, between 35 to 40 percent are managers, and between 7 to 10 
percent are proprietors. In comparison, between 60 to 70 percent of women are workers 
throughout this period, and no more than 30 percent and 4 percent are managers and proprietors, 
respectively, at any point from 1972 to 2010. 
 The unadjusted trend estimates in Figure 7.5 do not suggest any appreciable changes in 
class attainment by gender from 1972 to 2010, apart from a transitory period in late 1990s when 
men and women came to have similar chances of becoming independent producers. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, men were about 8 to 10 percentage points, or about 1.3 to 1.5 times, more likely than 
women to be managers and about 5 to 6 percentage points, or about 2.5 to 3 times, more likely to 
be proprietors. Several decades later, in the 1990s and 2000s, men remained 7 to 9 percentage 
points, or about 1.3 to 1.4 times, more likely than women to be managers and about 5 to 6 
percentage points, or about 2.5 to 3 times, more likely to be proprietors. Throughout the period 
under consideration, women were consistently about 15 to 18 percentage points, or about 1.3 
times, more likely than men to be workers. 
 Figure 7.6 describes covariate-adjusted gender differences in class attainment. It plots 
interval estimates of the proportion of men and women in different class positions computed 
from a multinomial logit model that controls for human capital characteristics, family 
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background, household structure, and sectoral concentration. These estimates indicate that 
covariate-adjusted gender differences in class attainment are smaller than unadjusted differences. 
This suggests that male and female differences in human capital, household responsibilities, and 
sectoral concentration account for part of the overall gender disparity in class attainment. But 
even after controlling for an extensive set of covariates, gender disparities in class attainment 
remain substantial and persist largely intact from 1972 to 2010. 
Throughout this period, men are consistently about 8 to 10 percentage points, or about 
1.3 to 1.4 times, more likely than comparable women to be managers, and about 3 to 4 
percentage points, or about 2 to 3 times, more likely to be proprietors. By extension, women are 
also consistently about 12 to 15 percentage points, or about 1.25 times, more likely than 
comparable men to be workers. The covariate-adjusted estimates in Figure 7.6 also indicate that 
the proportion of women classified as independent producers slowly increased from the early 
1970s through the late 1990s, when men and women had comparable chances of attaining this 
class position, but then declined sharply in the 2000s. These results, which reveal large and 
persistent gender differences in class attainment over the past four decades net of human capital 
characteristics, household constraints, and structural economic factors, are consistent with the 
enduring disparities hypothesis. 
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Figure 7.5. Unadjusted Gender Disparities in Class Attainment, 1972-2010
Workers
Managers
Ind. Producers
Proprietors
Notes: Plot displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and 
work full-time in the 1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation 
datasets.
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Figure 7.6. Covariate-adjusted Gender Disparities in Class Attainment, 1972-2010
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Race, Gender, and Class Strata 
Figure 7.7 describes unadjusted racial and gender differences in attainment of different 
class strata—that is, in the relative chances of becoming an owner of a large versus small 
enterprise or a manager at a higher versus lower level of the workplace authority hierarchy. 
These estimates are computed separately for the period from 1972 to 1990 and for the period 
from 1991 to 2010 in order to simultaneously improve the precision of estimates and allow for a 
crude tracking of changes over time. The upper panel of Figure 7.7 displays estimates for all four 
class strata on the same scale, and the lower panel uses a magnified scale on the right axis to 
better display estimates for large and small proprietors. 
 The unadjusted estimates in Figure 7.7 show a fairly stable pattern of racial and gender 
differences in attainment of higher versus lower strata over time. With respect to racial 
differences, nonblacks are more likely than blacks to be high-level managers, and they are 
substantially more likely to be large proprietors. Specifically, from 1972 to 1990 and from 1991 
to 2010, nonblacks are about 2 percentage points, or about 5 times, more likely than blacks to be 
large proprietors. With respect to gender differences, men are much more likely than women to 
become high-level managers and large proprietors during both periods, and there is little 
evidence of temporal change in these disparities. From 1972 to 1990 and from 1991 to 2010, 
men are about 5 percentage points, or around 1.6 times, more likely than women to be high-level 
managers, and about 2 percentage points, or upward of 3 times, more likely to be large 
proprietors. 
 Figure 7.8 describes covariate-adjusted racial and gender disparities in the chances of 
attaining higher versus lower class strata, separately for the period from 1972 to 1990 and for the 
period from 1991 to 2010. These estimates indicate that after accounting for differences in 
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human capital, family background, and sectoral concentration, racial disparities in access to 
higher levels of the managerial hierarchy are smaller and not statistically significant in either 
time period. Racial disparities in ownership of large enterprises, however, remain significant 
during 1972 to 1990 and during 1991 to 2010, even after controlling for an extensive set of 
covariates. Covariate-adjusted estimates also indicate that gender disparities in the chances of 
becoming a high-level manager or a large proprietor are pronounced during both periods and 
have remained stable over time. In the periods from 1972 to 1990 and 1991 to 2010, men are 
about 2.5 times more likely than women to be large proprietors, and about 1.5 times more likely 
to be high-level managers.  
In sum, these results indicate that blacks and especially women have constrained chances 
of ascending to the higher levels of managerial hierarchies and of owning a large business 
enterprise. These disparities in class attainment are explained in part by differences in human 
capital, family background, household constraints, and sectoral concentration, but racial and 
gender gaps persist in most cases even after controlling for these factors and are relatively 
invariant across time. Thus, these data indicate that, regardless of qualifications and personal 
constraints, the organizational positions that confer an extensive amount of power and influence 
in modern capitalist societies have remained firmly dominated by men, and to a lesser degree 
nonblacks, from 1972 to 2010. 
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Summary 
Continuity and change in modern class structures are central to the study of economic 
power and social stratification. Although competing theories suggest starkly different trends in 
aggregate class structure and in the class attainment prospects for disadvantaged status groups, 
past studies do not provide a rigorous assessment of these theories because they rely on 
imprecise measurement of ownership and authority relations, and time-series data that do not 
extend beyond the 1990s. Using data that permit direct measurements of ownership and authority 
relations in the workplace from 1972 to 2010, this chapter investigated hypothesized 
transformations of the American class structure and of racial and gender disparities in class 
attainment. 
 Results indicate that the relative size of different classes remained fairly stable from the 
early 1970s to the late 2000s. During the 1970s, the proportion of workers declined and the 
proportion of managers and proprietors increased, but from the mid-1980s onward, these trends 
reversed as the proportion of workers increased and the relative number of managers and 
proprietors steadily declined. As a result, the class structure of the American economy at the end 
of the 2000s closely resembled that of the early 1970s. In addition, results indicate that racial and 
gender disparities in class attainment also remained fairly stable throughout this period, despite a 
substantial narrowing of human capital differences, the introduction of policies designed 
explicitly to promote access to positions of economic power for subordinate status groups, and 
broad attitudinal changes indicating a decline in overt racism and sexism. Although results 
suggest some modest fluctuations over time, there is no discernable trend toward either greater 
equality or inequality in the class attainment prospects of different status groups. At present, 
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blacks and especially women remain significantly less likely to occupy positions of ownership 
and authority in production. 
 These results extend previous findings in several important ways. First, Wright’s (1997; 
1987) seminal studies on changes in aggregate class structure documented steady declines in the 
proportions of workers and a pronounced increase in the proportion of managers between 1960 
and 1990. Using a more direct measure of class and a longer time-series, this study corroborates 
these findings through the early 1980s, but it also reveals that trends in aggregate class structure 
completely reversed course in the mid- to late-1980s. These results demand a reconsideration of 
Wright’s (1997; 1987) conclusion that the empirical record provides overwhelming support for 
the declining significance of class perspective on changes in modern class structures. 
Second, the results presented in this chapter also demand a reconsideration of 
conventional methods used to measure the relative number of managers. While studies of the 
managerial class based on occupational classification data tend to show strong growth in the 
proportion of managers since the 1970s (e.g., Goldstein 2012), results based on self-reported 
supervisory data indicate that growth in the proportion of managers peaked in the mid-1980s and 
then declined. In addition, although prior research based on occupational classification data 
provides some evidence of gender integration across class positions since the early 1970s 
(Cohen, Huffman, and Knauer 2009; Hughes 2003; Loscocco and Robinson 1991), the results 
presented in this study indicate that gender disparities in class attainment have remained highly 
stable from 1972 to 2010, with women consistently underrepresented in ownership and 
management.  
These findings call occupation-based measures of managerial and ownership roles into 
question and cast doubt upon prior evidence of declining gender disparities in economic power. 
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They are also consistent with other evidence indicating that many firms have expanded 
managerial job titles, but not real organizational control and tangible workplace authority, to 
include a greater number of female and minority employees in an effort to appear compliant with 
nondiscrimination policies (Jacobs 1992; Reskin and Ross 1992). Altogether, this suggests that 
occupational classification data may have become increasingly unreliable as an indicator of 
workplace authority and managerial power over the past several decades. 
The results documented in this analysis are consistent with elements of the class-analytic 
perspective on long-term changes in relative size of different classes, especially since the mid-
1980s. Furthermore, the stable pattern of racial and gender differences in class attainment 
support the enduring disparities perspective. These persistent differences in class attainment 
suggest that discrimination and homosocial reproduction on the part of predominantly white 
male proprietors and managers remain widespread in capital markets, business networks, and 
promotion ladders. Although prior research indicates that racial and gender differences with 
respect to other dimensions of social stratification, such as education and income, have declined 
over the past four decades, this study reveals that deep inequalities in access to positions of 
ownership and authority within production continue to divide status groups in the United States. 
 Although this analysis makes several important contributions to research on class 
structure and class attainment, it is not without limitations. In particular, it does not observe 
discrimination or homosocial reproduction directly but rather relies on the “residual” approach to 
identifying these underlying mechanisms, which requires the strong assumption that there are no 
unobserved individual-level characteristics that affect class attainment and differ across status 
groups. If, for example, there are unobserved differences in human capital or career preferences 
between men and women, then it would be inappropriate to attribute residual disparities in class 
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attainment to discrimination. It is impossible to completely rule out unobserved heterogeneity as 
an explanation for observed status group disparities in class attainment, but this analysis 
controlled for an extensive set of human capital and family background characteristics and prior 
research suggests that racial and gender differences in career preferences are typically not large 
enough to explain the pronounced disparities in class attainment (Fairlie 2007). 
To further address this limitation, an additional analysis of the 1989, 1998, and 2006 
waves of the GSS, which asked a small random subsample of respondents if they would prefer to 
be self-employed or to work for someone else, indicate that racial and gender differences in 
preferences for self-employment cannot explain status group disparities in class attainment 
(results not shown, available upon request). A strong majority of GSS respondents report a 
preference for self-employment; there are few racial differences in these preferences; men are 
only about 15 percentage points, or about 1.3 times, more likely than women to prefer self-
employment; and large statistically significant racial and gender disparities remain in 
multivariate models of class attainment that additionally control for self-employment 
preferences. These ancillary analyses bolster the conclusion that persistent differences in class 
attainment by race and gender are in large part due to discrimination and homosocial 
reproduction. Nevertheless, they are based on a comparatively small number of respondents from 
only a few waves of the GSS and a single measure of career preferences. Without more detailed 
data, it is difficult to completely rule out the possibility that long-term racial and gender 
disparities in class attainment are due to differential preferences.
12
 
                                                          
12
 These ancillary analyses are based on 1,550 non-missing responses to the EMPSELF question in the GSS. It is 
important to note that multivariate models of class attainment that control for concurrently measured preferences are 
problematic because such a measure of preferences is endogenous to class attainment and to unobserved 
discrimination. That is, individuals who become successfully self-employed and do not suffer discrimination or 
other forms of exclusion may then be more likely to have a favorable attitude toward self-employment. 
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This analysis also does not account for the life-course dimension of class attainment, 
which suggests that status group integration across class boundaries may involve a process of 
cohort replacement that would only be reflected in time-series data many decades after 
egalitarian changes in human capital acquisition and prejudicial attitudes. For example, if 
promotion into positions of workplace authority typically occurs later in one’s career, at which 
point downward mobility out of authority hierarchies is rare, then gender disparities in 
promotional practices from decades past may continue to exert a strong influence on cross-
sectional gender differences in class attainment observed during more recent periods. In other 
words, the life-course perspective suggests that significant gender integration across classes will 
only be observed after the current stock of predominantly white male proprietors and managers 
retire and are replaced by greater numbers of blacks and women from younger cohorts who have 
the requisite human capital and no longer face significant discrimination. Although such a 
pattern of cohort replacement would attenuate the magnitude of changes in cross-sectional status 
group disparities, this study tracks these disparities over nearly four decades—a period long 
enough to reflect the posited cohort replacement process—and finds no evidence of integration. 
In addition, ancillary analyses of status group disparities using synthetic cohort methods indicate 
that more recent birth cohorts of blacks and women face barriers to becoming proprietors and 
managers that are just as steep as those encountered by older cohorts of blacks and women when 
they were are at a similar stage in their careers. 
These limitations notwithstanding, this analysis provides considerable evidence that 
status group disparities in class attainment remained remarkably stable from 1972 to 2010. This 
stability suggests that ascriptive inequalities in access to positions of economic power are highly 
resilient to policy interventions and expansions of higher education.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
Trends in Aggregate Income Inequality: A Decomposition Analysis 
 
This chapter provides a formal decomposition of trends in aggregate income inequality 
from 1983 to 2010 that evaluates the impact of (1) changes in between-class income differences, 
(2) compositional changes in the relative size of different classes, and (3) changes in within-class 
income dispersion. The weight of the evidence from prior chapters suggests a strong relationship 
between social class and growth in income inequality at the population level that is consistent 
with the class-analytic perspective. The exact contribution of compositional, between-class, and 
within-class changes to growth in aggregate income inequality, however, is still uncertain. Does 
growth in income differences between classes explain an appreciable part of observed growth in 
aggregate income inequality? Have compositional changes in the size of different classes inflated 
or dampened trends in population-level inequality? And, what is the relative importance of 
between-class and compositional effects compared to the residual, or within-class, effect? 
 
Methods 
Data and Measures 
This chapter once again uses time-series data from the 1983 to 2010 waves of both the 
GSS and CPS (King et al 2010; Smith et al 2011). The analytic sample consists of 20,577 
respondents in the GSS and 1,539,568 respondents in the CPS who were 18 to 65 years old at the 
time of the interview and worked full-time during the previous calendar year. Supplemental 
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analyses of data that include both full- and part-time respondents yield similar results (see 
Appendix A). Additional sample restrictions are necessary in some analyses because the 
requisite data are only available in certain survey waves. 
In both the GSS and CPS, class position, class strata, and personal market income are 
measured exactly as they were in Chapter VI. The covariates included in multivariate 
decomposition analyses are age, race, gender, and education. Age is expressed as a series of 
dummy variables for the following age groups: 18 to 25 years, 26 to 35 years, 36 to 45 years, 46 
to 55 years, and 56 to 65 years. Race is coded 1 for black and 0 for nonblack, and gender is 
coded 1 for female and 0 for male. Respondent’s education is expressed as a series of dummy 
variables for “less than high school,” “high school graduate,” “some college,” and “college 
graduate.” Multiple imputation with five replications is used to fill in missing values for all 
variables (Rubin 1987). 
 
Analyses 
I measure aggregate income inequality with the variance of log income,   
   (   ( )). The variance of log income is a scale-invariant measure of inequality that has a 
convenient functional relationship with several other inequality metrics, such as the Gini index 
(Allison 1978).
13
 For notational simplicity, the log operator on income is henceforth omitted 
from all equations.  
This measure can be decomposed into between-class and within-class components as 
follows  
                                                          
13
 Parallel analyses using the variance of untransformed income values as the measure of aggregate inequality yield 
results similar to those based on the natural log transformation. The variance of income is a translation-invariant, but 
not scale-invariant, measure of inequality that is equally sensitive to transfers in the upper and lower tails of the 
income distribution. The variance of log income, by contrast, is scale-invariant, but not translation-invariant, and it 
is disproportionately sensitive to transfers in the lower tail of the income distribution. 
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      ( ( | ))   (   ( | ))      .                                                           (8.1) 
The between-class and within-class components of aggregate inequality, respectively denoted by 
  and , can be expressed as a weighted sum of class-specific means and variances: 
       ∑   
 
     
  ∑   
 
     
  ,                                                                      (8.2)  
where    represents the proportion of respondents in class    ,     ̂   ̅ is the deviation of 
mean log income for class     from the population mean, and   
  denotes the variance of log 
income within class    .  
With time-series data, the change in aggregate income inequality from time     (the 
baseline survey wave) to      (a post-baseline survey wave) can be decomposed into a 
compositional effect,   , reflecting shifts in the relative size of different classes; a between-class 
effect,   , reflecting changes in mean income for different class positions; and a within-class 
effect,   , capturing changes in income dispersion within class positions. Specifically, the 
change in aggregate income inequality is given by the sum of these three components:  
                 ,                                                                                             (8.3) 
where the compositional effect of size shifts in class structure is  
   ∑ (        )(    
      
 )  ,                                                                                 (8.4) 
the between-class effect of changes in mean income for different class positions is  
   ∑    (    
     
 )  ,                                                                                                (8.5) 
and the within-class effect of changing inequality within class positions is 
   ∑    (    
     
 )  .                                                                                              (8.6) 
To investigate the link between class structure and growth in aggregate income inequality, I 
estimate the quantities in Equations 8.4 through 8.6 and scale them by the total change in 
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inequality. These estimates assess the proportionate impact of compositional shifts in class 
structure, changes in between-class income differences, and changes in within-class income 
dispersion on growth in aggregate income inequality. In the GSS, bootstrap methods are used to 
compute 95 percent confidence intervals for these effects (Efron and Tibshirani 1993). 
Inferential statistics are not computed in analyses of CPS data because the extremely large 
number of observations renders the magnitude of sampling error trivial. 
The decomposition analysis described here does not control for individual-level 
characteristics that affect both income and class attainment. The class effects estimated in the 
foregoing analysis may simply reflect the potentially confounding effects of increasing income 
returns to education or changes in the demographic makeup of classes. To estimate class effects 
on growth in aggregate income inequality net of individual characteristics, this study combines 
multivariate decomposition methods with variance function regression (Western and Bloome 
2009). 
In analyses of aggregate income inequality that involve   covariates with levels 
         , the data are organized in a decomposition table, where each observation is assigned 
to one of the              cells in the cross-classification of all covariates. Similar to the 
decomposition outlined previously, aggregate income inequality is expressed as a weighted sum 
of cell means and variances, with       ∑     
 
  ∑     
 
 , and temporal trends can be 
decomposed into the effects of changes in cell proportions, changes in between-cell mean 
income differences, and changes in within-cell income dispersion.  
For this approach to multivariate decomposition, variance function regression is used to 
simultaneously model the cell means and variances at each time point, and the net effects of class 
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on trends in aggregate income inequality are quantified with counterfactual variances that fix 
model coefficients at their baseline values. The variance function regression model has form 
 ( |     )   ̂             and                                                                      (8.7) 
   (   ( |     ))     (  
 )             ,                                                     (8.8)  
where   is a vector of dummy variables for class position and   represents a set of individual-
level covariates. Its parameters, which describe how class position and individual covariates 
relate to both mean income and income dispersion, are estimated in two steps. First, estimates of 
the mean effects,   ,   , and   , are obtained from a conventional least squares regression of log 
income on class dummy variables and individual covariates, stratified by time. Second, squared 
residuals from the model for mean income are computed as    
  (               )
 , and 
then the variance effects,   ,   , and   , are estimated by maximum likelihood from a gamma 
regression of the squared residuals on class dummy variables and individual covariates.
14
  
The net effects of class on trends in aggregate inequality are then quantified by plotting 
counterfactual variance estimates that fix the specific regression coefficients associated with 
class position at their baseline values. Specifically, to measure the effect of covariate-adjusted 
changes in mean income between class positions, I compute and plot the following 
counterfactual variance 
  
  ∑    ( ̃  
     
 )     ,                                                                                              (8.9) 
where the adjusted between-cell mean difference,  ̃    ̃    ̅  , is calculated from  ̃   
            . In this notation,    and    denote the values of these variables associated with 
cell   in the cross-classification of all covariates in the analysis. This counterfactual variance is 
                                                          
14
 In empirical analyses, rather than fully stratifying these regressions by time, I model the cell means and variances 
as a smooth cubic function of time. Experimentation with different smooth functions indicated that a cubic 
specification provides the best fit to the observed data. 
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interpreted as the aggregate level of income inequality that would have been observed had net 
differences in mean income between class positions remained constant since the baseline survey 
wave.  
The counterfactual variance that measures the effect of compositional changes in the 
relative size of different classes is given by 
  
  ∑  ̃  (   
     
 )  ,                                                                                                (8.10) 
where  ̃   is a cell proportion reweighted so that the marginal size of different class positions 
remains invariant over time. Let  (   | )      be the marginal proportion of individuals in 
class     at time  . The adjusted cell proportions are given by  ̃   (      ⁄ )    for all cells   
in which    . This counterfactual variance is interpreted as the level of aggregate income 
inequality that would have been observed had the relative size of different class locations 
remained invariant over time. In the GSS, to determine whether the net effects of class on trends 
in aggregate inequality are statistically significant, bootstrap methods are used to test the null 
hypotheses that      
     and      
     for    .
15
 
Where sufficient data permit, analyses parallel to those discussed throughout this section 
are conducted to investigate the effects of class strata on trends in aggregate income inequality. 
Like decompositions based on class position, these analyses involve decomposing changes in 
aggregate income inequality into components due to changes in the relative size of class strata, 
changes in between-strata income differences, and changes in within-strata income dispersion. 
These analyses additionally allow for an assessment of how divergent income trends between 
                                                          
15
 Specifically, I compute 98 percent confidence intervals for   
     and   
     based on the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentiles of a sampling distribution estimated from 500 bootstrap replications. If these confidence intervals do not 
contain the value zero, then the corresponding null hypotheses are rejected at the        level. 
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higher versus lower levels of the ownership and authority structure are linked to changes in 
income inequality at the population level. 
Because of sparseness in multivariate decompositions based on the GSS, observations 
from this data source are pooled within decades, and estimates are computed separately for the 
1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. This ensures that there are a sufficient number of observations in each 
cell of the decomposition table, improves the precision of estimates, and still allows for an 
informative, albeit less fine-grained, tracking of changes over time. 
 
Results 
Trends in Aggregate Income Inequality from 1983 to 2010 
Figure 8.1 displays trends in the variance of log income. The solid black line represents 
estimates from the GSS, the solid grey line represents estimates from the CPS, and the dotted 
grey line plots smooth model-based estimates from the CPS. Several patterns are evident in these 
data. First, estimates from the GSS suggest a higher overall level of income inequality than 
estimates from the CPS. For example, in the 1980s, the variance of log income in the GSS is 
about 0.45, while in the CPS it ranges between 0.36 and 0.40 during this period. A more detailed 
comparison of estimated income distributions from the GSS and CPS indicate that the higher 
overall level of inequality in the GSS is due to a greater frequency of low incomes. For example, 
during the 1980s, the first, fifth, and tenth percentiles of the income distribution in the GSS were 
about $7,500, $12,000, and $16,000, respectively, while in the CPS, the same percentiles were 
$9,500, $15,000, and $19,000. Above the tenth percentile, estimated income quantiles in the GSS 
and CPS are very similar. This suggests that midpoint imputation with the GSS interval measure 
of personal income may be less accurate in the lower tail of the distribution. 
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Second, both the GSS and CPS reveal an upward trend in aggregate income inequality 
since the early 1980s. The GSS, however, suggests that growth in income inequality was more 
pronounced from the 1990s to the 2000s, while the CPS suggests steeper growth in income 
inequality during the 1980s. In the GSS, the variance of log income increased by about 6 percent, 
from 0.46 to 0.49, between the 1980s and 1990s. Between the 1990s and 2000s, the variance of 
log income increased by about 16 percent, from 0.49 to 0.57. In the CPS, by contrast, the 
variance of log income increased by about 14 percent, from 0.36 to 0.41, between 1983 and 
1990. Then, between the mid-1990s and the late 2000s, the variance of log income increased by 
about 9 percent, from 0.44 to 0.48. The marked fluctuation in CPS estimates of aggregate income 
inequality during the early 1990s is likely due, at least in part, to a major questionnaire redesign, 
a change in survey mode, and a large increase in the topcoding thresholds for certain categories 
of income, all of which occurred between the 1993 and 1995 survey waves.
16
 
Trend estimates of the variance of log income provide a concise summary of overall 
changes in aggregate income inequality, but they do not reveal the more specific distributional 
changes underlying these trends. To investigate changes in the lower tail, middle, and upper tail 
of the income distribution that may be driving overall growth in the variance of log income, 
Figure 8.2 displays trends in the fifth percentile, the median, and the ninety-fifth percentile of the 
income distribution. These estimates are scaled to equal zero at the baseline time period, and all 
values thereafter represent proportionate changes.  
                                                          
16
 For a detailed review of these design changes to the CPS, see Burkhauser et al (2004) and Ryscavage (1999). 
Although abrupt changes in CPS topcoding thresholds lead to some pronounced short-term fluctuations in estimates 
of aggregate income inequality, previous research indicates that estimates of the long-term trend in aggregate 
inequality computed from these data (e.g., as depicted by the slope of the smooth model-based estimates in Figure 1) 
are highly consistent with similar trend estimates computed from alternative data that constrain the extent of 
topcoding to be the same across all waves of the CPS (Burkhauser et al 2004; Larrimore et al 2008). 
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In the GSS, estimates suggest that growth in aggregate income inequality is driven almost 
entirely by increasing incomes in the upper tail of the distribution together with stagnating 
incomes in the middle and lower tail of the distribution. Because top incomes grew more rapidly 
between the 1990s and the 2000s, GSS estimates of growth in aggregate income inequality were 
more pronounced during this period than during the 1980s. In the CPS, by contrast, growth in 
aggregate income inequality between the early 1980s and mid-1990s was driven by both 
increasing incomes at the top of the distribution and declining incomes at the bottom. The 
divergent estimates for the fifth percentile of the income distribution from the GSS and CPS 
again suggest that the interval measure of income used by the GSS is less accurate in the lower 
tail of the distribution. After the mid-1990s, Figure 8.2 indicates that both the median and fifth 
percentile increased moderately in the CPS, but aggregate income inequality continued to 
increase, albeit at a slower pace, because of pronounced income growth in the upper tail of the 
distribution. 
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Figure 8.1. Trends in Aggregate Income Inequality
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 
GSS and CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
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Figure 8.2. Trends in Income Quantiles
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Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 GSS and CPS 
waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets. Estimates are scaled to equal the percentage 
change since the baseline time period. CPS estimates are based on 5-year smoothed averges.
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Decomposition of Trends in Inequality by Class Position 
Table 8.1 presents results from a formal decomposition of changes in aggregate income 
inequality by class position, with estimates computed separately for the GSS and CPS. Results 
from the GSS indicate that compositional changes in the relative size of different classes had a 
negligible effect and that changes in between-class income differences had a modest dampening 
effect on growth in aggregate income inequality between the 1980s and 1990s. Between the 
1990s and 2000s, however, estimates from the GSS suggest that compositional changes in the 
relative size of different classes had a modest dampening effect and that growth in between-class 
income differences had a strong inflationary effect on trends in aggregate income inequality. For 
example, point estimates indicate that growth in between-class income differences explains about 
30 percent of the increase in aggregate income inequality between the 1990s and 2000s. For the 
entire period under consideration, results from the GSS indicate that compositional changes in 
the relative size of different classes had a modest dampening effect, that growth in between-class 
income differences had a modest inflationary effect, and that growth in within-class income 
dispersion had a very large inflationary effect on trends in aggregate income inequality. 
Results from the CPS are generally consistent with those from the GSS, although point 
estimates for compositional and between-class effects are somewhat less pronounced. The 
weight of the evidence from the CPS suggests that compositional changes in the relative size of 
different classes had a very small dampening effect on trends in aggregate income inequality 
throughout the period from 1983 to 2010. In addition, estimates from the CPS suggest that 
growth in between-class income differences had a negligible impact on growth in aggregate 
income inequality during the 1980s and a modest inflationary effect during the 1990s and 2000s. 
For example, between 1990 and 2000, the between-class effect explains 16 percent of the growth 
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in income inequality at the population level. Further echoing results from the GSS, increases in 
within-class income dispersion had the largest inflationary effects on trends in aggregate income 
inequality in the CPS. 
Figure 8.3 displays counterfactual variance estimates that quantify covariate-adjusted 
compositional and between-class effects on growth in aggregate income inequality since the 
early 1980s. These estimates are based on a multivariate decomposition of changes in the 
variance of log income combined with a variance function regression that controls for age, race, 
gender, and education. By controlling for the potentially confounding influence of individual-
level determinants of income and class attainment, these counterfactual estimates describe the 
net impact of compositional changes in the relative size of different classes and changes in 
between-class income differences. 
Results from the GSS indicate that observed aggregate income inequality (i.e., the 
variance of log income) increased by 24 percent, from about 0.46 to 0.57, between the 1980s and 
2000s. In comparison, estimates of the counterfactual variance quantifying the between-class 
effect indicate that aggregate income inequality would have increased by only 20 percent, from 
about 0.46 to 0.55, if covariate-adjusted income differences between class positions had 
remained unchanged at their 1980s level. Similarly, in the CPS, observed aggregate income 
inequality increased by 33 percent, from about 0.36 to 0.48, while estimates of the counterfactual 
variance quantifying between-class effects indicate that aggregate income inequality would have 
increased by only 28 percent, from about 0.36 to 0.46, if the net effects of class position on 
income had remained unchanged at their 1983 level. In other words, growth in between-class 
income differences had a significant inflationary impact on trends in aggregate income 
inequality, even after accounting for the confounding influence of education and demographic 
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characteristics. Counterfactual variance estimates quantifying compositional effects indicate that 
aggregate income inequality would have increased by a slightly larger amount if the relative size 
of different classes had not changed since the early 1980s. 
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Est. 95% CI Est. 95% CI Est. 95% CI
GSS
1980s to 1990s .02 (–.05, .07) –.17 (–.42, –.04) 1.16 (1.02, 1.43)
1980s to 2000s –.13 (–.17, –.10) .16 (.11, .21) .97 (.92, 1.02)
1990s to 2000s –.16 (–.23, –.12) .30 (.23, .38) .87 (.81, .93)
CPS
1983 to 1990 –.02 - –.01 - 1.02 -
1983 to 2000 –.02 - .08 - .93 -
1983 to 2010 –.02 - .07 - .95 -
1990 to 2000 –.03 - .16 - .87 -
1990 to 2010 –.03 - .12 - .91 -
Pr of change in variance of log income due to:
Study/period
Table 8.1. Decomposition of Trends in Aggregate Income Inequality by Class Position
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 
to 2010 GSS and CPS waves. Results are based on 5 multiple imputation datasets. Confidence 
intervals in parentheses are based on quantiles of 500 bootstrap sample estimates.
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Figure 8.3. Counterfactual Estimates of Income Inequality for Compositional and Between-class Effects
Total inequality
Comp effect
Btw-class effect
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 GSS and CPS 
waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets. The "C" and "B" labels respectively 
indicate that the compositional and between-class effects are statistically significant at the p<0.02 level in the GSS.
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C
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Decomposition of Trends in Inequality by Class Strata 
Table 8.2 presents results from a formal decomposition analysis of changes in aggregate 
income inequality by class strata—an analysis that incorporates gradational distinctions in the 
scope of authority and the extent of property ownership within production. This decomposition is 
based on data from 1994 to 2010 in the GSS and from 1992 to 2002 in the CPS because these are 
the periods for which the information needed to accurately measure gradational distinctions in 
property and authority are available in both surveys. 
In the GSS, compositional changes in the relative size of different class strata had a 
modest dampening effect on growth in aggregate income inequality between the 1990s and 
2000s, while changes in between-strata income differences had a large inflationary effect. For 
example, point estimates indicate that growth in between-strata income differences can explain 
nearly 50 percent of the increase in aggregate income inequality between the 1990s and 2000s. 
Results from the GSS also indicate that growth in within-strata income dispersion had a large 
inflationary effect on trends in aggregate income inequality. 
Results from the CPS are consistent, at least in part, with those from the GSS. 
Decomposition estimates from the CPS indicate that compositional changes in the relative size of 
different class strata had no impact on trends in aggregate income inequality. In addition, these 
estimates suggest that growth in between-strata income differences had a significant inflationary 
impact, although this effect is less pronounced than is indicated by estimates from the GSS. 
Specifically, in the CPS, the between-strata effect explains 15 percent of the growth in aggregate 
income inequality between 1992 and 2002. Results from the CPS also suggest that growth in 
within-strata income dispersion had a large inflationary effect, accounting for 85 percent of the 
increase in aggregate income inequality during the 1990s. 
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Figure 8.4 displays counterfactual variance estimates that quantify covariate-adjusted 
compositional and between-strata effects on growth in aggregate income inequality since the 
1990s. Results from the GSS indicate that observed aggregate inequality increased by 12 percent, 
from about 0.51 to 0.57, between the 1990s and 2000s. By contrast, counterfactual variance 
estimates for the between-strata effect indicate that aggregate income inequality would have 
increased by only 6 percent, from about 0.51 to 0.54, if covariate-adjusted income differences 
between class strata had remained unchanged at their 1990s level. In the CPS, observed 
aggregate inequality increased by 18 percent, from about 0.39 to 0.46, while counterfactual 
variance estimates indicate that aggregate income inequality would have increased by 15 percent, 
from about 0.39 to 0.45, if covariate-adjusted income differences between class strata had 
remained at same level since 1992. In both data sources, counterfactual variance estimates for the 
compositional effect indicate changes in the relative size of different class strata had a 
comparatively minimal impact on trends in aggregate income inequality since the early 1990s. 
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Est. 95% CI Est. 95% CI Est. 95% CI
GSS
1990s to 2000s –.18 (–.26, –.12) .48 (.38, .61) .70 (.61, .77)
CPS
1992 to 2002 .00 - .15 - .85 -
Pr of change in variance of log income due to:
Study/period
Table 8.2. Decomposition of Trends in Aggregate Income Inequality by Class Strata
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1994 
to 2010 GSS waves and the 1992 to 2002 CPS waves. Results are based on 5 multiple 
imputation datasets. Confidence intervals in parentheses are based on quantiles of 500 
bootstrap sample estimates.
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Figure 8.4. Counterfactual Estimates of Income Inequality for Compositional and Between-strata Effects
Total inequality
Comp effect
Btw-strata effect
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1994 to 2010 GSS waves and 
the 1992 to 2002 CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets. The "C" and "B" labels 
respectively indicate that compositional and between-strata effects are statistically significant at the p<0.02 level in the GSS.
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Summary 
Results indicate that compositional changes in the relative size of different classes had a 
small dampening effect and that growth in between-class income differences had a moderate 
inflationary effect on trends in aggregate income inequality from the 1980s to 2000s. Between-
class effects were weaker during the 1980s, when growing inequality was due in part to declining 
incomes at the bottom of the distribution, and stronger during the 1990s and 2000s, when 
growing inequality was largely due to increasing incomes at the top of the distribution. 
Additional analyses that incorporate gradational differences in property ownership and 
workplace authority suggest that growing income differences between class strata may explain as 
much as 50 percent of the growth in aggregate income inequality during the 1990s and 2000s. 
Despite evidence of significant between-class effects, increasing within-class income dispersion 
consistently had the largest impact on growth in income inequality at the population level.  
Although the weight of the evidence indicates that changes in between-class income 
differences had a notable impact on trends in aggregate income inequality, it remains unclear 
whether these effects have been more or less consequential than the effects of individual 
characteristics, such as educational attainment, that are commonly hypothesized to have been the 
primary determinants of recent growth in inequality (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Juhn 
1999; Lemieux 2006). To assess the practical significance of between-class effects, I compare 
them to the effects of increasing income returns to education on growth in aggregate income 
inequality. Results from this comparative decomposition analysis (not shown, available upon 
request) indicate that increasing income returns to education have generally had a larger impact 
on trends in aggregate income inequality than growth in between-class income differences. For 
example, results suggest that increasing income returns to education explain between 35 to 50 
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percent of growth in aggregate income inequality from the early 1980s to 2000s, while between-
class effects explain only about 10 to 20 percent of this growth. However, during certain periods, 
like the 1990s, estimates indicate that between-class effects are comparable to the effects of 
increasing income returns to education. 
The results presented in this chapter are difficult to reconcile with the declining 
significance of class perspective. Income differences between classes have increased 
substantially, the relative number of proprietors and managers has declined, and the relative 
number of workers has increased since the 1980s. These changes, and especially growth in 
between-class income differences, had a significant impact on recent trends in aggregate income 
inequality, consistent with the patterns predicted by class-analytic theory. Although these 
findings tend to support class-analytic theory, some important ambiguities remain. In particular, 
results indicate not only that classes have become more dissimilar from one another but also that 
they  have become more internally differentiated in terms of income. Furthermore, this growth in 
within-class income dispersion consistently had the largest impact on changes in aggregate 
income inequality.  
The results presented in Chapter VI indicate that growth in within-class income 
dispersion among workers was driven by declining incomes throughout the lower half of the 
distribution, stagnating incomes in the middle, and modestly growing incomes at the very top. 
Among proprietors and managers, by contrast, growth in within-class income dispersion was due 
to enormous income gains for the highest-earning proprietors and managers together with 
smaller, although still nontrivial, income gains for other members of these classes. At a simple 
level, growing within-class income dispersion lends support to the declining significance of class 
perspective in that large social classes, and workers in particular, have become more atomized 
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and no longer represent largely homogenous social groups with highly constrained life chances. 
But rather than foretelling the “death of class” as a social position with meaningful impacts and 
constraints on individual material welfare, growth in within-class inequality may simply reflect 
the differential impacts of monopolization, institutional change, and technological development 
on certain subgroups of proprietors, managers, and workers.  
For example, growing monopolization and economic concentration are expected to widen 
the overall gap in material welfare between different class positions, but the effects of 
competitive insulation are likely much more pronounced for proprietors and high-level managers 
in control of large enterprises than for small business owners and low-level supervisors. 
Similarly, institutional changes that improve the bargaining position of ownership and 
management, such as deunionization, are also likely to have their most pronounced effects on the 
incomes of unskilled workers and large employers. This type of internal heterogeneity within 
class positions—whether in terms of income, occupation, or skill—is not incompatible with 
class-analytic theory, except for perhaps its most ambitious variants that posit an extensive and 
growing degree of uniformity among members of the same class.  
 This chapter provides evidence of a robust relationship between class structure and 
changes in aggregate income inequality over the past three decades. These findings demand a 
reconsideration of recent theoretical claims that social classes—defined in terms of property and 
authority relations within production—are no longer linked to detectable patterns inequality in 
modern societies. Contrary to these arguments, this analysis indicates that class-analytic theory 
remains important for understanding recent trends in aggregate income inequality. 
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CHAPTER IX 
Conclusion 
 
Since the early 1980s, aggregate income inequality has increased substantially in the 
United States, and different sociological theories provide competing predictions about the link 
this trend and social classes. On one side of the debate, class-analytic theory suggests that the 
dynamics of market competition, technological development, and class conflict have widened 
income disparities between classes and disproportionately expanded the number of workers 
relative to the number of proprietors and managers. These between-class and compositional 
changes are anticipated to have a large inflationary effect and a small dampening effect, 
respectively, on growth in aggregate income inequality. The declining significance of class 
perspective, by contrast, contends that technological, political, and cultural changes have 
attenuated income differences between classes and disproportionately expanded the number of 
proprietors and managers relative to the number of workers, leading to a large dampening 
between-class effect and a small inflationary compositional effect on trends in aggregate income 
inequality. 
Despite ongoing theoretical debates about the continuing relevance of class for 
contemporary patterns of inequality, previous empirical research has not investigated the link 
between class structure and recent changes in the aggregate distribution of personal income. 
With time-series data from two omnibus national surveys, this study examines whether changes 
in class structure and between-class income differences are related to trends in income inequality 
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at the population level. Specifically, it assigns respondents to classes in a simple typology based 
on their position within the ownership and authority structure of the workplace and then 
decomposes growth in aggregate income inequality to evaluate the impact of compositional 
changes in the relative size of different classes, changes in between-class income differences, 
and changes in within-class income dispersion. 
Results indicate that between-class income differences increased by at least 50 percent 
since the 1980s. This increase was driven by growing incomes for managers and especially 
proprietors together with stagnating incomes for workers. Results also indicate that, since the 
mid-1980s, the proportion of workers and independent producers increased, while the proportion 
of proprietors and managers declined. Finally, formal decomposition analyses suggest that 
changes in the relative size of different classes had a small dampening effect and that growth in 
between-class income differences had a large inflationary effect on trends in aggregate income 
inequality, particularly during the 1990s. 
This study makes a number of contributions to theory and empirical research on class 
structure and income inequality. First, it outlines a simple approach to class analysis of income 
distribution based on several interrelated perspectives within the conflict theoretical framework, 
including anarchist theory and neo-Marxist theory. This framework has several advantages over 
other approaches to class analysis. In particular, it implies a parsimonious class typology that is 
easily measured and deployed in empirical research, avoids the ad hoc quality of alternative 
approaches that expand or contract their class typologies based on analytic convenience (e.g., 
Breen 2005; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), provides a precise account of the mechanisms—
exploitation and domination—underlying class conflict, and contains a more comprehensive 
theory of the social changes governing trends in class structure and class inequality over time. 
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Second, by testing several key implications of this framework using time-series data from 
two large national surveys, this study addresses calls for historical investigations of class 
inequality (Wright 1997) as well as recent arguments that class has dissolved as a salient 
explanatory category in modern society (Pakulski 2005). This type of population-based evidence 
about property, authority, and personal income distribution over time is largely absent from the 
literature on social stratification in America. The results of this analysis resonate with research 
on the functional distribution of income, which documents a declining share of labor income 
since the early 1980s (Baker and Mishel 1995; Dumenil and Levy 2004b; Kristal 2013), and with 
studies of executive compensation, which reveal enormous income gains for those at the apex of 
the managerial hierarchy in America’s largest companies (Frydman and Jenter 2010). With 
nationally representative data on personal market income, this study extends these findings by 
showing that widening income differences between positions in the property and authority 
structure of the American economy is a general and pervasive social trend with a pronounced 
effect on growth in income inequality among the population at large. 
Third, this study also contributes methodologically by applying a new approach to 
covariate adjustment in nonparametric regression models: IP-weighted local linear estimation. In 
the foregoing analyses, this method provided an efficient way to adjust income trends for 
demographic and educational differences across classes without imposing a rigid functional form 
on the relationship between class, covariates, and income over time. This method can be applied 
to any problem that involves estimating temporal trends in the group means of a metric outcome. 
It is especially useful when the shapes of the group-specific time trends are unknown and the 
groups of interest differ on covariates that also affect the outcome. 
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Public debate about the most effective means for attenuating income inequality is largely 
dominated by just two perspectives. The conservative perspective, insofar as it admits that 
growing inequality is in fact a problem, contends that declining incomes at the bottom of the 
distribution are due to a persistent subversion of morale, motivation, and effort caused by high 
taxes, generous welfare programs, and government regulation. The solution, therefore, is to 
reduce the scope of government interventions in the economy and allow the forces of market 
competition to naturally multiply the ambition and effort of workers. The liberal perspective, by 
contrast, argues that the market should be relied upon as much as possible, but where 
inefficiencies, excesses, and imperfections remain, the welfare state should be strengthened and 
government should be used as a redistributive mechanism without fundamentally restructuring 
the social relations of production. 
The theory and results presented in this study suggest a third perspective could be 
productively added to the public debate. Specifically, they suggest that inequality may also be 
attenuated by transforming exclusionary ownership and authority relations within the workplace. 
To achieve this transformation, some theorists in the class-analytic tradition have advocated for a 
state-controlled nonmarket system of production and distribution (e.g., Marx 1978), while others 
have promoted a loosely regulated market economy inhabited by a vibrant mix of independent 
producers, worker-owned and managed cooperative enterprises, and democratically controlled 
banking institutions (e.g., Proudhon 2011). Given the mixed progress and limited success of the 
liberal and conservative proposals in recent decades, a serious public discussion of alternative 
modes of organizing and governing productive enterprises that do not involve rigidly hierarchical 
property and authority relations seems warranted. 
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Although this study provides a number of important contributions to theory and research 
on class structure and income inequality, it is not without limitations. First, it relies on a 
somewhat limited measure of class position that imperfectly captures differences in ownership 
and authority within production. For example, it remains unclear whether self-employment and 
supervisory data from full-time respondents accurately classifies rentiers, venture capitalists, and 
corporate directors with substantial shareholdings as proprietors because much of their income is 
generated through passive engagement in economic activity.  
Second, despite efforts to control for several types of skills using measures of educational 
attainment, cognitive test scores, and disaggregated occupational categories, it remains possible 
that observed income trends between class positions are simply due to unobserved skill 
heterogeneity. Without more detailed data, it is difficult to completely rule out the possibility that 
observed trends in between-class income differences are not merely the result of changing 
income returns to unobserved skills.  
Third, this study focuses on but one of a variety of different income measures—personal 
market income excluding the value of capital gains and in-kind benefits. Changes to the tax code 
that incentivize proprietors to shift capital income payments to salaries and bonuses as well as 
growth in the value of employer-provided benefits to workers may distort estimates of class 
inequality over time. In addition, although this income measure captures trends in market-
mediated distributional outcomes, it may be less reliable as an indicator of changes in personal 
material welfare because it ignores the impact of government taxes and transfers. 
Finally, this study does not evaluate the more specific claims of class-analytic theory 
about the underlying mechanisms responsible for long-term changes in class structure and class 
inequality, such as technological development, institutional change, and monopolization. This 
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study suggests a close correspondence between these underlying mechanisms and class effects 
on aggregate income inequality, but it does not rigorously evaluate causal link between them. 
These limitations highlight important directions for future research on class structure and 
income inequality. In particular, future research should focus on whether the trends documented 
in this study are directly related to patterns of capital mobility, technological substitution, 
monopoly power, and different types of class-based political activism. This might be 
accomplished by linking individual data from the CPS or GSS to information on plant 
relocations and sector monopolization from the Economic Census or to information on corporate 
investment in political candidates from the Federal Election Commission. These data might be 
used to test whether regional or inter-industry differences in class inequality are associated with 
local rates of capital mobility, differential monopolization across industrial sectors, or corporate 
political investment at the state level. Future research should also investigate alternative 
measures of property, authority, and income—for example, by using data from the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics on individuals’ non-household wealth holdings, decision latitude in 
production, and lifetime incomes that account for the value of capital gains, in-kind benefits, and 
government taxes and transfers. 
Despite these limitations, this study provides evidence of a robust relationship between 
class structure and changes in aggregate income inequality over the past three decades. These 
findings demand a reconsideration of recent theoretical claims that social classes—defined in 
terms of property and authority relations within production—are no longer linked to detectable 
patterns inequality in modern societies. Contrary to these arguments, this study indicates that 
class-analytic theory remains important for understanding recent trends in population-level 
income inequality. As social scientists increasingly grapple with these trends, rigorous 
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integration of class-analytic theory with quantitative empirical research will be crucial for 
advancing knowledge of social stratification. 
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APPENDIX A 
Parallel Analyses of Full- and Part-time Respondents 
 
To assess whether results are sensitive to sample restrictions based on levels of economic 
engagement, this appendix presents results from a parallel analysis that includes both full- and 
part-time respondents. If trends in the relative size of different classes or in between-class 
income differences are substantially different among respondents who work part-time, the results 
presented in the main text may provide a misleading assessment of the link between class 
structure and aggregate inequality over time. In this analysis, respondent reports of their annual 
income are converted to an estimated hourly wage rate using additional information on the 
typical length of a work week in hours and the number of weeks worked in the previous year. 
Data on work hours and work weeks are collected from all respondents at every survey wave of 
CPS, but the GSS records these measures in only a handful of survey waves for a small subset of 
respondents. Analyses of hourly wages are therefore based on data only from the CPS. 
Results from this analysis are presented in Figures A.1 to A.18 and Tables A.1 to A.2. 
They are very similar to those reported in the main text. Findings from the pooled sample of full- 
and part-time respondents reveal a substantial increase in wage inequality between class 
positions driven by rapidly growing wages for proprietors and managers, and stagnating wages 
for workers. Results further indicate that divergent wages between class positions are not simply 
due to demographic or educational differences, and that wage growth is especially pronounced 
among the highest-earning upper strata of proprietors and managers. Consistent with results 
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presented in the main text, Figure A.3 suggests that between-class wage differences increased by 
about 50 percent from 1983 through the mid-2000s, and then declined slightly during the 
economic recession of 2007 to 2009. 
Estimates from the pooled sample of full- and part-time respondents also indicate that 
during the 1970s, the proportion of workers declined and the proportion of managers and 
proprietors increased. But from the mid-1980s onward, these trends reversed, and the proportion 
of workers increased while the proportions of managers and proprietors steadily declined. In 
addition, results from this parallel analysis indicate that racial and gender disparities remained 
fairly stable throughout this period. Although estimates suggest modest fluctuations in racial and 
gender disparities over time, there is no discernable trend toward either larger or smaller racial 
and gender differences in class attainment from 1972 to 2010. 
Results from a parallel decomposition analysis based on respondents in the CPS who 
worked either full- or part-time are quite similar to those reported in the main text, although there 
are some minor differences. Findings from the pooled sample indicate that growth in between-
class wage differences had a notable inflationary effect on growth in aggregate wage inequality. 
Furthermore, this effect was more pronounced in the 1990s and 2000s than in the 1980s. For 
example, estimates in Table A.1 indicate that growth in between-class wage differences explains 
about 9 percent of the growth in aggregate wage inequality throughout the entire period from 
1983 to 2010, but during the period from 1990 to 2010, growth in between-class wage inequality 
explains about 17 percent of the growth in aggregate wage inequality. Unlike the results 
presented in the main text, parallel analyses of wage inequality among both full- and part-time 
respondents suggests a small inflationary effect (rather than a small dampening effect) of 
compositional changes in the relative size of different classes on growth in aggregate wage 
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inequality. These differences are fairly minor, however, and both analyses suggest relatively 
small compositional effects. The main substantive finding that growth in between-class 
inequality had a significant inflationary impact on trends in aggregate inequality, particularly 
during the 1990s and 2000s, is not sensitive to sample restrictions based on a respondent’s level 
of economic engagement.
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Figure A.1. Unadjusted Trends in Mean Hourly Wage by Class, Full- and Part-time CPS Samples
Workers
Ind. Producers
Managers
Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work either full- or part-time
in the 1983 to 2010 CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation 
datasets.
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Figure A.2. Covariate-adjusted Trends in Mean Hourly Wage by Class, Full- and Part-time CPS Samples
Workers
Ind. Producers
Managers
Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work either full- or part-time
in the 1983 to 2010 CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation 
datasets.
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Figure A.3. Total Change in Mean Wage Differences between Class Positions, Full- and Part-time CPS Samples
Unadjusted means
Adjusted means
Notes: Samples include respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work either full- or part-time
in the 1983 to 2010 CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation 
datasets.
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Figure A.4. Covariate-adjusted Trends in Wage Deciles by Class, Full- and Part-time CPS Samples 
A. Workers           B. Independent Producers 
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Figure A.4 continued 
C. Managers           D. Proprietors 
       
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work either full- or part-time in the 1983 to 2010 CPS waves. 
Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets and are based on quantile regression models with quadratic 
functions of time. 
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Figure A.5. Unadjusted Trends in Mean Hourly Wage by Class Strata. Full- and Part-time CPS Samples
Low-level Managers
High-level Managers
Small Proprietors
Large Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work either full- or part-time in 
the 1992-2002 CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
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Figure A.6. Covariate-adjusted Trends in Mean Hourly Wage by Class Strata, Full- and Part-time CPS Samples
Low-level Managers
High-level Managers
Small Proprietors
Large Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work either full- or part-time in 
the 1992-2002 CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
  
 
1
68
 
Figure A.7. Covariate-adjusted Trends in Wage Deciles by Class Strata, Full- and Part-time CPS Samples 
A. Low-level Managers         B. High-level Managers 
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Figure A.7 continued 
C. Small Proprietors          D. Large Proprietors 
       
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work either full- or part-time in the 1992 to 2002 CPS waves. 
Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets and are based on quantile regression models with quadratic 
functions of time. 
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Figure A.8. Trends in Class Structure, Full- and Part-time GSS Samples
Workers
Managers
Ind. Producers
Proprietors
Notes: Plot displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and 
work full- or part-time in the 1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation 
datasets. 
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Figure A.9. Trends in Class Strata, Full- and Part-time GSS Samples
Low-level Managers
High-level Managers
Small Proprietors
Large Proprietors
Notes: Plot displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and 
work full- and part-time in the 1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation 
datasets. 
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Figure A.10. Unadjusted Racial Disparities in Class Attainment, Full- and Part-time GSS Samples
Workers
Managers
Ind. Producers
Proprietors
Notes: Plot displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and 
work full- or part-time in the 1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation 
datasets. 
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Notes: Plot displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and 
work full- or part-time in the 1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation 
datasets. Proportions are estimated with control variables set to their pooled sample means.
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Figure A.11. Covariate-adjusted Racial Disparities in Class Attainment, Full- and Part-time GSS Samples
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Figure A.12. Unadjusted Gender Disparities in Class Attainment, Full- and Part-time GSS Samples
Workers
Managers
Ind. Producers
Proprietors
Notes: Plot displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and 
work full- or part-time in the 1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation 
datasets.
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Notes: Plot displays 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and 
work full- or part-time in the 1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation 
datasets. Proportions are estimated with control variables set to their sample means.
Men
Women
Figure A.13. Covariate-adjusted Gender Disparities in Class Attainment, Full- and Part-time GSS Samples
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Figure A.14. Unadjusted Racial and Gender Differences in Attainment of Class Strata, Full- and Part-time GSS 
Samples
Low-level Managers
High-level Managers
Small Proprietors
Large Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full- or part-time in the 
1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation datasets.
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Figure A.15. Covariate-adjusted Racial and Gender Differences in Attainment of Class Strata, Full and Part-
time GSS Samples
Low-level Managers
High-level Managers
Small Proprietors
Large Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full- or part-time in the 
1972 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 20 multiple imputation datasets. 
Proportions are estimated with control variables set to their sample means.
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Figure A.16. Trends in Aggregate Wage Inequality, Full- and Part-time CPS Samples
Observed
Model-based
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full- or part-time in the 1983 to 
2010 CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
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Figure A.17. Counterfactual Estimates of Wage Inequality for Compositional and Between-class Effects, Full-
and Part-time CPS Samples
Total inequality
Comp effect
Btw-class effect
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full- or part-time in the 1983 to 2010 CPS 
waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
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Figure A.18. Counterfactual Estimates of Wage Inequality for Compositional and Between-strata Effects, Full-
and Part-time CPS samples
Total inequality
Comp effect
Btw-strata effect
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full- or part-time in the 1992 to 2002 
CPS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
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Compositional Between-group Within-group
effect effect effect
CPS
1983 to 1990 .06 –.01 .95
1983 to 2000 .07 .08 .85
1983 to 2010 .06 .09 .85
1990 to 2000 .04 .22 .74
1990 to 2010 .03 .17 .80
Pr of change in variance of log income due to:
Study/period
Table A.1. Decomposition of Trends in Aggregate Wage Inequality by Class 
Position, Full- and Part-time CPS Samples
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full- or 
part-time in the 1983 to 2010 CPS waves. Results are based on 5 multiple 
imputation datasets.
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Compositional Between-group Within-group
effect effect effect
CPS
1992 to 2002 .07 .16 .77
Pr of change in variance of log income due to:
Study/period
Table A.2. Decomposition of Trends in Aggregate Wage Inequality by Class 
Strata, Full- and Part-time CPS Samples
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full- or 
part-time in the 1992 to 2002 CPS waves. Results are based on 5 multiple 
imputation datasets.
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APPENDIX B 
Measuring Class with Occupational Data from the CPS 
 
This appendix describes and evaluates the procedures used to assign individuals to 
classes using occupational categories and self-employment data from the CPS. With this 
approach, census occupational categories are used as a proxy measure for supervisory and 
managerial responsibilities at work. Respondents in occupations that typically involve 
supervisory or managerial responsibilities are classified as proprietors if they are self-employed 
and as managers if they are employed by someone else. Conversely, respondents in occupations 
that do not typically involve supervisory or managerial responsibilities are classified as 
independent producers if they are self-employed and workers if they are employed by someone 
else. 
To determine whether occupations typically involve supervisory or managerial 
responsibilities, highly specific occupational categories are first aggregated into larger groups to 
yield sufficiently large sample sizes. Then, these occupational groups are cross-tabulated with 
respondent reports of supervisory responsibilities from the GSS, which collects data on 
occupation and directly asks about various types of job responsibilities. This cross-tabulation is 
presented in the left-hand columns of Table B.1, with occupational groups sorted in descending 
order based on the percentage of respondents who report that they supervise others at work. 
Occupational groups in which more than 50 percent of respondents reported that they 
supervise others at work are defined as typically involving supervisory or managerial  
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responsibilities. Respondents in these occupations are classified as either proprietors or 
managers, depending on their self-employment status. Occupational groups in which less than 50 
percent of respondents reported supervising others at work are defined as not typically involving 
supervisory or managerial responsibilities. Respondents in these occupations are classified as 
either independent producers or workers, depending on their self-employment status. The exact 
coding of the occupational proxy measure used in the main text is documented in the middle and 
right-hand columns of Table B.1, which provide a breakdown of detailed occupational codes 
next to their class assignments. 
This measurement strategy is subject to known error. It misclassifies respondents who 
have control over the work activities of others but are in occupations that do not typically involve 
supervisory or managerial responsibilities (e.g., a self-employed “carpenter” that owns a large 
construction company is classified as an independent producer rather than a proprietor). It also 
misclassifies respondents who do not have any control over the work activities of others but are 
in an occupation that does typically involve supervisory or managerial responsibilities (e.g., an 
employed “real estate agent” without a subordinate staff or any decision latitude within his or her 
company is classified as a manager rather than a worker). Despite these known limitations, 
occupational categories still capture some information about supervisory and managerial 
responsibilities and thus can be used together with self-employment data to roughly assign 
individuals to classes. 
For a certain subset of occupations, this measurement strategy is particularly prone to 
error because these occupational categories do not closely reflect the social relations of 
production. Specifically, for engineering, skilled trade, and farming occupations, Table B.1 
shows that between 40 and 50 percent of respondents have supervisory or managerial 
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responsibilities at work. This indicates that many individuals in these occupations have an 
inaccurate class assignment from the proxy measurement procedure.  
Self-employed carpenters, for example, likely include both owners of large home 
building companies as well as small independent contractors. Similarly, carpenters that report 
working for someone else are likely composed of many regular workers with no control over the 
activities of others as well as a large number of project managers directing construction at 
particular worksites. Engineers, skilled tradespersons, and farmers enter the social relations of 
production in a variety of different ways, making it particularly difficult to assign them to a 
relational class location with a high level of accuracy. Because of the inaccuracy associated with 
measuring the relational class position of engineers, skilled tradespersons, and farmers, this 
appendix evaluates the primary occupational proxy measure on which results presented in the 
main text are based as well as an alternate proxy measure that additionally classifies respondents 
in these occupations as proprietors or managers (rather than independent producers or workers), 
depending on their self-employment status. 
Table B.2 contains static estimates of class size, separately by the different measures of 
described here. These estimates come from the 1994 to 2010 waves of GSS, which is the period 
for which all three class measures can be obtained in this survey. Results indicate that both the 
primary and alternate occupational proxy measures tend to overstate the number of workers and 
understate the number of managers. Furthermore, estimates of the relative size of different strata 
within classes indicate that this pattern of underestimation is primarily due to the occupational 
proxy measures misclassifying a nontrivial number of low-level managers as workers. These 
misclassified low-level managers are likely respondents in non-managerial occupations that 
nevertheless have supervisory responsibilities at the point of production. Table B.2 also provides 
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misclassification rates, which give the percentage of respondents classified differently under the 
direct versus occupational proxy measure. These rates indicate that the primary occupational 
proxy measure assigns about 34 percent of respondents to an incorrect class position and about 
40 percent of respondents to an incorrect class stratum. The alternate occupational proxy 
measure has slightly higher misclassification rates, as expected. 
Table B.3 presents results from static models of income fit to GSS data from 1994 to 
2010, separately by the different class measures. These results help to assess whether between-
class income differences based on the occupational proxy measures are consistent with those 
based on the direct measure. Table B.3 indicates that estimates of class income differences based 
on the primary occupational proxy measure are reasonably consistent with those based on the 
direct measure. The only notable difference is that, compared to the direct measure, the primary 
occupational proxy measure overstates mean income for low-level managers. Taken together 
with the disparate estimates of class size documented in Table B.2, this suggests that the main 
limitation of the primary occupational proxy measure is that it misclassifies a number of 
individuals with low-level supervisory responsibilities in nonmanagerial occupations. Table B.3 
additionally indicates that the alternate occupational proxy measure not only provides somewhat 
inaccurate estimates for managers but also underestimates mean income for proprietors. Based 
on these results, the primary occupational proxy measure that classifies engineers, skilled 
tradespersons, and farmers as independent producers or workers is preferred over the alternate 
measure that classifies respondents in these occupations as proprietors or managers, depending 
on their self-employment status.  
The highest level of confidence in results from the CPS can be achieved if it is also 
possible to demonstrate that the primary substantive conclusions of this study are insensitive to 
 187 
 
the choice of proxy measure. Figures B.1 to B.7 and Tables B.4 to B.5 present results from a 
parallel analysis of the CPS based on the alternate occupational proxy measure of class. The 
alternate proxy measure provides similar estimates of temporal changes in between-class income 
differences and justifies similar substantive conclusions about the link between class structure 
and aggregate income inequality since the early 1980s. 
 In sum, the supplementary analyses presented here indicate that occupational data 
provide a reasonable proxy measure for the relational definition class outlined in this study; that 
the primary occupational proxy measure that classifies engineers, skilled tradespersons, and 
farmers as independent producers or workers performs better than an alternate proxy measure 
that classifies these occupations as proprietors or managers; and that notwithstanding differences 
in performance between the primary and alternate proxy measure, both measures lead to similar 
substantive conclusions about the relationship between class structure and aggregate income 
inequality. 
 
  
  
 
1
88
 
 
  
Self-employed Employed
Production/trade supervisors 85.71 Proprietor Manager 503, 553-8, 613, 633, 803, 823, 843 600, 620,700,770,900,924
Office/clerical supervisors 82.78 Proprietor Manager 303-7, 413-5, 433, 448, 456 370-3,400-1,420-1,430-2,470-1,500
Jurists 73.08 Proprietor Manager 178-9 210-1
Farm/agricultural managers 70.37 Proprietor Manager 475-7, 485 20
Health professionals 69.72 Proprietor Manager 84-9, 96 300-1,304-6,312,325-6
Clergy 69.70 Proprietor Manager 176 204-5
Execs, managers, administrators 66.51 Proprietor Manager 3-22**,23-37 1-16,22-43,50-3,56,62-95
FIRE/sales professionals 60.33 Proprietor Manager 243-55 481-2,492
Construction/extraction trades 47.66 Ind. Producer Worker 563-99, 615-7 622-53,680-92
Architects, engineers 44.24 Ind. Producer Worker 43-59 130-53
Farmers, agricultural workers 42.22 Ind. Producer Worker 473-4, 479-84, 486-98 21,601-13
Writers, artists, entertainers 38.72 Ind. Producer Worker 183-99 260-96
Social/recreational workers 38.71 Ind. Producer Worker 174-5, 177 201-2,206
Scientists 34.77 Ind. Producer Worker 63-83, 166-73 120-4,160-86
Mechanics 31.03 Ind. Producer Worker 505-49 670,701-62
Sales workers 30.31 Ind. Producer Worker 256-85 472-80,483-90,493-6
Technicians and programmers 30.06 Ind. Producer Worker 213-35 100-11,154-6,190-6,214-5,903-4
Precision production workers 28.63 Ind. Producer Worker 634-99 621,780-4,806-10,813,821,823,833-5,844-52,875-6,891-2
Other laborers 25.59 Ind. Producer Worker 863-89 660,671-6,693-4,894-6,942-75
Service workers 24.44 Ind. Producer Worker 403-7, 416-31, 434-47, 449-55, 457-69 374-95,402-16,422-25,434-65,905
Fabricators, inspectors 24.35 Ind. Producer Worker 783-99 666,771-75,814,874,941
Clerical workers 24.05 Ind. Producer Worker 308-89 54,60,501-94
Vehicle/machine operators 23.30 Ind. Producer Worker 703-79, 804-13, 824-9, 844-59 785-804,812,815-20,822,824-32,836-43,853-73,880-90,893,911-23,926-36
Nurses, health techs 17.82 Ind. Producer Worker 95, 97-106, 203-8 303,311,313-24,330-65
Teachers 15.18 Ind. Producer Worker 113-65 200,220-55
**These occupational categories define the upper stratum of the managerial class (i.e., high-level managers)
2000 COCs
Table B.1. Occupational Proxy Measure of Class
Notes: The percentages of respondents in each occupational group that report having supervisory responsibilities come from a GSS sample that includes respondents who are 
18 to 65 years old, work full-time, and have nonmissing occupation and supervisory data in the 1988 to 2010 waves. Bold font is used to highlight those occupations in which 
>60 percent of respondents report having supervisory responsibilities.
Proxy Coding
Occupational group 1980/1990 COCs
Pct w/ Auth 
in GSS
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Class
Workers 57.90 67.56 63.23
Ind. producers 5.76 6.67 5.24
Managers 30.60 20.90 25.28
Proprietors 5.73 4.88 6.24
Missclassification rate - 34.08 34.53
Class strata
Managers
Low-level managers 20.63 11.39 15.72
High-level managers 9.97 9.50 9.56
Proprietors
Small proprietors 4.11 3.47 4.71
Large proprietors 1.62 1.41 1.53
Missclassification rate - 39.74 40.71
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-
time in the 1994 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 
multiple imputation datasets. Missclassification rate gives the percentage of 
respondents classified differently under the direct versus occupational proxy 
measure. The alternate occupational proxy measure additionally classifies 
architects, engineers, production trades, extraction trades, and farmers as 
proprietors or managers (depending on their self-employment status), rather than 
independent producers or workers.
Direct Measure
Alt. Occ. Proxy 
Measure
Occ. Proxy 
Measure
Table B.2. Class distributions by Occupational Proxy Measure, GSS 1994-
2010
Variable
Marginal Pct
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coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
Class
Workers ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Ind. producers 6107 2102 9736 2031 11383 2546 -2647 2014 2066 1883 3604 2374
Managers 16658 1139 24799 1338 23858 1248 11269 987 15807 1207 14186 1165
Proprietors 53920 4128 59791 3797 49832 3246 38415 3431 39960 3567 32000 3059
Rsq
Class strata
Workers ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Ind. producers 6107 2102 9736 2031 11383 2546 -2473 2029 2140 1884 3692 2371
Managers
Low-level managers 9521 1094 19500 1704 18801 1479 6923 1013 13079 1550 11208 1399
High-level managers 31433 2590 31153 2037 32175 2001 20733 2083 19332 1852 19523 1821
Proprietors
Small proprietors 37704 3689 40762 3893 32718 3055 23837 3369 22697 3606 16564 2843
Large proprietors 95219 10962 106738 8403 102692 8140 77062 9168 83380 8098 80573 7830
Rsq 0.107
0.261 0.263 0.256
0.278 0.278 0.275
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1994 to 2010 GSS waves. Results are combined estimates from 
5 multiple imputation datasets. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported. Adjusted models control for time, age, race, sex, education, region, 
cognitive ability, and parental education.
Table B.3. Estimates and Fit Statistics from Static Models of Income by Occupational Proxy Measure, GSS 1994-2010
Specification
Unadjusted Income Model Adjusted Income Model
Direct Measure
Alt. Occ. Proxy 
Measure
Direct Measure
Alt. Occ. Proxy 
Measure
Occ. Proxy 
Measure
Occ. Proxy 
Measure
0.069
0.096
0.089
0.109
0.081
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Compositional Between-group Within-group
effect effect effect
CPS
1983 to 1990 –.04 .08 .96
1983 to 2000 –.04 .09 .95
1983 to 2010 –.04 .04 .99
1990 to 2000 –.05 .09 .96
1990 to 2010 –.05 .02 1.03
Pr of change in variance of log income due to:
Study/period
Table B.4. Decomposition of Trends in Aggregate Income Inequality by an 
Alternate Occupational Proxy Measure of Class Position
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time 
in the 1983 to 2010 CPS waves. Results are based on 5 multiple imputation 
datasets.
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Compositional Between-group Within-group
effect effect effect
CPS
1992 to 2002 .02 .13 .86
Pr of change in variance of log income due to:
Study/period
Table B.5. Decomposition of Trends in Aggregate Income Inequality by an 
Alternate Occupational Proxy Measure of Class Strata
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time 
in the 1992 to 2002 CPS waves. Results are based on 5 multiple imputation 
datasets.
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Figure B.1. Unadjusted Trends in Mean Income by Class and Occupational Proxy Measure, CPS
Workers
Ind. Producers
Managers
Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 CPS waves. 
Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
Alt. occ. proxy 
measure
Occ. proxy 
measure
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Figure B.2. Covariate-adjusted Trends in Mean Income by Class and Occupational Proxy Measure, CPS
Workers
Ind. Producers
Managers
Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 CPS waves. 
Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
Alt. occ. proxy 
measure
Occ. proxy 
measure
  
 
1
95
 
 
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
2.75
3.00
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
S
u
m
 o
f 
E
u
cl
id
ea
n
 D
is
ta
n
ce
s 
(s
cl
 t
o
 1
9
8
3
)
Year
Figure B.3. Total Change in Mean Income Differences between Classes by Occupational Proxy Measure, CPS
Unadjusted means
Adjusted means
Notes: Samples include respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 CPS waves. 
Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
Occ. proxy 
measure
Alt. occ. proxy 
measure
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Figure B.4. Unadjusted Trends in Mean Income by Class Strata and Occupational Proxy Measure, CPS
Low-level Managers
High-level Managers
Small Proprietors
Large Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1992-2002 CPS waves. 
Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
Alt. occ. proxy 
measure
Occ. proxy 
measure
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Figure B.5. Covariate-adjusted Trends in Mean Income by Class Strata and Occupational Proxy Measure, CPS
Low-level Managers
High-level Managers
Small Proprietors
Large Proprietors
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1992-2002 CPS waves. 
Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
Alt. occ. proxy 
measure
Occ. proxy 
measure
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Figure B.6. Counterfactual Estimates of Income Inequality for Compositional and Between-class Effects, 
Alternate Occupational Proxy Measure of Class Position
Total inequality
Comp effect
Btw-class effect
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 CPS waves. 
Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
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Figure B.7. Counterfactual Estimates of Income Inequality for Compositional and Between-strata Effects, 
Alternate Occupational Proxy Measure of Class Strata
Total inequality
Comp effect
Btw-strata effect
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1992 to 2002 CPS 
waves. Results are combined estimates from 5 multiple imputation datasets.
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APPENDIX C 
Income Measurement in the GSS and CPS 
 
This appendix describes the procedures used to measure personal market income in the 
GSS and CPS, and it explains the adjustments applied to topcoded incomes in both surveys. In 
the GSS, total personal income earned over the previous year is measured in intervals, and dollar 
values are imputed based on interval midpoints. The highest incomes fall in a final open-ended 
interval, the lower bound of which increases systematically across survey ways as nominal 
incomes increase over time. Table C.1 provides the exact lower-bound values used as topcode 
thresholds in the GSS as well as the percentage of respondents at each wave with incomes above 
these thresholds. Incomes are topcoded at $50,000 from 1983 to 1985, at $60,000 from 1986 to 
1990, at $75,000 from 1991 to 1997, at $110,000 from 1998 to 2005, and at $150,000 from 2006 
onward.  
For these topcoded incomes, nominal values are estimated using a Pareto approximation 
for the upper tail of the income distribution (Hout 2004). This approach involves extrapolating 
from the next-to-last income interval’s midpoint using the frequencies from both the next-to-last 
and the last open-ended intervals. Specifically, the formula for estimating topcoded incomes is 
          (
 
   
) ,                                                                                                      (C.1) 
where       is the lower bound of the last open-ended income interval and  
  
   (           )    (    )
   (     )    (       )
.                                                                                         (C.2) 
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In Equation C.2,        and      are the frequencies from the next-to-last and the last open-
ended intervals, respectively. These estimates are computed from data pooled across waves that 
use the same income measurement intervals because estimates computed separately for each 
survey wave are somewhat unstable with several extremely large imputed values. Table C.1 
reports the exact values substituted for topcoded incomes based on this imputation procedure.  
In the CPS, income from different sources is measured in nominal dollars using separate 
survey items, and then these amounts are summed to achieve a measure of total market income. 
This study focuses on income from labor, businesses, farm operations, and several different types 
of investments, including income from interest, dividends, and rents. The survey items used to 
measure income from these different sources were revised between 1987 and 1988, so 
information on income measurement and topcoding is presented separately for the periods before 
and after this change. Between 1983 and 1987, the CPS used separate survey items to measure 
income from labor, businesses, farm operations, interest, and dividends and rents combined. 
From 1988 onward, the CPS first asked about income from a respondent’s main job, regardless 
of whether that income came from labor, a business, or a farm. The survey then inquired about 
other income from secondary labor, business, or farm activities not reported as income from a 
respondent’s main job. Additionally, after 1988, the CPS included separate items for income 
from dividends and rents.  
In public CPS data, large incomes from each of these sources are top-coded to protect 
respondent anonymity. The exact topcoding thresholds for each income source and each survey 
wave, together with the percentage of topcoded respondents, are presented in Tables C.2 to C.4. 
To adjust for topcoding in the public CPS, incomes above the topcoding threshold are imputed 
with group-specific means of above-threshold incomes. These means are computed from internal 
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CPS data (not available to the public) in which income topcoding is much less extensive. Internal 
CPS income data are not completely uncensored, but the internal topcoding thresholds are 
generally much higher than topcoding thresholds in the public data (e.g., from 2003 to 2010, the 
internal topcoding threshold for main job income was $1,099,999, while the public threshold was 
$200,000). Overall, internal CPS data contain uncensored incomes from all sources for about 
99.5 to 99.8 percent of the sample (Larrimore et al 2008). Thus, internal CPS data can be used to 
estimate topcoded incomes for the public CPS while maintaining respondent anonymity, but 
because of internal topcoding, even these estimates will slightly understate average incomes for 
respondents above the public topcoding threshold. Nevertheless, this procedure provides more 
accurate estimates of topcoded incomes than other common adjustments, such as imputing based 
on a constant multiple of the public topcoding threshold (Card and DiNardo 2002; Larrimore et 
al 2008). The group means used to impute topcoded incomes in the public CPS are provided in 
Tables C.5 to C.9. From 1996 to 2010, the Census Bureau directly provided these group means 
along with the public CPS data. For survey waves prior to 1996, group means are obtained from 
Larrimore et al (2008), who calculated and reported this information with special permission 
from the Census Bureau in order to provide researchers with a consistent imputation procedure 
over time. 
 There are typically between 1 to 5 percent of respondents with incomes that exceed 
topcode thresholds at any given wave in both the GSS and CPS. For certain groups of 
respondents, however, a significantly higher proportion have topcoded incomes. In particular, 
about 8 percent of proprietors and 18 percent of large proprietors have incomes that exceed the 
topcode threshold for main job earnings in the CPS, and in the GSS, about 18 percent of 
proprietors and 25 percent of large proprietors have topcoded incomes. This indicates that 
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income trends for proprietors and large proprietors, and especially trends in the upper quantiles 
of the income distribution for these groups, are sensitive to topcoding and should therefore be 
interpreted with caution. Furthermore, because the topcoding adjustments in this study do not 
reflect the enormous gains among the upper fractiles (i.e., the top 0.05 to 0.01 percent) of the 
income distribution (Piketty and Saez 2006) and because proprietors and managers are 
disproportionately represented in these fractiles, the estimates provided in this study likely 
understate the true increase in between-class income differences since the early 1980s. 
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Pct topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
Imputed 
value
1983 3.16 50,000 80,732
1984 4.28 50,000 80,732
1985 6.73 50,000 80,732
1986 3.26 60,000 93,729
1987 2.79 60,000 93,729
1988 3.14 60,000 93,729
1989 3.29 60,000 93,729
1990 3.81 60,000 93,729
1991 2.37 75,000 127,858
1993 5.74 75,000 127,858
1994 4.11 75,000 127,858
1996 5.30 75,000 127,858
1998 1.28 110,000 235,730
2000 1.71 110,000 235,730
2002 1.60 110,000 235,730
2004 2.88 110,000 235,730
2006 2.60 150,000 277,607
2008 3.29 150,000 277,607
2010 2.40 150,000 277,607
Table C.1. Topcoded income data in the 1983-2010 
GSS waves
Year
Income
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 
years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 2010 GSS 
waves. Imputed values come from a Pareto approximation 
of the upper tail of the income distribution.
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Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
1983 0.92 75,000 0.21 75,000 0.02 75,000 0.00 75,000 0.02 75,000
1984 0.94 75,000 0.27 75,000 0.03 75,000 0.00 75,000 0.01 75,000
1985 0.51 99,999 0.16 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.02 99,999 0.03 99,999
1986 0.62 99,999 0.13 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.02 99,999
1987 0.83 99,999 0.17 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.01 99,999
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1983 to 1987 CPS waves.
Table C.2. Topcoded income data in the 1983-1987 CPS waves
Dividends/rents
Year
Labor income InterestFarm incomeBusiness income
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Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
1988 0.95 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.00 99,999
1989 1.19 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.00 99,999
1990 1.61 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.00 99,999
1991 1.56 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.03 99,999 0.00 99,999
1992 1.60 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.00 99,999
1993 1.83 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.00 99,999
1994 2.25 99,999 0.03 99,999 0.02 99,999 0.00 99,999
1995 2.61 99,999 0.04 99,999 0.02 99,999 0.01 99,999
1996 0.86 150,000 0.57 25,000 0.12 40,000 0.04 25,000
1997 1.04 150,000 0.42 25,000 0.10 40,000 0.01 25,000
1998 1.10 150,000 0.80 25,000 0.13 40,000 0.05 25,000
1999 1.12 150,000 0.73 25,000 0.15 40,000 0.03 25,000
2000 1.37 150,000 0.87 25,000 0.14 40,000 0.03 25,000
2001 1.57 150,000 1.03 25,000 0.12 40,000 0.08 25,000
2002 1.73 150,000 0.88 25,000 0.17 40,000 0.10 25,000
2003 1.04 200,000 0.42 35,000 0.10 50,000 0.07 25,000
2004 0.96 200,000 0.48 35,000 0.16 50,000 0.11 25,000
2005 0.96 200,000 0.44 35,000 0.14 50,000 0.08 25,000
2006 1.09 200,000 0.53 35,000 0.13 50,000 0.13 25,000
2007 1.20 200,000 0.61 35,000 0.13 50,000 0.06 25,000
2008 1.19 200,000 0.55 35,000 0.09 50,000 0.05 25,000
2009 1.44 200,000 0.61 35,000 0.11 50,000 0.05 25,000
2010 1.46 200,000 0.46 35,000 0.11 50,000 0.07 25,000
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in the 1988 to 2010 CPS 
waves.
Table C.3. Topcoded income data in the 1988-2010 CPS waves
Year
Main job income Oth. farm incomeOth. business incomeOth. labor income
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Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
Pct 
topcoded
Topcode 
threshold
1988 0.00 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.00 99,999
1989 0.02 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.01 99,999
1990 0.04 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.00 99,999
1991 0.02 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.00 99,999
1992 0.01 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.01 99,999
1993 0.02 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.01 99,999
1994 0.02 99,999 0.00 99,999 0.02 99,999
1995 0.01 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.02 99,999
1996 0.03 99,999 0.01 99,999 0.03 99,999
1997 0.03 99,999 0.02 99,999 0.02 99,999
1998 0.05 99,999 0.07 99,999 0.07 99,999
1999 0.21 35,000 0.59 15,000 0.23 25,000
2000 0.32 35,000 0.70 15,000 0.19 25,000
2001 0.24 35,000 0.59 15,000 0.19 25,000
2002 0.25 35,000 0.38 15,000 0.25 25,000
2003 0.23 25,000 0.23 15,000 0.15 40,000
2004 0.23 25,000 0.39 15,000 0.13 40,000
2005 0.36 25,000 0.43 15,000 0.16 40,000
2006 0.44 25,000 0.53 15,000 0.14 40,000
2007 0.60 25,000 0.51 15,000 0.17 40,000
2008 0.60 25,000 0.63 15,000 0.13 40,000
2009 0.40 25,000 0.40 15,000 0.17 40,000
2010 0.38 25,000 0.54 15,000 0.17 40,000
Notes: Sample includes respondents who are 18 to 65 years old and work full-time in 
the 1988 to 2010 CPS waves.
Table C.4. Topcoded income data in the 1988-2010 CPS waves continued
Year
Interest RentsDividends
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White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic
1983 89,485 87,647 96,915 92,340 87,647 NA 88,987 90,964 90,964 90,608 NA 90,964
1984 90,220 NA 92,530 88,528 NA NA 92,506 86,400 86,400 89,529 NA NA
1985 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
NA NA 99,999
a
NA 99,999
a
99,999
a
NA NA
1986 136,613 170,804 124,324 133,348 NA NA 136,144 108,836 NA 108,836 NA 108,836
1987 140,359 119,934 150,042 125,434 169,047 NA 130,751 -99,999 170,968 170,968 NA NA
Notes: NA indicates that there were not any topcoded respondents in a particular group.
a
Public topcode threshold is equivalent to internal threshold and thus no additional information about large incomes is available.
Business income
Male Female
Table C.5. Group mean imputation values for topcoded incomes in the 1983-1987 CPS waves
Year
Labor income
Male Female
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White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic
1983 82,381 NA NA NA NA NA 97,565 92,724
1984 83,154 NA NA NA NA NA 94,024 87,201
1985 99,999
a
NA NA NA NA NA 99,999
a
99,999
a
1986 NA NA NA NA NA NA 99,999
a
99,999
a
1987 122,398 NA NA NA NA NA 99,999
a
99,999
a
Notes: NA indicates that there were not any topcoded respondents in a particular group.
a
Public topcode threshold is equivalent to internal threshold and thus no additional information about large incomes 
is available.
Table C.6. Group mean imputation values for topcoded incomes in the 1983-1987 CPS waves continued
Year
Farm income
Male Female Interest Dividends/rents
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White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic
1988 148,852 136,582 159,300 151,838 153,098 153,098 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1989 143,204 138,971 154,412 152,647 137,250 137,250 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1990 153,067 159,309 153,072 143,812 124,782 124,782 99,999
a
NA NA NA NA NA
1991 151,763 144,161 135,010 153,090 132,453 132,230 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1992 142,991 133,707 136,560 131,061 121,099 NA 99,999
a
NA NA NA NA NA
1993 148,241 144,800 143,657 149,557 114,123 114,123 99,999
a
NA NA NA NA NA
1994 188,027 232,995 205,449 215,571 273,701 159,042 158,174 125,569 NA 125,569 NA NA
1995 187,347 180,854 179,894 191,029 160,143 212,792 207,148 109,775 109,775 109,775 NA NA
1996 302,539 464,782 257,390 283,525 NA 404,570 64,542 29,778 183,748 56,977 35,662 35,662
1997 318,982 391,163 384,160 357,884 454,816 454,816 45,749 62,044 62,044 48,635 257,102 62,044
1998 330,659 204,325 309,950 306,468 267,659 394,555 61,345 51,707 39,943 48,755 47,530 35,080
1999 306,731 266,303 419,044 402,204 492,657 367,181 59,925 51,139 52,678 35,583 34,826 36,826
2000 300,974 257,525 362,315 256,384 244,810 333,565 50,037 35,625 39,676 51,469 67,776 50,770
2001 329,998 277,959 345,181 318,370 247,864 469,588 55,436 63,610 41,197 44,451 35,358 36,064
2002 320,718 326,969 331,926 361,315 477,562 330,981 60,670 49,155 50,534 43,389 40,556 65,493
2003 390,823 443,501 562,913 480,607 336,975 595,494 91,360 60,724 49,866 55,255 48,548 57,290
2004 404,469 360,083 427,646 390,847 556,932 387,963 89,988 156,017 64,536 67,710 57,293 49,202
2005 422,850 471,917 421,411 474,404 713,263 366,935 77,282 60,016 57,768 63,911 53,189 60,586
2006 423,545 543,488 404,840 410,175 303,536 257,855 79,378 52,371 54,590 55,344 59,002 68,283
2007 437,528 579,599 619,221 423,652 615,203 438,937 74,091 53,197 56,306 61,472 45,266 240,674
2008 419,969 272,589 425,629 366,022 688,117 351,023 73,029 51,636 56,732 57,459 57,069 57,991
2009 389,599 553,087 436,465 407,720 383,596 397,063 72,946 62,071 57,838 59,069 70,577 64,367
2010 409,068 418,365 415,929 433,605 566,972 493,804 67,527 59,900 54,534 62,705 40,348 87,422
Notes: NA indicates that there were not any topcoded respondents in a particular group.
a
Public topcode threshold is equivalent to internal threshold and thus no additional information about large incomes is available.
Other labor income
Male Female
Table C.7. Group mean imputation values for topcoded incomes in the 1988-2010 CPS waves
Year
Main job income
Male Female
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White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic
1988 99,999
a
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1989 99,999
a
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1990 99,999
a
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1991 99,999
a
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1992 99,999
a
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1993 99,999
a
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1994 157,513 NA NA 157,513 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1995 305,001 NA 357,471 357,471 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1996 154,528 82,233 NA 64,058 NA NA 53,067 45,717 NA 45,717 NA NA
1997 128,477 152,709 152,709 152,709 NA 152,709 38,781 NA NA 38,781 NA NA
1998 101,769 NA 104,335 53,484 NA NA 90,170 NA NA 61,127 NA NA
1999 123,543 NA 103,545 52,835 NA NA 65,337 NA NA 44,558 NA NA
2000 119,583 NA 64,058 63,258 NA NA 87,162 NA 51,354 54,785 NA NA
2001 117,099 NA 55,231 55,231 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2002 127,597 108,083 79,683 56,934 49,520 49,520 NA NA NA NA NA NA
2003 141,605 149,560 149,560 75,880 NA NA 65,682 199,326 199,326 46,839 NA 199,326
2004 111,645 104,785 91,233 99,464 104,785 NA 67,545 37,503 50,171 40,178 37,503 NA
2005 160,832 164,370 164,370 90,574 NA 164,370 50,413 45,639 45,639 71,842 45,639 45,639
2006 186,628 76,650 76,650 80,515 76,650 76,650 208,516 43,931 141,398 51,655 43,931 43,931
2007 125,974 195,957 146,920 454,133 195,957 NA 145,701 48,679 48,679 43,376 NA 48,679
2008 93,400 93,014 93,014 93,014 93,014 93,014 43,286 NA 49,095 63,438 NA 49,095
2009 133,732 183,401 183,401 171,377 183,401 NA 62,368 NA 35,615 NA NA NA
2010 120,846 135,215 135,215 122,432 NA 135,215 61,670 59,646 NA 34,352 NA NA
Notes: NA indicates that there were not any topcoded respondents in a particular group.
a
Public topcode threshold is equivalent to internal threshold and thus no additional information about large incomes is available.
Other farm income
Male Female
Table C.8. Group mean imputation values for topcoded incomes in the 1988-2010 CPS waves continued
Year
Other business income
Male Female
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Year Interest` Dividends Rents
1988 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
1989 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
1990 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
1991 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
1992 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
1993 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
1994 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
1995 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
1996 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
1997 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
1998 99,999
a
99,999
a
99,999
a
1999 60,819 36,877 57,453
2000 63,005 36,962 55,220
2001 61,337 36,364 58,676
2002 64,854 38,962 57,417
2003 50,186 33,581 72,409
2004 51,372 39,987 74,636
2005 55,524 35,416 76,259
2006 54,984 37,508 76,212
2007 53,946 38,224 75,061
2008 52,619 33,651 70,556
2009 51,580 38,815 73,177
2010 55,289 40,100 71,580
Table C9. Group mean imputation values for topcoded 
incomes in the 1988-2010 CPS waves continued
a
Public topcode threshold is equivalent to internal 
threshold and thus no additional information about large 
incomes is available.
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APPENDIX D 
IP-weighted Local Linear Regression 
 
This appendix describes IP weighting and local linear regression with a series of 
simulation experiments. Consider first a simple example in which the goal is to estimate 
temporal trends in the mean of a metric outcome separately for two distinct groups without any 
compositional differences between them. The nonparametric regression function in this example 
can be written as 
  ( |     )    ( )                                                                                            (D.1) 
where  ( |     ) is the expectation of the outcome for group     at time  , and  ( ) is a 
group-specific function of time. The conventional local linear estimator for  ( ) is given by 
 ̂ ( )  ∑       
  
    ∑ (
 
  
)
(  ( )   ( )(     ))  (     )
  ( )  ( )   ( ) 
   
  
   .                                  (D.2) 
In this equation,     is the metric outcome for individual   in group  , and 
    (
 
  
)
(  ( )   ( )(     ))  (     )
  ( )  ( )   ( ) 
 is a local weight assigned to each respondent, where  
  ( )  ∑ (
 
  
) (     )
 
  (     )
  
    and   (     )  
 
 
 (
     
 
) represents a kernel 
function with bandwidth  . 
The asymptotic bias of ̂ ( ) is equal to  
    ( ̂ ( )   ( ))  
  
 
  
  ( ) ∫     ( )  .                                                          (D.3) 
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This expression indicates that the bias of the conventional local linear regression estimator 
depends on the size of the bandwidth, the curvature of the conditional expectation function, and 
the type of kernel. Specifically, smaller bandwidths and less curvature in the expectation 
function are associated with lower bias because as     or  
  ( )   ,     ( ̂ ( )   ( ))  
 . When the conditional expectation function is linear, and thus  
  ( )   , the local linear 
estimator is unbiased.  
The asymptotic variance of ̂ ( ) is given by  
   ( ̂ ( ))  
  ( )
   ( )
∫   ( )
   ,                                                                            (D.4) 
indicating that the precision of the estimator depends on the sample size, bandwidth, type of 
kernel, and the distribution of observations across time. Specifically, the variance decreases as 
the sample size, bandwidth, and density of observations at time   increase. Based on these 
expressions for the asymptotic bias and variance, the asymptotic mean squared error of ̂ ( ) is 
equal to  
    ( ̂ ( ))  
  ( )
   ( )
∫   ( )
    (
  
 
  
  ( ) ∫     ( )  )
 
.                        (D.5) 
This reveals a clear bias-variance tradeoff associated with the size of the bandwidth: narrow 
bandwidths reduce bias but increase variance, and wide bandwidths reduce variance but increase 
bias. In general, narrow bandwidths are expected to perform best when the group-specific time 
trends are highly nonlinear, while wider bandwidths are better suited for conditional expectation 
functions that are characterized by more moderate deviations from linearity. 
Now suppose that, rather than being comparable in terms of other covariates, the two 
groups of interest in this example differ on one or more factors that also affect the outcome. In 
this situation, the group-specific trends estimated from Equation D.2 are confounded by 
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compositional differences between groups. There are several approaches to adjusting trend 
estimates for this type of confounding. First, one could condition on the covariates,    in a 
parametric model for  ( |         ), but correctly specifying this model may be difficult 
if its functional form is unknown or highly nonlinear. The conditional expectation 
 ( |         ) could also be estimated nonparametrically using multivariate local linear 
regression and a higher-order kernel, but with many covariates, this approach suffers from the 
so-called “curse of dimensionality,” meaning that the variance of this estimator rapidly increases 
with the dimension of  . Even with a large sample and just a few covariates, multivariate local 
linear regression can perform quite poorly. 
IP-weighting provides an alternative semi-parametric approach to adjusting group-
specific time trends for confounding that attenuates some of the problems associated with 
parametric multivariate regression and fully nonparametric multivariate methods. With this 
approach, information about compositional differences between the groups of interest on a 
potentially high-dimensional set of covariates is reduced to a single dimension—the conditional 
probability of group membership given the covariates—and a simple transformation of this 
probability yields a set of weights that balance the distribution of covariates across groups. 
Conventional local linear regression is then applied to the weighted observations to estimate 
unconfounded group-specific time trends. Specifically, this approach estimates the following 
double expectation function:   ( ( |         ))    ( ), which is the expectation of the 
outcome conditional on group membership, covariates, and time, averaged across the covariates. 
The IP-weighted local linear regression estimator for this function can be expressed as  
 ̂ ( )  ∑    
    
  
    ∑ (
   
∑    
  
   
)
(  
 ( )   
 ( )(     ))  (     )
  
 ( )  
 ( )   
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where     is the IP weight equal to
 (   |  )
 (   |       )
,   
 ( ) is equal to ∑ (
   
∑    
  
   
) (    
  
   
 )
 
  (     ), and   (     ) is defined as previously. The weight     varies around 1 based 
on the degree to which covariates impact the probability of group membership. It gives greater 
weight to individuals who are less likely to be members of their observed group given their 
covariate values, and it gives less weight to individuals who are more likely to be a member of 
their observed group. This estimator is considered semi-parametric in the sense that the weights 
are in practice typically estimated from a parametric model, but this need not be the case, as fully 
nonparametric methods could also be used to estimate the weights. In the next section, I 
demonstrate how the IP-weighted local linear estimator works in several different simulated data 
examples, and then I investigate the small and large sample properties of this estimator with a 
series of simulation experiments. 
Table D.1 summarizes the distribution of a binary covariate by group membership and 
time from fifty thousand simulated observations. The exact data generating model is documented 
in the footnotes to the table (as is the case for all subsequent simulations). In this example, 
selection into different groups based on the binary covariate is invariant over time, and at each 
time point, this covariate is highly imbalanced across the groups of interest. The second set of 
columns in Table D.1 illustrates the impact of weighting by the inverse probability of group 
membership, revealing covariate balance across groups at each time point in the weighted 
sample. 
Figure D.1 presents unadjusted and IP-weighted local linear regression estimates for a 
simulated outcome based on the group and covariate data from Table D.1. The outcome variable 
is generated from a model with a highly nonlinear time trend. There are no differences in this 
trend between groups conditional on the binary covariate, which has time-invariant effects on 
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both the probability of group membership and the outcome. Because the binary covariate is 
imbalanced across groups and has a time-invariant effect on the outcome, unadjusted estimates 
show a similar temporal trend for each group, but the trend lines are shifted upward and 
downward by a constant amount. The IP-weighted estimates, by contrast, closely approximate 
the true expectation function that both groups share conditional on the confounding covariate. 
Figure D.2 presents local linear regression estimates from simulated data where, as in the 
previous example, the outcome follows a highly nonlinear trend among both groups conditional 
on the binary covariate, and the binary covariate has a time-invariant effect on the probability 
group membership. Unlike the previous example, however, the binary covariate has time-
dependent effects on the outcome, with its impact increasing in magnitude over time. For this 
example, unadjusted local linear estimates show highly divergent temporal trends between 
groups. The IP-weighted estimates, on the other hand, show both groups following the same 
nonlinear trend over time and closely approximate the true conditional expectation function 
averaged across levels of the binary covariate. 
Table D.2 and Figure D.3 present results from a final simulated example in which the 
outcome follows a highly nonlinear trend, and the two groups of interest follow the same trend 
conditional on a confounding binary covariate. The binary covariate in this example has a time-
invariant effect on the outcome and time-dependent effects on the probability of group 
membership such that compositional differences between groups on this covariate become more 
pronounced over time. The descriptive statistics in Table D.2 summarize this pattern of growing 
covariate imbalance over time and show that IP weighting balances the covariate distribution 
across groups at each time point. Figure D.3 plots unadjusted local linear estimates, which show 
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divergent trends in the outcome between groups, and IP-weighted local linear estimates, which 
recover the time trend shared by both groups conditional on the binary covariate. 
The simulated examples discussed here demonstrate the various confounding processes 
that can lead to divergent group-specific trend estimates with conventional local linear 
regression. In empirical research on class differences in income over time, all of these 
confounding processes are likely operating simultaneously with multiple covariates. For 
example, the effects of both education and gender on income are changing over time as are their 
effects on class attainment. The simulated examples discussed previously show that IP-weighted 
local linear regression is capable of adjusting for all of these confounding processes. 
Table D.3 and Table D.4 describe the small and large sample properties of the IP-
weighted local linear regression estimator based on the results of several simulation experiments 
with one thousand replications. The first simulation, summarized in the upper panels of Table 
D.3 and Table D.4, involves a highly nonlinear trend with a conditionally normal and 
homoscedastic outcome. The second simulation, summarized in the middle panels of Table D.3 
and Table D.4, involves only a moderate degree of trend nonlinearity with a conditionally normal 
and homoscedastic outcome. The last simulation, presented in the lower panels of Table D.3 and 
Table D.4, is designed to approximate the income models considered in the empirical analysis. It 
involves a moderately nonlinear temporal trend with a highly skewed and heteroscedastic 
outcome. 
In each of these simulations, the IP-weighted local linear regression estimator performs 
as expected. The bootstrap standard error provides a good approximation for the true standard 
deviation of IP-weighted estimates. Bias is more severe at a point on the expectation function 
with a high degree of curvature, compared with a point where the expectation function is roughly 
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linear, and it increases with the size of the bandwidth. Shapiro-Wilk tests applied to the 
simulated sampling distributions suggest that estimates based on conditionally normal data are 
themselves normally distributed. For small sample estimates based on highly skewed lognormal 
data, these tests frequently reject the null of a normal sampling distribution. Graphical inspection 
of these distributions, however, indicates that they are nevertheless very close to normal. In 
simulations where temporal change in the outcome is only moderately nonlinear, bias with both 
the narrow and standard bandwidths is close to zero, and 95 percent bootstrap confidence 
intervals that assume a normal sampling distribution cover the true conditional expectation with 
equivalent probability. Overall, for moderately nonlinear functions, the IP-weighted local linear 
regression estimator performs quite well regardless of bandwidth size, and for highly nonlinear 
functions, the IP-weighted estimator performs better with a narrow bandwidth. 
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Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
1.00-1.49 0.29 0.73 0.50 0.51
1.50-2.49 0.31 0.72 0.53 0.51
2.50-3.49 0.31 0.70 0.52 0.49
3.50-4.49 0.27 0.70 0.47 0.50
4.50-5.49 0.28 0.70 0.48 0.49
5.50-6.49 0.29 0.69 0.49 0.49
6.50-7.49 0.30 0.69 0.51 0.49
7.50-8.49 0.29 0.69 0.49 0.49
8.50-9.49 0.29 0.71 0.49 0.50
9.50-10.49 0.31 0.71 0.52 0.51
10.50-11.49 0.29 0.70 0.48 0.49
11.50-12.49 0.29 0.70 0.49 0.50
12.50-13.49 0.31 0.69 0.51 0.49
13.50-14.49 0.28 0.69 0.47 0.49
14.50-15.49 0.30 0.71 0.49 0.50
15.50-16.49 0.30 0.68 0.50 0.48
16.50-17.49 0.29 0.71 0.48 0.51
17.50-18.49 0.31 0.72 0.52 0.51
18.50-19.49 0.31 0.70 0.51 0.50
19.50-20.00 0.27 0.74 0.45 0.53
a
50,000 observations simulated from the following data generating model: 
time ~ uniform(1,20), covariate ~ binomial(1,0.5), group ~ binomial(1,0.3 
+ 0.4*covariate)
Table D.1. Weighted and unweighted covariate distribution by group in 
simulated data example with time-invariant selection process
a
Time
Unweighted IP-weighted
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Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
1.00-1.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.46
1.50-2.49 0.48 0.54 0.50 0.50
2.50-3.49 0.49 0.56 0.51 0.51
3.50-4.49 0.49 0.56 0.52 0.50
4.50-5.49 0.45 0.57 0.48 0.50
5.50-6.49 0.44 0.61 0.49 0.52
6.50-7.49 0.44 0.61 0.49 0.51
7.50-8.49 0.43 0.58 0.50 0.48
8.50-9.49 0.45 0.63 0.53 0.51
9.50-10.49 0.42 0.62 0.50 0.50
10.50-11.49 0.43 0.65 0.53 0.51
11.50-12.49 0.41 0.64 0.51 0.50
12.50-13.49 0.38 0.65 0.49 0.50
13.50-14.49 0.36 0.68 0.48 0.52
14.50-15.49 0.34 0.64 0.47 0.48
15.50-16.49 0.36 0.66 0.50 0.49
16.50-17.49 0.35 0.67 0.51 0.49
17.50-18.49 0.35 0.71 0.53 0.52
18.50-19.49 0.30 0.71 0.48 0.51
19.50-20.00 0.31 0.68 0.52 0.49
a
50,000 observations simulated from the following data generating model: 
time ~ uniform(1,20), covariate ~ binomial(1,0.5), group ~ binomial(1,0.3 
+ 0.02*covariate*time)
Table D.2. Weighted and unweighted covariate distribution by group in 
simulated data example with time-dependent selection process
a
Time
Unweighted IP-weighted
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Simulation description Mean SD Mean BSE Linear bias
Curvature 
bias
RMISE
95% CI 
coverage
Distn shape
Normal outcome w/ highly nonlinear
temporal change
a
Narrow bandwidth 3316 3267 -951 -2292 4172 0.89 normal
Standard bandwidth 2455 2452 -2026 -5459 4701 0.59 normal
Wide bandwidth 1905 1909 -2462 -7007 5123 0.40 normal
Normal outcome w/ moderately
nonlinear temporal change
b
Narrow bandwidth 3381 3339 -77 -168 3689 0.94 normal
Standard bandwidth 2423 2429 -330 -406 2690 0.95 normal
Wide bandwidth 1840 1851 -672 -1460 2308 0.88 normal
Lognormal outcome w/ moderately
nonlinear temporal change
c
Narrow bandwidth 5755 5570 -443 -535 5993 0.93 aprx norm
Standard bandwidth 4197 4130 -582 -543 4413 0.94 aprx norm
Wide bandwidth 3255 3246 -809 -1476 3581 0.92 aprx norm
Table D.3. Small sample (n=500) properties of IP-weighted local linear estimator in three simulation experiments
Notes: Narrow, standard, and wide bandwiths respectively equal 0.5, 1, and 2 times h=1.06*sd(x)*(n^(-1/5)). Linear bias 
refers to bias at a point where the regression function is roughly linear, and curvature bias refers to bias at a point where the 
regression function is highly nonlinear. RMISE denotes root mean integrated squared error of the estimator.
a
Data generating model: time ~ uniform(1,20), covariate ~ binomial(1,0.5), group ~ binomial(1,0.3 + 0.02*covariate*time), 
outcome ~ normal(40000 + 7000*cos(time) + group*(0 + 0*g(time)) covariate*(0 + 3000*time),10000)
b
Data generating model: time ~ uniform(1,20), covariate ~ binomial(1,0.5), group ~ binomial(1,0.3 + 0.02*covariate*time), 
outcome ~ normal(40000 + 1000*time  - 100*time^2 + group*(0 + 0*time + 0*time^2) + covariate*(10000 + 3000*time - 
50*time^2),10000)
c
Data generating model: time ~ uniform(1,20), covariate ~ binomial(1,0.5), group ~ binomial(1,0.3 + 0.02*covariate*time), 
outcome ~ covar*(10000+5000*time-125*time^2) + lognormal(10.6 + 0.015*time - 0.0015*time^2 + group*(0 + 0*time + 
0*time^2),0.5)
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Simulation description Mean SD Mean BSE Linear bias
Curvature 
bias
RMISE
95% CI 
coverage
Distn shape
Normal outcome w/ highly nonlinear
temporal change
a
Narrow bandwidth 1265 1258 -441 -1058 1633 0.88 normal
Standard bandwidth 917 917 -1260 -3322 2588 0.39 normal
Wide bandwidth 695 698 -2347 -6312 4338 0.19 normal
Normal outcome w/ moderately
nonlinear temporal change
b
Narrow bandwidth 1349 1337 -73 -115 1435 0.95 normal
Standard bandwidth 960 956 -211 -223 1047 0.95 normal
Wide bandwidth 699 699 -544 -755 961 0.83 normal
Lognormal outcome w/ moderately
nonlinear temporal change
c
Narrow bandwidth 2220 2194 -81 -139 2288 0.95 normal
Standard bandwidth 1598 1590 -248 -226 1668 0.95 normal
Wide bandwidth 1188 1187 -604 -725 1371 0.91 normal
Table D.4. Large sample (n=5000) properties of IP-weighted local linear estimator in three simulation experiments
Notes: Narrow, standard, and wide bandwiths respectively equal 0.5, 1, and 2 times h=1.06*sd(x)*(n^(-1/5)). Linear bias 
refers to bias at a point where the regression function is roughly linear, and curvature bias refers to bias at a point where the 
regression function is highly nonlinear. RMISE denotes root mean integrated squared error of the estimator.
a
Data generating model: time ~ uniform(1,20), covariate ~ binomial(1,0.5), group ~ binomial(1,0.3 + 0.02*covariate*time), 
outcome ~ normal(40000 + 7000*cos(time) + group*(0 + 0*g(time)) covariate*(0 + 3000*time),10000)
b
Data generating model: time ~ uniform(1,20), covariate ~ binomial(1,0.5), group ~ binomial(1,0.3 + 0.02*covariate*time), 
outcome ~ normal(40000 + 1000*time  - 100*time^2 + group*(0 + 0*time + 0*time^2) + covariate*(10000 + 3000*time - 
50*time^2),10000)
c
Data generating model: time ~ uniform(1,20), covariate ~ binomial(1,0.5), group ~ binomial(1,0.3 + 0.02*covariate*time), 
outcome ~ covar*(10000+5000*time-125*time^2) + lognormal(10.6 + 0.015*time - 0.0015*time^2 + group*(0 + 0*time + 
0*time^2),0.5)
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Figure D.1. Unadjusted and IP-weighted local linear estimates based on simulated data with time-invariant 
group selection and time-invariant covariate effects on outcomea
Group 1 estimates
Group 2 estimates
True mean function
aData generating model: time ~ uniform(1,20), covariate ~ binomial(1,0.5), group ~ binomial(1,0.3 + 
0.4*covariate), outcome ~ normal(40000 + 7000*cos(time) + group*(0 + 0*g(time)) covariate*(40000 + 
0*g(time)),10000)
95% CIs
Point est.
Unadjusted
IP-weighted
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Figure D.2. Unadjusted and IP-weighted local linear estimates based on simulated data with time-invariant 
group selection and time-dependent covariate effects on outcomea
Group 1 estimates
Group 2 estimates
True mean function
aData generating model: time ~ uniform(1,20), covariate ~ binomial(1,0.5), group ~ binomial(1,0.3 + 
0.4*covariate), outcome ~ normal(40000 + 7000*cos(time) + group*(0 + 0*g(time)) covariate*(0 + 
3000*time),10000)
95% CIs
Point est.
Unadjusted
IP-weighted
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Figure D.3. Unadjusted and IP-weighted local linear estimates based on simulated data with time-dependent 
group selection and time-invariant covariate effects on outcomea
Group 1 estimates
Group 2 estimates
True mean function
aData generating model: time ~ uniform(1,20), covariate ~ binomial(1,0.5), group ~ binomial(1,0.3 + 
0.02*covariate*time), outcome ~ normal(40000 + 7000*cos(time) + group*(0 + 0*g(time)) covariate*(40000 
+ 0*g(time)),10000)
95% CIs
Point est.
Unadjusted
IP-weighted
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